Integration Challenges and Opportunities in Divided Countries

A Comparative Analysis of Germany and South Korea

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1 Introduction

Can citizens of divided countries be successfully integrated? This research project focuses on the integration challenges and opportunities inherent in reunifying divided nations by examining the German reunification experience and the ongoing integration of migrants from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) into the South Korean society. The objective is to inform future planning for unification in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and contribute to the overall stability of the Northeast Asian region. It also seeks to shine light on some underappreciated aspects of Germany's unification experience and show what lessons can be drawn from it for the Korean case.

The research project focuses on South Korea in particular as it considers the challenges and opportunities presented by the potential future unification of the Korean Peninsula. Given the historical and geopolitical significance of Korea's division, the study aims to produce insights that are academically compelling and practically valuable for planning future unification strategies. By examining the integration of North Korean defectors into South Korean society, the project seeks to provide a foundational understanding of the mechanisms that could be at play in a post-unification Korea. Therefore, while the study adopts a comparative perspective that includes Germany's experience with reunification and integration of new citizens, the primary focus remains Korea and its short- as well as long-term challenges related to integration and unification.

The potential future unification of Korea has been expected, hoped for, or dreaded by a considerable number of people worldwide and within East Asia since the postwar period. Initially attempted through war, discussions between the two Koreas aimed at peaceful integration and unification of their divided country have been pursued since the 1970s. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the near concurrent crisis of North Korea's state socialist economy, there were expectations, hopes and fears of an impending North Korean state collapse, too. However, while this has yet to occur, a transformation of North Korea from its current status as a poor, single-party autocracy remains a possibility, as does the eventual unification of Korea, and the creation of a liberal democratic unified state.

The reunification of Germany in 1990 and subsequent creation of a cohesive national fabric with former citizens of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany) alongside the ongoing efforts to integrate North Korean defectors into South Korean society provide crucial case studies for those interested in the study of divided societies, countries, and also migration integration. These experiences offer valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities that arise when two distinct societies with different political, economic, and social systems are brought together.

The question of how successfully Germans from the former GDR were included into a unified Germany depends on one's perspective, criteria, and expectations. Nevertheless, Germany was reunified, and by most measures of subjective perceptions (Gramlich, 2019a)

and objective indicators (Gramlich, 2019b), the unification has been fairly successful even if there is evidence of persistent social (Brosig-Koch et al., 2011) and economic divides (Rensmann, 2019). Using the opinions and attitudes of citizens of former communist states — 'post-communist citizens' in the literature — or citizens from post-communist jurisdictions as a benchmark, we examine the state of North Korean migrant integration compared to that of Germany's integration of East and West Germany.

Ultimately, we seek to apply the insights from the German experience to the South Korean context to identify effective strategies for managing complex integration processes on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. Guided by political science, psychology, and area studies literature, our broader framing and empirical approach explores migrants' political attitudes, values, social discrimination, and identification with their respective societies. This study seeks to determine whether or where attitudes and values converge or diverge and then explores the reasons why. To generate new data insights, we employ observational and experimental survey questionnaires with the populations in Germany and South Korea, including North Korean migrants.

By identifying effective strategies for managing the complex integration process in a potential future unification scenario on the Korean Peninsula, the study aims to facilitate the pursuit of a more peaceful future. The research findings can inform policies that promote social cohesion, tolerance, and empathy within the South Korean society today, ultimately fostering a more inclusive environment for North Korean defectors and other minority groups. Finally, this research will enhance public diplomacy efforts by providing a Central European perspective on promoting stability in Northeast Asia.

Due to the constraints of scope and resources, an exhaustive investigation of all facets of social integration is not viable. Instead, this research focuses on three dimensions of public attitudes among relevant groups from Korea and Germany. We provide more detail in sections to follow, but a high-level overview is as follows:

I. **Political Attitudes.** The first dimension of our integration metric revolves around political attitudes regarding political, social, and economic order. We employ an experimental design that assesses preferences by asking respondents to appraise the political stances of fictitious 'emerging politicians'. This strategy is especially pertinent to our emphasis on transitions from socialist or authoritarian governance to democratic institutions. It explores the shifts in political outlooks among citizens as they adapt to new types of governance and varying ideals of institutional order. In our conceptual framework, convergence of attitudes between intra-country groups would signify integration, while divergence would suggest integration challenges.
II. **Social Discrimination.** The second dimension examines social discrimination or the lack thereof against members of the former national 'other' (German attitudes towards former citizens from former East Germany and South Korean attitudes toward Koreans of North Korean origin). We administer a discrimination experiment using a simulated job training program to measure preferences for redistribution. Respondents are asked to prioritize candidates for inclusion, acting as if they were public servants.
III. **Subjective Integration.** The final dimension focuses on the concept of subjective integration. This idea incorporates a measurement of national belonging, using 'national pride' measures, and preferences for national membership and belonging measured using another experimental design that explores what people think makes someone 'truly [a national]'. Similar to the first dimension, the objective is to discern variations in attitudes and preferences across distinct sub-national groups—specifically between North and South Koreans and diverse groups within Germany.

Moving forward, we offer a brief introduction to the literature that we build upon and also consider conceptual issues related to divided nations/countries versus divided societies and territories in order to situate our question and research concerns more broadly.

1.1 Unification and Integration in Divided Societies

Since the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the third wave of democratization, and the unification of Germany, there has been considerable interest in how the socialist experience has affected publics across the former communist world. Integration of citizens who have lived under communism was a pressing real-world concern, helping to support the spread of democracy and an open social and economic order.

Part of the interest in questions related to post-socialism involved integrating societies separated by political, social, and economic differences — like Germany. This presents significant challenges that require decades to overcome. The reunification of Germany in 1990 and the ongoing assimilation of North Korean defector-migrants (hereafter, migrants) into South Korea as new citizens offer valuable insights into the complexities of domestic integration in divided nations and the issues with migrant integration generally.

Despite their differences, both unified Germany and South Korea have navigated the inclusion of citizens, who once lived in different socialist societies, into their own. Living under a communist political system has long-term implications for one's political attitudes (Becker et al., 2020; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2017), which in turn fosters distinct cultural, political, and social identities among North and South Koreans, as well as among East and West Germans.

The reunification of Germany following the fall of the Berlin Wall involved substantial economic, political, and social challenges. Integration proved complicated due to considerable disparities in political systems, economic structures, and social values between the two societies (Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Campa & Serafinelli, 2019; Lippmann et al., 2020). One was a democracy, the other a one-party dictatorship; one upheld an economic and social system rooted in market competition, while the other operated under a system of administrative command. Although substantial progress has been made in economic and social integration (Gramlich, 2019a; 2019b), differences in social behavior (Brosig-Koch et al., 2011), levels of social trust (Heineck & Süssmuth, 2013), and lack of satisfaction with democracy (Pickel & Pickel, 2023) persist between today's eastern and western areas of Germany.

Similarly, the integration of North Korean migrants into South Korea is complex and challenging, marked by significant obstacles. Research on the (South) Korean experience reveals that despite shared ethnicity and history, North Korean migrants face considerable cultural and linguistic barriers. These barriers, as well as minor differences like the speech with Northern accents, contribute to further "othering" of North Koreans (Korea Hana Foundation, 2017; 2020). In schools, North Korean migrants' children are often confronted with negative stereotypes and discrimination as "out-group" members (Kim, 2016). Qualitative studies suggest that migrants also face everyday discrimination due to their identity (Kim & Jang, 2007; Youm & Kim, 2011), although a majority of South Koreans consider North Korean migrants as part of their national community (Yoon, 2021).

On the other hand, literature suggests that individuals from the same ethnic or national background are seen as a normatively more desired group. In the case of North Korean migrants in South Korea, there is an assumption that they would receive support and acceptance from their fellow Koreans due to their shared ethnic identity (Denney et al., 2022; Rich et al., 2021). A shared Korean national and ethnic identity, respectively the personal identification with it, is a promoting factor in the successful integration of North Korean migrants, as it stimulates socially desirable behaviors and attitudes, including confidence in the South

Korean way of life (Cho, 2022). However, the reality is often different, as many North Korean migrants face discrimination and challenges in their integration process. The contradiction between co-ethnic communitarianism expectations and the discrimination experienced by North Korean migrants highlights a significant gap in our understanding of co-ethnic migrant integration in South Korea, with broader implications for Korean unification and divided societies in general.

The persisting discrimination takes a toll on migrants' mental health beyond obstructing a successful integration process (Kim, 2016). While facing similar issues post-reunification, the German case reveals the effect of convergence in attitudes over time (Svallfors, 2010), thus implying a juxtaposition of the stickiness of attitudes and their changes while adapting to a reunified society. Nevertheless, aside from political regime-based factors of shaping attitudes, demographic variables such as age impact socialization processes (Hu, 2022; Lee et al., 2021).

We consider these and other issues in more detail in a dedicated literature review section that follows this introduction. Next, we discuss the concept of divided societies.

1.2 Korean Division in Comparative Perspective

All communities are the product of humanity's social imagination, and nations are no different. No country's borders, culture, linguistic mix, or social structure is a necessary fact of nature. Ultimately nations are imagined communities and are arguably a modern construction (Anderson, 2006; Gellner, 1983), but they may have more distant origins and a premodern reality (Smith, 1996; 2010).

The world's borders are arbitrary and in many parts of the world, the product of colonialism or the aftermath of internecine conflict. Consequently, not all states have a sense of shared identity, nor do all divisions of otherwise contiguous territories represent divisions of actual nations and ethnic groups. Borneo, one of the world's largest islands, is divided between three states (Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia), and there has been no active movement to 'reunify' it since the 1960s. Similarly, there are multiple islands inside and outside Europe divided between European states that are peacefully divided. Usedom and Saint Martins are two representative examples.

Some countries, once unified, have been divided, often due to civil war and/or imposition by outside powers. The Korean Peninsula is one of a few places that saw division in the aftermath of World War II and the start of the decolonization period. Alongside Germany, Vietnam was divided until 1976 and Yemen until 1990, even though it was never historically united. On the other hand, the island of Ireland has been divided since Irish independence in 1921, China and Taiwan have been divided since 1949, Cyprus has been divided since the mid-1970s, and the island of Papua has an ongoing conflict (in West Papua) aimed at independence from Indonesia and eventual unification with Papua New Guinea. Arguably, Palestine is also a divided society, with Gaza and the West Bank ruled by rival governments who do not recognize one another but both lay claim to each other's territory, and a divided country being recognized by much of the international community as a national political entity distinct from its neighbors (Nasser, 2005).

The examples provided here are but a few, and while it is not our intention to examine these cases in any depth, they nevertheless constitute examples of different divided countries and societies. Such cases serve to underline the broader relevance of studying the Korean case, both for its own sake and for understanding the kinds of issues that other divided societies may face as and when they (re-)unify.

Divided countries represent a specific type of socio-political configuration, distinct from the concept of divided societies. Across the globe, numerous national and ethnic collectives exist without sovereign statehood — such as the Scots within the United Kingdom, Kurds across Turkey and Iraq, indigenous communities in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as the Basques and Catalans in Spain, among others in Latin America and Africa. These groups, although split by international borders, maintain a continuous cultural and linguistic identity, forming what can be described as divided societies. However, they do not constitute divided countries because they do not possess state recognition by the international community, neither de facto nor de jure. Likewise, geographically contiguous islands with political divisions are not automatically classified as divided countries because their separation does not necessarily indicate a historical or current unity as a single political unit.

Hence, a divided country, as it is conceptualized in this report, comprises two or more nation-states that view each other (or rather groups within each view the other), either fully or partially, as integral parts of their own nation and country. These states do not merely regard each other as separate countries but envision eventual unification into a larger national community and a single unified state. The history of Europe is replete with such examples, including the unification of the United Kingdom, the many states that made up modern Germany who were unified under Prussian leadership in 1871. The same applies to Italy, and arguably Poland after the Second World War. And the world continues to see irredentist movements in many countries with similar aims, like Russia in (Eastern) Ukraine and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh. War or armed conflict is not necessary for the unification of divided countries, but these examples point to the role that violence may play in such a process and has in the past.

A divided country often shares conceptual similarities with a partitioned society and, to a lesser extent, a partitioned territory. Partitioning can occur due to ethnic or religious divisions between different groups (Tir, 2002). For example, India experienced partition due to conflicts between Muslim and Hindu communities (Bharadwaj et al., 2009). Cyprus was also partitioned as a result of conflict between Turkish and Greek-speaking parts (Kaufmann, 2007). Palestine was initially partitioned between Muslim and Jewish communities before the outbreak of the first Arab-Israeli War (Nassar, 2005). Similarly, the division of Ireland into north and south was indeed influenced by religious and ethnic issues (Levin, 2004). While Korea and Germany can also be seen as partitioned countries, their division was not due to religious or ethnic conflicts.

The term partition is useful because it has an identity under international law. Partitioning of territories and even countries is not novel to the 20th century, and it has a long history of associations with imperialism, too (Kattan, 2022). However, while the term may capture the origins of Korea's division, and sometimes the emergence of other divided countries, it does not capture the continued nature of this division. Pakistan and India do not constitute a divided country, whereas Korea clearly does. Hence, while we note the concept of partition and its usefulness in capturing what happened to the country of Korea and the geographical entity of the Korean Peninsula in 1945, we prefer the term 'division' and 'divided country'.

Historically, Korea had been a unified, peninsula-wide political entity since at least the unification of the country by the Kingdom of Silla in 668 AD. The Silla unification indeed marks a seminal moment, even if it does not necessarily denote the inception of a cohesive or modern Korean identity. The emergence of national consciousness centered on a belief in a common ethnic identity is a much later development, probably dating to the late 19th and early 20th century (Schmid, 2002). It is perceived in contemporary terms as largely a product of modern encounters, significantly shaped by the crucible of colonial modernity

and the post-war bifurcation into the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) (Huh, 2009).

However, it is important to recognize that a distinct elite-level identity, which regarded the Korean country as a separate and sovereign entity apart from its neighbors, was present and had a substantial influence on the region's social evolution long before the modern conception of national identity took form (Breuker, 2010; Westad, 2021). Hence, speaking of a shared peninsula-wide identity with a common culture is common and relatively uncontroversial. A shared identity of some sort and extent has existed for much of the past millennium. The unification of Germany, by comparison, only occurred in the late 19th century, and a country like Yemen was not historically a unified polity.[1]

The Korean Peninsula was divided in 1945 between Soviet and US occupation zones as a result of Soviet entry into the Pacific war (Choe, 2020; Jager, 2013). The division resulted in a highly artificial border that divided an otherwise integrated society and country. Indeed, what makes the continued divided status of Korea so tragic and notable is the arbitrariness of the dividing line at the 38th parallel, the number of people affected, and the hardness of the border (the present-day Demilitarized Zone, or DMZ). In many other divided countries that continue to exist, including Cyprus, Ireland and China-Taiwan, restrictions on travel do not imply being unable to see family (Cyprus) or are largely or completely absent (China, Ireland). Whereas the borders of the two Koreas remain hard, and the vast majority of North Koreans are unable to travel.

The hardness of the borders between the two Koreas is notable, especially when compared to Germany, the other major case of a divided country during the Cold War. Following the Korean War, it was nearly impossible to cross the border between the two countries, and by the time of German unification in 1990, only 607 North Koreans had managed to cross to the South since the end of the Korean War in 1953 (KBS, 2010). This is in stark contrast to Germany, where over 3 million managed to move from East Germany to West before the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 (Ross, 2002), and a further 616,000+ who left via official permits, indirectly, through escapes, or by random circumstance (Jarausch, 1994, p. 17). For context, East Germany's population was 16.6 million in 1990 (Conrad et al., 1996, p. 332).

Furthermore, the media environment for East Germans was rather different from what we see in North Korea today. Put simply, despite the hardline views of the East German government with respect to economic and social life, there was a substantially greater degree of information freedom. The consumption of West German TV and radio was legal and tolerated from the early 1970s onwards (Crabtree et al., 2015; Kern, 2011; Piotrowska, 2020; Frank 2014). In the GDR, the government did indeed impose a strict regime that sought to control economic, social life, and the flow of information, utilizing the secret police (the Stasi) to monitor and suppress dissent. However, the reception of West German broadcasts was a complex issue. Officially, the East German government did not permit the consumption of Western media, which it deemed as imperialist and counter-revolutionary propaganda. Nevertheless, it became common for East Germans to watch and listen to West German broadcasts, particularly as the GDR authorities found it practically impossible to prevent signal spillover from the West.

Moreover, subsequent investigations of the Stasi archives and data on TV reception point to how access to West German media made Stasi operations more difficult and also had a

[1] Regarding national identity, not simply statehood, the period starts early, certainly. The occupation of German territories by Napoleon, coupled with the intentional dismantling of feudal structures and the introduction of a new statehood model by the French, marked a transformative period. This phase, beginning around 1806, catalyzed the emergence of a distinct German national consciousness, particularly among the elite and middle classes. This period's significance lies in its role as a precursor to the later unification efforts and the shaping of a modern German identity, distinct from its feudal past and influenced by external political forces.

socializing effect. East Germans with access to West German media were subsequently less likely to support radical left or right-wing parties in elections (Friehe et al., 2020) and exhibit considerably lower levels of xenophobia (Hornuf et al., 2023).

By comparison, North Koreans face a dauntingly closed and repressive situation, with a large number of North Korean migrants reporting that they rarely or never encountered South Korean culture before coming South (Kim et al., 2022). Surveys examining illicit media consumption preferences imply that generalized social trust does not exist in North Korea, and people largely rely on family and friends when seeking out illicit foreign content (Ward & Denney, 2023). This is not surprising given that all non-state content is legally suspect (or per se illegal). Consumption of unauthorized foreign content is now subject to explicit legal sanctions up to the death penalty in case of widespread dissemination under the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Exclusion Act (Daily NK, 2023).

North Koreans' isolation creates a stark cultural gap between them and their Southern compatriots. This isolation is far from as total as it once was in the Kim Il Sung era (1945–1994, especially post-1953), but the 'leakage' of information into the country via smuggled USBs, memory cards, and radio broadcasts is significantly lower compared to the level of information available to East Germans during the Cold War.

This cultural gap or divide between the open, culturally increasingly cosmopolitan South and isolated North is reinforced further by the vast economic and social differences between the two Koreas. South Korea is one of the world's richest societies, a major economic power, while North Korea continues to pursue a heavily militarized, autarkic form of state socialism that trades off food security and economic prosperity for defense capabilities. Socially, South Korea may be unequal, and more unequal than some capitalist societies in northern Europe, but social mobility and a labor market that gives its citizens freedom of association are luxuries that North Koreans generally do not have. The North Korean social order is characterized by state domination. Under such conditions, civil society is all but nonexistent, and jobs are allocated by the state — with illicit black markets being the primary means by which people evade state-controlled labor allocation institutions (Schwekendiek & Xu, 2020).

The interaction between the restrictive informational and social environment in North Korea and the country's systemic impoverishment compounds the difficulties that would be encountered in any effort to integrate the two Korean societies. In essence, the authoritarian political structure and draconian legal codes in North Korea have not only isolated its citizens from global cultural norms but have also engendered a form of social atomization (Ward & Denney, 2022). This socio-political landscape, coupled with the stark economic and social contrasts between the two nations, forms a formidable barrier to the successful integration of North Korean defectors into South Korean society, let alone the broader prospect of national reunification.

Given this context, manifold issues of integration, discrimination, and national belonging present an intricate challenge that would likely be exacerbated in the event of a unified Korean state. These are issues, however, that Germany has had to wrestle with over the past three decades and counting. East Germany, despite being less repressive, more open, and economically advanced, remained far less developed and prosperous in comparison to West Germany. No doubt its people had great expectations for a unified future, and some were left bitterly disappointed by what transpired (Hellmann et al., 2020; Redding & Sturm, 2008; Weisskircher, 2020). Seeking a theoretical and empirical understanding of enduring disparities between East and West Germany can, we believe, help to better understand the challenges that a unified Korea is likely to encounter. However, the extent of these challenges may be far greater still, politically and socially.

1.3 Report Roadmap

The rest of the report is divided up into five sections which we describe and summarize below.

Section two, 'Case Selection', sets out the theoretical and practical reasons to compare populations from the two Koreas with the two Germanies. It considers why such comparisons are of interest, but the contrasts between East Germany and North Korea, and between South Korea and unified Germany today. These contrasts point to the limitations of the comparison, but prior knowledge and awareness of them ensure that realistic conclusions can be drawn from empirical results.

Section three, 'Literature Review', examines the literature on the three theoretical issues we seek to examine in the Korean and German contexts: post-communist citizenship, discrimination, and political belonging. The theoretical and empirical literatures in these three areas provide a rich basis from which to build upon. First, the literature on post-communist citizenship offers potential propositions regarding attitudes toward democratic institutions, markets, the state, and cultural issues like race and gender. Second, the literature on discrimination postulates a number of distinct drivers of discrimination including prejudice, economic self-interest, and broader concerns about society (sociotrophy). Third, the literature on national belonging sets out a range of arguments regarding how and why some groups are more likely to identify with and feel a sense of belonging to the nation in which they live. Understanding each of these literatures is crucial in addressing the political, social and psychological integration of former East Germans and North Koreans into capitalist democratic societies.

Section four, 'Empirical Design', is dedicated to the study's methodological framework, clarifying how the research questions will be operationalized through empirical inquiry. It reaffirms the research goals, particularly probing whether social integration is feasible in divided or reunifying countries. The analytical framework is outlined, connecting theoretical literature with the practical methodological choices made for the study, specifically the motivation, construction, and implementation of the novel choice-based conjoint survey experiments. The empirical strategies, including the statistical methods employed, are outlined and explained. Data generation for both experimental and observational surveys is described, alongside an analysis of sample selection and related methodological considerations, such as data quality.

Section Five, titled 'Empirical Findings', presents the results of surveys conducted to assess the integration of individuals from North Korea into South Korea and from the former East Germany into the reunified Germany across three dimensions. By providing both intra- and inter-country analyses, the section seeks to consider the effects of democratic governance and political institutions. It considers whether there is a measurable effect of communist legacies on integration processes. The findings are presented through descriptive statistics and graphical interpretations.

The section analyzes how these new citizens' attitudes, identities, and societal preferences compare with the existing populations within each country and then extends to compare these patterns between the two nations. It also measures how South Korean and Western German populations — the 'receiving societies' — discriminate (or not) against residents of various origins, focusing on new citizens in Korea and, in the case of Germany, those from former East Germany. Lastly, results from the new national identity conjoint and other surveys are analyzed.

Section six, 'Conclusion and Discussion', provides a succinct summary of the study and a discussion. It revisits the primary research question and its driving motivation and reflects

on the purpose and value of the research. This section then reviews the main findings and considers their implications, academically and practically.

2 Case Selection

In this section, we consider our choice of cases. We discuss the areas of comparison, comparability, and contrast between East Germany and North Korea and between South Korea and unified Germany. We consider why comparisons between the Koreas and the Germanies are valid and compelling. We also highlight the major contrasts and how these limit the extent of infers that can be drawn from the Germanies to the Koreas or vice versa. Nonetheless, despite such limitations, given appropriately theoretically informed research design and survey instruments, we believe there is still much that can be learned from such a comparison.

2.1 Why Compare East Germany and North Korea?

When examining public attitudes across the Korean Peninsula, the German experience offers a compelling comparative framework. Although East Germany was categorically more developed, less restrictive, and more open to external influences than North Korea, both nations have exhibited significant similarities in their historical legacies of authoritarian governance and socialist orientation. This resemblance implies that the political perspectives of East Germans could serve as an indicative model for the future orientations of North Koreans in a hypothetical unification scenario. The rationale for the selection of the two cases examined in this study — Germany's reunification and the ongoing integration of North Korean migrants into South Korean society — is founded on comparability and contrast. Ultimately, we believe that comparing these two cases allows us to study the attitudes of both the integrators (post-GDR citizens and North Korean migrants) and their 'receiving societies'.[1]

[1]The term 'receiving society' is employed in this study to denote the societal context into which new citizens or migrants integrate. However, it is crucial to clarify its application in the context of unified Germany and South Korea, given the distinct nature of integration in these two cases. In the case of South Korea, the term aligns closely with its conventional usage. South Korea represents a clear example of a receiving society in the traditional sense, where North Korean migrants actively move into a new socio-political environment. The South Korean population, therefore, is directly engaged in the integration process, encountering and interacting with these migrants in various aspects of societal life. This dynamic requires active adaptation and response from both the migrants and the South Korean population.

Conversely, the application of 'receiving society' to unified Germany, particularly West Germany, necessitates a broader interpretation. Post-reunification, West Germany did not experience a significant influx of East Germans as migrants. However, the reunification process itself necessitated adjustments and accommodations on the part of West Germans. While the integration process was less about physical migration and more about systemic transformation, West Germans were still part of a societal shift. The introduction of a new population with distinct socialization experiences, albeit without extensive physical relocation, did require a form of societal 'receiving', albeit different from the South Korean context. This included economic adjustments, such as the solidarity surcharge tax, and cultural adaptations to integrate the East German population and their experiences into a unified national narrative.

Accordingly, the aspect of comparability emerges from social integration in both cases, where citizens from authoritarian and communist systems are integrated into democratic and capitalist societies. The German case provides an in-depth look at a completed reunification process, whereas the South Korean context offers an ongoing, dynamic view of social integration as North Korean migrants gradually assimilate into South Korean society. However, insofar as the two populations are both citizens of a communist society, who are then integrated into a capitalist democracy, there are substantial similarities.

Contrast, on the other hand, is evident in the differences in context, pace, and scale of integration in the two situations (Frank 2013). Germany's reunification was a nationwide event triggered by (peaceful) civil unrest, the relaxation of travel restrictions in the Eastern Bloc and, ultimately, the fall of the Berlin Wall as well as the opening of the borders between the two German states in 1989.[2] East Germans became citizens of a unified polity through the end of their state's independence and its absorption into a unified Germany. Conversely, North Koreans who arrive in South Korea do so as de facto inter-state (if intra-national and co-ethnic) migrants, although the two Koreas maintain claims of rightful rule and sovereignty over the entire Korean Peninsula.

However, the integration process has some comparable aspects as well. While North Koreans are migrants, they are legally entitled to South Korean citizenship,[3] unlike most other migrant groups worldwide but not altogether different from the situation facing East Germans in the early 1990s as they became new citizens in the newly unified Federal Republic of Germany. Also similar is the process of social integration as a gradual and sometimes individualized process, unfolding over an extended timeframe. Hence, in crucial respects, the integration process contains substantial similarities. It should still be noted, however, that the size of the groups involved will impact the capacity of the two 'receiving' states (i.e., West Germany and South Korea). The West German government was tasked with reforming and opening an entire state of some 16 million people and integrating and (re)socializing these people into a democratic polity of which they had little experience. By contrast, the South Korean government has, to date, received just over 30,000 people from the North. Figure 2.1 shows their years or resettled from 1998 until the year of writing.

As we discuss further below, some important similarities notwithstanding, there are substantial differences between the conditions within the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). These differences in initial contextual conditions for former GDR citizens and former citizens of the DPRK are notable. First, because they further reinforce the case differences, underscoring the question of case comparability. More substantially, they are also likely to have a considerable influence on the attitudes and capacity to adapt to a democratic, capitalist society.

[2]We note that the German unification process was far from instantaneous. It involved intricate negotiations, legal changes, and gradual socio-economic integration that spanned months and years rather than occurring overnight. After the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, it took almost a year for official reunification to occur. Even then, the process of merging the two disparate economies, legal systems, and social structures has been ongoing, and many scholars argue that this process remains incomplete. The end of East Germany's state independence and its absorption into the Federal Republic did not automatically harmonize the divergent identities, values, and experiences of East and West Germans — something which this research investigates. The notion of Ostalgie, or nostalgia for aspects of life in East Germany, as well as persistent economic and social disparities between the two regions, testifies to the complexities involved in forging a unified national identity.

[3]Nationality Act Case 12-2 KCCR 167, 97Hun-Ka12 confirms the right of North Korean citizens to South Korean citizenship. For a more complete discussion of this issue, see Greitens (2021).

Figure 2.1: North Korean Migrant Resettlement in South Korea, Counts, 1998–2023.

Data: Ministry of Unification. Figures do not account for deaths or onward migration. 2023 numbers are provisional (as of September).

2.2 The Pre-Integration Context

East Germany and North Korea were both state socialist systems, producing a common form of political socialization. Marxist-Leninist party regimes appear to have produced particular socialization effects on those who lived under them. These regimes did not tolerate real electoral opposition, with single-candidate, non-competitive elections being a norm in the Soviet Union and many other Soviet-type systems (Pravda, 1986; Sakwa, 1998). They created a mono-organizational order in which the ruling party was the sole legitimate source of political authority (Rigby, 1979). The single-candidate, de facto single-party elections staged under such systems may have served to intimidate would-be dissidents, acting as propaganda spectacles demonstrating the unity of the people behind communist rule (Huang, 2015), but they may also have socialized younger adults in non-democratic electoral systems and created the appearance of 'democratic' legitimacy as part of a broader process of socialization.

While this order did not necessarily inspire faith in the aspired communist future, ideology created important mental models and discursive patterns that were both flexible to change by those in power but also dominant paradigms of political thought in society (Walker, 1989; Yurchak, 2013). In the North Korean and East German cases, this ideology included the standard monist view of the party and leader as correct, though the North Korean case took the power and centrality of the leader to remarkable extremes (Hunter, 1999; Tertitskiy, 2015). Exposure to such ideologies may have helped to forge durable mental models of the world. Authoritarian regimes cannot fully control their citizens' every thought, but at least can foster a worldview or a set of underlying assumptions about how the world does and should work that may persist long after the regimes have passed into history.

One particularly important model to consider is the case of the 'monopoly capitalist ideology', which is the view that was inculcated into citizens of communist states regarding how markets and capitalist systems worked. In this view, the state, government, and the political class under capitalism were an instrumentality of capitalist class control over the working class, and the latter faced growing poverty and penury due to this. This ideology was an important part of the worldview in state socialist countries (Nordahl, 1974; Ward, 2021). As such, citizens living under communist states will have been socialized to see mar-

kets and capitalism as socially negative. They were also obviously supposed to associate the countries that had such systems with corruption, social vice, and the like.

Added to this, in communist systems, the state was actually the primary or sole actor within the economy, as both a producer and distributor of goods and services (Ellman, 2014; Kornai, 1992). There was some variation in this regard, with some communist countries having comparatively large private sectors, like Hungary under Goulash socialism (1958~1989), and there was substantial variation in the level of centralization and the types of control that state officials exerted over the economy (Ellman, 2014). Nonetheless, communist governments and communist parties that took power in the post-1945 period generally had hostile relations with non-state economic actors, for both economic and political reasons - to both promote economic development and control society.

State control and economic planning were portrayed as both scientific and superior to unfair and disorderly market capitalism, with markets depicted as disorderly and unjust (Kornai, 1992). That planning was often a post hoc propaganda fiction, and that these systems were primarily characterized ad hoc by administrative command and state ownership did not directly detract from this picture (Gregory, 2004). Yet, the irrationality in economic decision-making, notably defensive decision-making, produced by these systems, which led to a lack of innovation (Amann & Cooper, 1982; Banerjee & Spagat, 1991), did not necessarily make markets look more 'rational' or coherent by comparison. These issues did not inevitably invoke a need in people's minds to adopt markets and private property as primary institutions for ordering an economy. Nor were they a secret in many communist societies. In contrast, many issues with communist economies were widely discussed in the Soviet press, for instance (Nove, 1992). However, distrust of markets and market capitalism is a hallmark of ideology in Soviet-type societies, and a lack of guarantees for private property rights characterized both urban and rural life under socialism (Nee, 1989; Walder, 2011).

Further, the experience of markets and the property rights that undergird them was highly limited for both North Koreans (Hunter, 1999) and most East Germans (Granick, 2015). Markets were marginalized under such systems and associated with social outsiders, though markets never completely disappeared (Trecker, 2020; Ward & Green, 2021). While markets were more socially and ideologically despised in communist societies than in the capitalist world, suspicion and phobia of markets are quite prevalent even in capitalist societies under certain circumstances (Rubin, 2013).

Despite these commonalities, the citizens of these two countries lived amidst very different pre-communist initial economic and cultural conditions, and the communist systems they lived under were also very different. It is essential to account for or, at least, acknowledge the distinct differences when making such comparisons.[4]

East Germany was a relatively open society, particularly in the access to Western media that its people had and the possibility of travel to Western countries. Hence, the political attitudes of East Germans were likely more aligned with those of their Western counterparts than would be expected of North Koreans in a comparable setting. A seminal body of scholarship anchored by Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2014; 2017) categorizes East Germany as conforming to a neo-Stalinist ideological and institutional framework. In relative terms, East Germany was much more permeable than contemporary North Korea in its degree of openness. Not only could a significant segment of East German citizens venture to the West, but they also had access to West German television broadcasts (Childs, 2001; Crabtree et al., 2015). East Germans had considerable expectations for a post-unification future. These expectations were a consequence of multiple factors, including their exposure to West German

[4]There is also the matter of how the unification process impacted East Germans and their perceptions of Westerners.

culture, their experience of West German consumer goods, but also the electioneering of West German politicians who pushed for a speedy unification (Frank, 2016).

By contrast, North Korea is truly unprecedented, even within the communist world, in the types and intensity of restrictions on the liberties it imposed on its people — and continues to do so.

First, North Korea maintains a system of draconian controls on internal migration that make it near impossible for people to move beyond their municipality or county, let alone outside of the country without permission. This system means that many North Koreans have little understanding of what is happening outside their locality, let alone in the country at large — unless they have familial or friendship connections in other parts of the country, and can move between localities. Much inter-regional travel is facilitated through corruption (largely bribery of police) that allows individuals to move around in violation of the 'travel order'.

Second, access to education, employment opportunities, housing, and welfare provision is neither equal nor structured through institutions that seek to promote access to those most in need. Rather, the regime maintains a multi-layered system of residential registration which includes Songbun, a caste-like system that traces one's ancestry (including grandparents and parents' potential involvement in revolutionary or counter-revolutionary activities), one's own allocated social status, and one's social strata (Tertitskiy, 2015). This system represents a significant expansion of pre-existing systems of internal passports in the Soviet Union and the Chinese Hukou system (Wang & Kim, 2023). Nothing like this system of control existed in East Germany.

Consequently, East Germans might not serve as a perfect analog for North Koreans, but they could function as an ideal upper bound for setting expectations concerning North Korean attitudes post-unification. Utilizing East Germany as a comparative metric provides valuable, albeit limited, prognostic insights into the range of potential political attitudes and the scope of integration challenges that might emerge in a unified Korean context. This analytical approach contributes to both empirical knowledge and theoretical frameworks that explore the influence of authoritarian legacies on the political attitudes of citizens undergoing a transition to democratic governance.

The comparative evaluation of the institutional and structural factors in North Korea and East Germany provides a lens through which to consider the differential impact of authoritarian governance and institutions in the political socialization process, as well as issues pertaining to persistent social discrimination, and subjective integration. The institutional and structural differences between North Korea and East Germany offer more than mere historical or empirical contrast; they serve as key variables that moderate the effectiveness and limitations of acculturation processes in both unified Germany and in South Korea. These divergent authoritarian contexts thus serve as a crucial basis for examining the intricate processes of political, social, and subjective integration.

Table 2.1 summarizes the main reason for case selection, some of the key features of the two cases, and what we hope to gain from the comparison.

2.3 The Unified Germany and South Korea Comparison

The use of the German case as a scenario for Korean unification is by no means uncontroversial, feeding into a larger debate about the (potential) cost of (re-)unification in both cases and the value of the lessons that can be drawn from comparing them. This comparative framework further explores broader themes, such as the implications of democratic governance in South Korea and Germany and the legacies of state socialism in the German Democratic

	Germany	South Korea
Reason for Selection	Complete reunification of a nation divided by distinct political and economic systems.	Ongoing individual-level integration in the context of a divided peninsula.
Case Features	• Nationwide integration process • Former socialist East Germans integrating into a capitalist and democratic system • High level of prior exposure to West German culture • Post-unification political participation (30+ years) • Pervasive surveillance • Some suppression of religious freedoms	• Individual integration process • North Korean migrants integrating into a democratic and capitalist South Korean society • Relatively low levels of exposure to South Korean culture • Post-migration political participation (1~30 years) • Pervasive surveillance and widespread use of harsh repression • No religious freedoms
Benefits of Study	Offers insights into attitudes and integration process after complete reunification. Allows for a retrospective view of integration, examining both successes and challenges.	Allows for a study of ongoing integration, potentially offering actionable insights. Offers a unique view into the ongoing challenges and successes of individual-level integration.

Table 2.1: Case Selection Overview

Republic and North Korea. The differences between the Koreas and the former two Germanies, such as the ones introduced above, obligate an objective and critical lens when trying to examine potential lessons (Frank, 2016) and need to be assessed on contemporary knowledge of especially the North Korean system as changes over time impact the value such a comparison has (Frank, 2014).

We examine intra- and inter-country dynamics to understand the integration of individuals transitioning from one system to another within the same nation. The study scrutinizes whether attitudes, preferences, and identity markers among these new citizens converge or diverge with the remaining population of the 'new' country. Additionally, we entertain a careful and exploratory consideration of the impact of each country's unique post-socialist context on these integration dynamics, which is examined in depth. For South Korea, this pertains to North Korean migrants who actively chose to relocate, embodying a journey both physical and systemic. Conversely, East Germans in unified Germany represent a different kind of integration. They did not physically migrate but experienced a profound systemic shift within their own society.

The distinction between types of integration and 'unification' is critical: North Korean migrants in South Korea took active steps towards a new life, making conscious decisions to adapt to a different socio-political system. By contrast, East Germans experienced a form of passive integration, where the transformation was imposed rather than chosen. The scenarios would be considerably more similar under a scenario whereby one of the two Koreas was integrated into the other. That is not, however, the case. The pairwise comparison would also hold more logically if the study was examining East German migrants who resettled in Western Germany — but this is not the question or concern of the study. The comparison chosen thus presents a complicated narrative. While both groups, North Koreans in South

Korea and East Germans in unified Germany, navigate the complexities of integration, their journeys differ fundamentally in terms of choice, agency, and the nature of their transition.

Do the fundamental differences between the unification and integration processes in our cases imply that they are incomparable, akin to comparing apples to oranges? For three main reasons, we argue against this notion, emphasizing the importance of recognizing the differences while also considering the comparative value of the German case for the prospect of Korean unification.

First, it is essential to establish why Germany is the most analogous case to Korea. Both Germany and Korea were divided nations, each experiencing a split along ideological lines during the Cold War era. This shared historical experience of division and subsequent unification (in Germany's case) provides a unique platform for comparison. Furthermore, both countries underwent significant socio-political transformations from authoritarian to democratic systems, albeit under different circumstances. In Germany, this transition was accompanied by the physical integration of two societies that had developed distinctly for decades. In Korea, while physical unification remains unrealized, the integration of individuals from North to South Korea mirrors, in part, the challenges faced in Germany.

Second, considering Germany as a representation of a future Korea is instructive. Germany's experience post-unification offers insights into the long-term processes and potential challenges of integrating societies with disparate socio-political backgrounds. In this sense, we do not need to justify a comparative framework at all — Germany stands on its own as a case of successful unification. It serves as a case study in managing the complexities of social, economic, and political integration in a post-divided society. This perspective allows us to shift the focus from direct comparisons between East Germans and North Koreans to a broader understanding of Germany's integration experience as a potential blueprint for Korea.

Lastly, and most substantially, the theories of socialization and extensive literature on post-communist citizens substantiate the comparison between the two cases. These theories, evaluated and reviewed in more detail in our literature review section, explore how individuals socialized under communist regimes adapt to new socio-political realities. In both German and Korean contexts, this shift involves negotiating identities, values, and attitudes shaped by previous regimes. The experiences of East Germans post-unification provide valuable insights into the potential trajectories of North Korean migrants in South Korea, especially regarding their adaptation to a capitalist, democratic order.

Our comparative analysis operates on two levels, integrating intra- and inter-country comparisons to comprehensively understand integration dynamics. This approach allows us to dissect the differences in the effects of integration on distinct groups — North Korea migrants in South Korea and former East Germans in unified Germany. This distinction is crucial as it acknowledges the varied nature of their transitions into new socio-political realities.

The two-tiered comparative approach first examines how these groups, each socialized under different systems, assimilate into their new environments. We examine the experiences of those from the former GDR as they adapt to life in a unified Germany and juxtapose this with the resettlement experiences of North Koreans in South Korea. The point here is to consider the experiences on their own terms specific to the context of each country. This intra-country analysis provides insights into how individuals navigate the shift from a communist to a capitalist democracy within their respective nations.

The second tier of our analysis extends to an inter-country comparison. Here, we contrast the integration experiences in Germany and Korea to draw broader conclusions about life after socialism in capitalist democracies. By comparing these two distinct cases, we aim to

uncover the nuances of post-socialist integration and the varied trajectories of individuals who transition from one system to another.

In doing so, we seek not only to understand the specific experiences of these groups but also to contribute to a deeper understanding of the challenges and opportunities presented by societal transitions in the post-Cold War era. This comparative framework, while acknowledging the unique circumstances of each case, provides valuable insights into the complex process of integration in post-socialist societies.

Regarding contemporary conditions, it is important to note that the divergences between South Korea and Germany in their demography and social organization introduce additional variables into any consideration of resocialization, integration, and discrimination. South Korea is a historically homogeneous nation, both ethnically and culturally, with a relatively small foreign-born, non-ethnic Korean population — although that is changing (Denney & Green, 2021). Germany, conversely, is characterized by a more heterogeneous demographic landscape, with a considerable proportion of foreign-born, non-German, and even non-European residents, many of whom have been naturalized as German citizens (Figure 2.2).[5] Although they differed in nature and scale, both Germanies also fostered labor migration, primarily from countries within their political bloc. Yet, in comparison, the West German guest worker integration led to long-term residence for many, even after reunification.



Figure 2.2: Immigrants as Share of Population, 1990–2020.

Source: Data calculated by Our World in Data based on UN DESA, International Migrant Stock.

The contrasting demographic profiles between the two cases introduce myriad implications for the post-socialist citizens in both nations and the prevailing attitudes among the native populations. Specifically, the prevailing homogeneity in South Korea's demographic composition introduces a set of unique variables into the dynamics of social integration. One

[5]The substantial increase in Germany's immigrant population between 2015 and 2020 was predominantly influenced by the influx of refugees, largely from Syria and Afghanistan, in response to geopolitical instability and conflicts, particularly the Syrian Civil War. This phenomenon was further amplified by the subsequent wave of family reunifications. Other contributing factors included the EU's policy of free movement, Germany's economic appeal, demographic challenges such as an aging native population, labor market needs, and adjustments in immigration policy to accommodate this demographic shift. Furthermore, the number of Ukrainian immigrants in Germany, living as refugees or otherwise, will have driven the country's migrant stock even higher. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, more than one million Ukrainians have sought resettlement in Germany (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), 2023).

might intuitively posit that this homogeneity would facilitate the integration of North Korean defectors, given the shared ethnic background and cultural heritage. This notion draws on the theory of co-ethnicity, which postulates that individuals from the same ethnic or cultural group may have a stronger sense of solidarity and trust, which can contribute to political stability and, by extension, social integration (Chandra, 2004). Related to that, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) examine the impact of ethnic divisions on the provision of public goods, arguing that individuals from the same ethnic group are more likely to cooperate and contribute to public goods due to shared cultural norms and trust. However, as section three discusses, competing research suggests that co-ethnic effects may not necessarily guarantee seamless integration. In fact, the shared ethnic and cultural background could engender heightened expectations and subsequent scrutiny, thereby creating its own set of challenges related to discrimination or acceptance.

Conversely, Germany's multi-ethnic societal composition presents a contrasting backdrop against which to analyze integration dynamics. In such a diverse setting, integrating East Germans into a reunified Germany may be influenced by a broader array of factors, including but not limited to ethnicity. The pluralistic nature of German society may offer varying degrees of social cushioning, allowing for more nuanced interactions between Western Germans, post-communist citizens, and citizens of former East Germany.

Furthermore, these demographic idiosyncrasies are not merely of empirical interest but also carry substantive theoretical weight. South Korea's relatively homogeneous society offers a compelling case study at one extreme of the spectrum among democratic market economies, whereas Germany constitutes an alternative and, given immigration trends, something of a potential future unified Korean scenario — or even a future scenario for South Korea itself, whether unification occurs in the foreseeable future or not. In any case, South Korea enriches the comparative analysis, providing an invaluable reference point against which theories of discrimination and integration in diverse democratic societies can be assessed and refined.

Incorporating this complex demographic backdrop into our comparative framework adds another layer to the already multifaceted issue of social integration of divided nations. Understanding how demographic characteristics intersect with political, economic, and cultural variables is critical for a nuanced understanding of the processes of resocialization and integration. Consequently, the demographic disparities between South Korea and Germany underscore the importance of this research, promising not only to yield new empirical insights but also to contribute significantly to the theoretical discourse surrounding integration in democratic societies.

In the next section, we consider the literature on the three dimensions of public attitudes that this research focuses on.

3 Literature Review

This section examines key scholarly works on three dimensions of integration relevant to transitioning societies, especially in cases where there is a move from a communist to a democratic political system. Integrating these perspectives with the historical backdrop of German reunification, we see how East Germans have navigated life in a unified capitalist democracy since 1990. Their experiences afford us a valuable comparative perspective for the potential unification of Korea. This section thus dissects three interconnected challenges: the process and success of inculcating democratic principles post-authoritarianism, the role and origins of discrimination by dominant groups in hindering integration, and the subjective experience of belonging, exploring how individuals from East Germany and North Korea conceptualize and feel about their identities within new political and social realities.

3.1 Political and Social Order

As we discussed above regarding the logic of our case selection, institutions, the ideologies imbued within them and propagated by them, and experiences of social life under these institutions exert a powerful effect on political behavior. The effects of political socialization in a particular institutional context are well-studied.[1] The study of socialization is also tied to the idea that there are generational differences in political attitudes, behaviors, orientations, and beliefs. Thus, when we speak of "Baby Boomers" or "Millennials" (or more often in South Korea, the "MZ generation"[2]), we are not just speaking of groups born during a particular time period, we are talking about people with a particular mentality, a view of the world that was forged and shaped in a particular temporal and spatial context. Part of this context may be seismic events, like wars, financial crises, or other socially or politically seismic events that occur at any time in the lives of a particular generation and exert considerable impact on their worldview. However, a major force in the creation of durable generation-specific identities, attitudes, and behavioral tendencies is believed to be played by political socialization.

The political socialization process involves people, namely children and young adults, learning how to participate in political life, and acquiring political attitudes, beliefs, and values. The socialization process has been the source of considerable discussion and theoretical debate since the 1960s, and survey data indicates both the existence of generation-specific effects and the capacity of individual preferences to change. There continues to be debate and disagreement over when socialization primarily occurs. Some argue that the most for-

[1] See Grasso (2014) for a summary of the literature.

[2] The "MZ Generation" in South Korea is a term commonly used to refer to the collective cohort of Millennials and Generation Z, those born from the early 1980s to the early 2000s. This demographic is particularly relevant in South Korea due to its distinctive consumer behavior, digital savviness, and social influence.

mative period for political socialization is the late teens and early to mid-twenties (Jennings & Niemi, 1981), some that it is centered on the teenage years (Bartels & Jackman, 2014), while others claim that it is up to and including the twenties (Neundorf & Smets, 2016).

Nonetheless, what is clear is that formative political experiences give rise to enduring political views that result in shifts in voting patterns, government and policy preferences, and other political attitudes (Sears & Valentino, 1997; Bartels & Jackman, 2014), but also the role of schooling in the civic socialization process. That is, the making of engaged, democratic citizens (Koskimaa & Rapeli, 2015; Wiseman et al., 2011). This process is not total, of course. It does not create political automata who simply reproduce the same preferences throughout their lives. Indeed, people respond to their changing circumstances, to exogenous shocks, to changing social conditions, and to new information. But socialization is a crucial part of the life cycle, and it is not easy to fundamentally alter, although resocialization or acculturation does occur to some extent, as we will explore below.

The literature on non-democratic societies demonstrates the mirror image of the impacts that democratic civic education has on long-run attitudes to one's country's political system. This is evident even within democratic societies, with migrants from more autocratic societies sometimes being less willing to participate in democratic politics, less favorable in their views toward it, or else less willing to discuss such participation with others (Bilodeau, 2014; Bilodeau et al., 2010; Bilodeau & Dumouchel, 2023). Political habits and attitudes, including political participation itself, develop as a result of the political socialization process.

The existing literature indicates that childhood socialization is primarily affected through official organizational channels, such as school and official youth activities. In authoritarian settings, the mechanism by which political socialization occurs is believed to be schooling (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2012).[3] Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017) also argue that in democratic systems, socialization may be more important in childhood. But in communist systems, adult socialization is more important in predicting attitudes toward democracy, markets, and social welfare, with child socialization only producing half the effects for markets and social welfare, and none for democracy.

The impact of socialization on civic attitudes is well evidenced in the post-communist context.[4] There appear to be regime-type-specific effects that emerge as a result. First, communist regimes did not only dominate their economies, but they also sought to build all-encompassing welfare regimes that were unusually comprehensive by the standards of many dictatorships. Communist states struggled with persistent shortages of labor, so their welfare systems generally placed great emphasis on ensuring that the population was kept fit for work (Rutland, 1985). The communist welfare state can be considered a form of "coercive distribution", that is, providing public goods and welfare to the "masses" to facilitate dependency on the regime. Such an arrangement often appears to have created certain expectations regarding the state's role in society (Albertus et al., 2018). Hence, existing evidence shows that regimes like communist regimes that engage in more redistribution foster a more anti-

[3]This is also not to discount the potential role that parents may play in political socialization (see for instance, Dinas 2014), but in authoritarian systems, scholars and other official institutions of the state are considered to be more important.

[4]Authors such as Pop-Eleches and Tucker and others contributing to the literature on the subject use the term "post-communist citizens" when referring to individuals who were socialized in and/or are currently residing in countries that transitioned from communism to another form of government after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. This terminology is consistent with the political science lexicon where "post-communist" refers to the historical and political period following the end of communist rule in these states. It encompasses not only the economic and political systems that succeeded communism but also the societal and cultural transformations that ensued. However, the term "post-socialist" is sometimes used interchangeably with "post-communist", especially in broader sociocultural analysis, to refer to the period after the decline of state socialism in these regions. We use mainly "post-communist" in this report but at times "post-socialist" when it makes sense to do so.

democratic legacy than more exclusionary regimes, especially among citizens who benefit from such policies (Neundorf et al., 2019; Rosenfeld, 2020).

Living and coming of age in a more closed and autocratic society can make one less open to democratic values. Indeed, an essential characteristic of a democratic society is being open to new ideas and a state that, in theory, allows and facilitates the emergence and growth of social movements independent of the state (Edwards, 2014). Comparative datasets meant to operationalize and measure aspects of democracy measure democratic quality, including variables designed to capture political systems' relative openness, in the form of participation in political processes (the participatory principle) and with the views of minorities represented (the consensual principle); this has been one of the major contributions of the Varieties of Democracy project, which, despite challenges, has done just that.

Comparative political systems research finds the relative openness of a country's political and social system has a significant impact on the hostility of those socialized under it to democratic values (Neundorf et al., 2019; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2017). Hence, one would expect that East Germany and North Korea, with their strong emphasis on expansive and all-encompassing welfare programs and full employment, would produce high levels of anti-democratic sentiment among their people (Hoyer, 2023; Hunter, 1999). That said, North Korea has been remarkably closed even by the standards of communist regimes, meaning that the effects of officially enforced socialization may be stronger due to a lack of countervailing influence—especially relative to East Germany, where the consumption of West German media was widespread (Crabtree et al., 2015).

However, as noted above, post-communist socialization does not have constant and unchanging effects on social values and attitudes. Nor does it necessarily lead to specific political outcomes at the national level. Situational or circumstantial factors also shape popular attitudes and can lead to popular support for autocratic politics or else continued support for democratic governance, despite authoritarian socialization. This is evident in Eastern Europe, where at least in some countries that emerged as liberal democracies post-1989, like Hungary, democratic backsliding has occurred. Hungary is a particularly interesting case because its government was notably more economically liberal under communism (Benczes, 2016; Kornai, 1992), and yet has fallen into competitive authoritarianism with widespread popular support (Bozóki & Hegedűs, 2018). Whereas others like Romania and Bulgaria, which were more autocratic under communism have remained relatively open democracies (Bochsler & Juon, 2020). At the same time, Poland has had significant problems with democratic backsliding (Bernhard, 2021), but it recently voted out its authoritarian government in the 2023 parliamentary election; it is unclear in what direction the country is heading.

In recent years, electoral outcomes reveal a pronounced inclination among a considerable segment of the electorate in the eastern German regions to favor the right-wing party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) with far right and explicitly anti-democratic tendencies, although this is not usually explained with reference to authoritarian socialization (Betz & Habersack, 2019; Weisskircher, 2020). On the other hand, the popularity of the successor parties to the former ruling party of East Germany—the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), now called "the Left" (Die Linke)—after the reunification is seen as a testament to the impact of left-authoritarian socialization and legacies within eastern German society (Doerschler, 2015; Patton, 2012; Webb, 2009).

Much of the support for the right-wing AfD is often explained by the marginalization of eastern Germans in modern Germany. In other words, when the democratic order and the market deliver, people support the institutions they live under in later life, despite authoritarian socialization, while those who experience privation yearn for the past, real or imagined (Grix, 2000; Pickel & Pickel, 2023), or else at least have skepticism for the democratic present (Auerbach & Petrova, 2022).

Another important factor is the role played by potential re-socialization or acculturation in a democratic order. While one's experiences before their 25th birthday, typically the cutoff point for the socialization window, and in one's teenage years are likely formative and may have persistent effects, the literature on migrant integration points to the ways that destination country culture and values can potentially impact and change migrant attitudes. These effects have been observed to varying extents in different contexts among various groups. For instance, research observes changes in support for democracy (Eskelinen & Verkuyten, 2020) and the welfare state (Luttmer & Singhal, 2011; Reeskens & Oorschot, 2015), in addition to other liberal values like gender equality or equity redistribution in the labor market (Glas, 2022; Röder & Mühlau, 2014), views on homosexuality (Eskelinen & Verkuyten, 2020), and social trust (Dinesen & Hooghe, 2018).

The convergence in attitudes of migrants and the "receiving" society may not be perfect, as there are often differences of opinion within a democratic society about social values and the state's role in the economy. But varying degrees of convergence are observed. The bottom line is that the literature demonstrates the potential for new members in a democratic society to begin with one set of values, preferences, and attitudes but, over time, moderate or change their views. New citizens and residents adapt to the norms and values prevalent in society.

Tendencies to change notwithstanding, both pre-existing socialization (i.e., the culture of the country of origin) and the destination country's official and social attitudes toward migrants seem to play roles in the extent of re-socialization or assimilation into mainstream views. This is particularly important when discussing the case of migrant groups like North Koreans living in South Korea, but also potentially former East Germans, and where they have lived after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. One might expect, for instance, that internal migrants to the western states of the unified German republic would be more strongly acculturated to democratic and pro-market values, or even Germans who were socialized in former East Germany and never left their home jurisdiction; except some places lacking access to outside information (Münz, 1995), many GDR citizens would have had a heavy dose of external information about the alternative, democratic Germany. This would especially be the case for residents of (East) Berlin.

Overall, the existing literature points to three distinct phenomena that likely shape popular attitudes among those socialized under state socialist regimes (and autocracies generally). First, socialization under autocratic rule during the "crucial period" of early political life when political views and preferences become, to some extent, crystallized. Second, circumstantial or situational economic and social factors individuals face after the collapse of socialist regimes motivate support for democracy and the market economy—or the alternatives. Third, the resocialization of democratic values and liberal norms mitigates the strength of previous autocratic socialization and supports the development of durable support for a democratic, liberal market order.

One of the main strengths of existing literature is the widespread use of repeated cross-sectional data from surveys taken over the course of decades (Neundorf et al., 2019; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2017). This allows for the use of longitudinal and pooled modeling techniques that help to identify the relative effects of aging, specific cohort effects (i.e., autocratic socialization), and period effects (i.e., the effect of being alive during a particular period of time). However, one weakness of this approach—which will be directly addressed in this research—is that it relies on direct survey question responses, which are often too abstract or lack construct validity.

Some studies use experimental designs to address the methodological issues inherent in observational survey designs. For instance, Pfarr, Schmid, and Ulrich (2017) provide evidence demonstrating that support for the welfare state does not differ between Eastern and Western Germans when they are presented with budgetary choices in an experimental design

with the need to satisfice. In other words, answers to abstract questions may produce differing results, but when presented with practical issues, the two populations may not actually differ in their preferences. This contrasts with other evidence from lab experiments in which Germans from former East Germany were likelier to engage in behaviors that evinced lower levels of social trust and solidarity (Brosig-Koch et al., 2011; Ockenfels & Weimann, 1999). Such evidence would imply potentially lower welfare support levels than Pfarr, Schmid, and Ulrich (2017) indicate.

While better research designs may underscore the potentially problematic nature of existing survey evidence, the need for a more diverse array of methods remains. This does not mean that the existing literature lacks potentially useful survey instruments or important findings. Many existing studies examine satisfaction with democracy or views of democracy (e.g., Neundorf, 2010; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2017), gender roles (Galligan et al., 2007; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2017), and markets (Otrachshenko et al., 2023; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2014; 2017; Rakhmanov, 2023) from cross-national surveys conducted in Eastern Europe and the former countries of the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, it remains a fact that much of the existing literature relies on observational surveys like the World Values Survey (WVS), whose data and questionnaires are becoming outdated in some regards. They do not consider directly what kinds of value positions are most pressing and which are most intensively held when respondents answer such questions. Filling both empirical and methodological gaps, we will build upon the post-communist and socialization literatures with new experimental designs. We introduce them in the Empirical Design section of the report.

3.2 Social Discrimination

The examination of national belonging and social discrimination commands the attention of social scientists, particularly in light of the increased migration to developed nations over the last five decades. This focus extends to encompass not only migrants but also resident minority groups and other marginalized populations who face discrimination based on their minority status or other defining characteristics. Discrimination against citizens from post-communist countries has received less attention in scholarly literature. This oversight occurs because many individuals from such backgrounds are not recognized as distinct social outgroups within formerly divided societies, and thus, their experiences of discrimination are less frequently documented or analyzed. Although, as we discuss further below, some research indicates that such discrimination exists in these societies. Thus, in this section, we first review the literature on the general causes identified by social scientists with respect to social discrimination. Then, we consider the literature on social discrimination within South Korea and Germany specifically, given the focus on these countries for this research.

In both the post-socialist context and, more generally, in Western Europe, North America, and other developed democracies, exclusionary attitudes toward migrants are documented and explained in several different ways. There is considerable literature on which to build and test theories regarding popular attitudes to migration, migrants, and outsiders of various other kinds. These reflect two broad concerns that are not directly based upon prejudice. The first is personal perceived economic impacts of migration, or "economic self-interest". The second concern is about the broader impact of migration on society, the national economy, and culture, what is commonly termed "sociotrophy". Sociotrophy is a catch-all term for issues that do not directly affect respondents' wealth or income and is often applied to concerns about the values of migrants and their potential impact on their host society.

In addition to such concerns, prejudice also manifests in various forms, including racism, Islamophobia, and other exclusionary sentiments targeting migrants based on their identities. Such attitudes may be mitigated or aggravated by other characteristics of migrants, such as their gender, language competence, and so on. The variegated intensity of prejudice, contingent on other characteristics of individual members of the group subject to prejudice, has been termed "intersectionality" (Choo & Ferree, 2010; Grosfoguel et al., 2015). This complexity can lead to seemingly contradictory outcomes, such as black men encountering more discrimination in the labor market compared to black women, despite women, in general, facing broader discrimination in employment contexts (Esses, 2021). These cases illustrate how the convergence of race and gender may result in discrimination that does not follow a simple additive pattern, but instead interacts in unpredictable ways.

Below, we review the literature on these three major causes and the existing literature on discrimination generally and then consider the literature on South Korea and Germany.

First, migrants belong to a group that is not necessarily a permanent part of the host society or its body politic. They often do not have equal legal rights and access to government services in many jurisdictions as non-citizens. Hence, seeking to exclude them from the provision of state programs, or to exclude would-be migrants who are perceived to create greater costs or fewer gains for natives, is hardly surprising. There is a developed literature on economic threats and opportunities, with a range of methods utilized to demonstrate how natives discriminate against particular types of migrants due to their potential or perceived impact on the labor market, and how they see different kinds of migrants affecting their own personal economic situation (Gerber et al., 2017), with skilled migrants often favored (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010; Valentino et al., 2019).

The favoring of skilled migrants reflects dual concerns about competition within the labor market, but also the concern that migrants may crowd out natives in welfare provision and/or may impose additional costs on natives (in the form of taxation). These can be distinguished as concerns about "labor market competition", "welfare congestion", and "fiscal burden". These are distinct phenomena but are part of the broader phenomenon of economic self-interest.

Alongside perceived economic self-interest, literature has also examined the role of sociotropic concerns. These are concerns about the broader effects of immigration on culture, society, or the economy may shape preferences with respect to migrants and ethnic others or outsiders who are not necessarily migrants. Sociotropic concerns are distinct from economic self-interest insofar as they relate to broader concerns about the country or national community. Sociotropic concerns might include the impact that migrants might have on a segment of the labor market where the respondent is not involved, or on the housing stock in an area where the respondent does not reside (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Tzeng and Tsai, 2020), but it often extends beyond that.

Roupakias and Dimou (2021), for example, argue that immigration sentiments are mainly fueled by concerns about the potential impacts on a nation's cultural homogeneity rather than purely (national) economic considerations. Solodoch (2020) finds that sociotropic concerns go beyond personal prejudice and involve a broader assessment of immigration's social impact. Such concerns are not simple prejudice and may reflect a reasonable appraisal of the potential effects that migrants may have on society, but they are also clearly not driven by economic self-interest.

Third, discrimination resulting from prejudice on the basis of ethnicity, race, or religion (i.e., out-group hostility) is a major and well-evidenced driver of preferences with respect to migration. Prejudice is usually considered to be emotional hostility toward an out-group(s) by individuals (Duckitt, 2003). This is distinct from structural prejudice (including structural racism), which pertains to the way that institutions and/or other impersonal social structures

function in ways that unfairly impact specific groups. It should be noted that because prejudice is generally frowned upon in many countries, it is subject to social desirability bias. In other words, survey respondents may feel pressure to or prefer to falsify their preferences and lie when answering questions that could indicate they hold prejudices, including racism (Janus, 2010).

There are also other ways to mask prejudice. There is concern among some scholars that sociotropic concerns may mask underlying discriminatory attitudes (e.g., Solodoch, 2020). For instance, stated concerns about the attitudes of migrants regarding the role of women in society may be utilized as a convenient alternative to simply voicing prejudice. Prejudice itself is a pervasive phenomenon well-documented in the existing literature on migration (Esses, 2021; McLaren, 2003). As noted above, it is also potentially context-specific, with particular migrant characteristics including age (Dolberg et al., 2018), gender (Ferrant & Tuccio, 2015), language capabilities (Yoo et al., 2009) further aggravating or mitigating prejudicial views.

The body of research on attitudes in post-communist contexts boasts robust theoretical foundations and employs diverse methodologies. This includes studies that rely on direct questions within surveys and, notably, an emerging corpus of work embracing experimental survey techniques such as conjoint analysis. However, there is a gap in this literature regarding cross-national experimental investigations that probe the influence of prejudice on public preferences. Moreover, the cases of Germany and South Korea provide valuable opportunities to assess the enduring impact of communist indoctrination on discriminatory attitudes and to evaluate whether prejudice against individuals from post-communist nations constitutes a significant social issue.

The characterization of North Koreans resettling in South Korea as such requires careful consideration and clarification given the division of Korea into two distinct sovereign states since the mid-20th century—with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea emerging from what was once a unified nation—the term "return" does not strictly apply as North Koreans have not previously resided in the South.

North Koreans might be considered a kind of ethnic "return" migrants, but it is more precise to describe North Koreans in South Korea as "co-ethnic migrants".[5] This term acknowledges that they share an ethnicity with the majority population of their new country but without implying prior residence in the South. Co-ethnic migration is indeed supported in many contexts by policies facilitating the entry and naturalization of individuals with ethnic ties to the host country (Skrentny et al., 2007).

Therefore, while North Koreans in South Korea are migrating to a country where the dominant ethnicity is the same as their own, and in this sense, are similar to "ethnic return" migrants, the historical and political context makes the term "return" somewhat misleading. South Korea's approach to these migrants, as outlined in detail by (Seol & Skrentny, 2009), can be understood as aligning with other East Asian nations and is less generous than some Western European policies (Skrentny et al., 2007). This comparison reflects variations in national strategies towards co-ethnic migration, shaped by differing historical circumstances, political structures, and social policies.

Relative to other migrants with similar skills, qualifications, and other human capital, the South Korean government supports co-ethnics who wish to migrate to South Korea. The country's visa system and naturalization policies are purpose-built to positively discriminate in favor of co-ethnics (Kim, 2008). Some have argued that such policies are justified given the historic marginalization and oppression of Korea and Koreans, especially given the country's

[5]For a discussion of the multiple and often competing identities of those from North Korea moving and resettling in South Korea, see Hough (2022), Kim (2016), and Kim and Lee (2023).

history of being colonized and the poverty endured by Koreans emigrating in former times (Lee, 2010). Similar arguments could be applied to North Koreans today fleeing poverty and oppression, and arguably the South Korean government's policies toward North Koreans are partially undergirded by such a logic.

Nonetheless, North Koreans and ethnic returnees from other parts of the world are not treated socially as South Koreans. Existing survey data collected over decades demonstrates that South Koreans practice what has been described as "conditional inclusion" of North Koreans in their midst (Hough & Bell, 2020; Seol & Seo, 2014). This has also been described as being a form of "racialization" (Hough, 2022), due to the linguistic divide that exists between North Korean migrants and native South Koreans in South Korean society.

An important point to stress here is that while North Koreans living in South Korea are often described as being "refugees" or "escapees", they are also migrants—and we approach them as such in this study. They have moved more or less on their own accord from the northern half of the Korean Peninsula via China and other third countries to South Korea. The existing literature has cataloged the discrimination that they have faced in South Korean labor markets (Bidet, 2009; Kim et al., 2020), in South Korean society more broadly (Chung, 2008; Kim, 2016), and as potential welfare recipients (Ward & Denney, 2022).

The existing literature also indicates that North Koreans face discrimination in their own lives and feel themselves to be discriminated against in some contexts. Studies indicate that North Koreans face discrimination on a day-to-day basis (Kim & Jang, 2007; Youm & Kim, 2011), and many report feeling "othered" because of their accents and differences in the language they use (Korea Hana Foundation, 2017; 2020). Younger North Koreans resettled in the South have reported being discriminated against and facing problems due to negative stereotypes (Kim, 2016). At the same time, most South Koreans indicate in surveys that they consider North Korean migrants to be part of South Korean society (Yoon, 2021).

In contrast to North Korean migrants, Germans from the former East Germany are not migrants but citizens of the unified country of Germany. Strikingly, however, there is a rather limited literature on measuring the discrimination they face, and the attitudes of western Germans toward easterners. The current literature on discrimination acknowledges it primarily as a perceived issue among eastern German voters, with scholars such as Marvin (1995) and Zehring and Domahidi (2022) standing out as exceptions. However, the investigation into discrimination within this demographic is predominantly restricted to qualitative analyses of discourse and political movements. There is a notable lack of quantitative research focused on public attitudes. This gap highlights a need for empirical studies that directly engage with the sentiments of individuals to provide a more nuanced understanding of discrimination in this context.

This knowledge gap is surprising, especially given the range of literature on German attitudes toward migration (Schnaudt and Weinhardt, 2017; Seibel, 1997), and the growing comparative literature on intra-ethnic hierarchical citizenship and "origins-based discrimination" (Denney et al., 2022; Koopmans et al., 2018; Scherr, 2016; Ward & Denney, 2022; Zick et al., 2008). There is substantial evidence compiled using a range of different methods that indicates the existence and persistence of discriminatory and exclusionary attitudes towards migrants in Europe and within former state socialist countries. Among post-socialist states, exclusionary attitudes toward migrants (Bandelj and Gibson, 2020; Löw, Puzić, and Bojić, 2022), as well as welfare chauvinism (Grdešić, 2020), especially with respect toward ethnic and religious minorities. Further, labor market discrimination has also been documented, with ethnic and religious outsiders facing adverse outcomes (Gaddis, 2015).

While the comparative literature offers frameworks applicable to the German situation, their insights have been largely underexplored. This oversight is particularly unfortunate considering the relevance of the German experience to South Korea, which confronts its own

challenges of discrimination against diasporic Koreans, including those from the North. Furthermore, the German case could yield valuable lessons for South Korea as it contemplates the societal issues that could emerge from any future reunification of the Korean Peninsula. The comparison underscores the significance of addressing this knowledge gap, not just for academic completeness but also for its practical implications in informing policy and social integration strategies. We seek to fill this very gap.

3.3 Subjective Integration

We live in a world of nations, nation-states, and competing nationalisms. While there continues to be considerable debate about the origins and development of nationalism (Mylonas & Tudor, 2021), there is little doubt that ideas of the nation and national community have a considerable and continuing impact on the lives of humankind, whether as citizens of a nation-state or as a part of a national or ethnic group.

At the same time, migration is a fact of life for a considerable portion of the world's population, and how migrants respond to resettlement in their host country is important for their sense of life satisfaction and their future lives in the countries where they have been resettled. Diasporic communities may also face similar issues, as do minority groups generally. Indeed, this literature ranges more broadly beyond migrant populations to encompass other minority groups within society, demonstrating that the relative sense of national belonging and subjective integration is important for the well-being of such groups.

Objective indicators of migrant integration have received significant attention from social scientists (Ager & Strang, 2008), but there has also been a growing interest in the subjective sense of national belonging and integration amongst both subgroups of natives from different ethnic origins (Huddy & Khatib, 2007), and migrants (Norris & Puranen, 2019; Tyrberg, 2023). Objective measures of migrant integration include labor market outcomes, language acquisition, educational attainment, and other markers of socioeconomic status. Many of these objective measures of integration also reflect the concerns of the host country's population that are observable in existing studies of attitudes toward migration. In other words, the anxieties of host societies, namely economic costs and capacity to engage in social life, and other impacts of migrants on social life.

With respect to the Korean and German cases, labor market outcomes point to the challenges that both the unified German state and South Korea have faced in integrating post-communist citizens. East Germans faced mass unemployment with the privatization of its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) post-1990, while North Koreans living in South Korea struggled with higher unemployment rates (Korea Hana Foundation, 2021). Educational attainment and the compatibility of human capital acquired within a state socialist context have also been an issue for both states.[6]

In both the North Korean and East German cases, human capital that may be useful under one system, like ideological knowledge, is stressed within the education system, but is less useful, if at all, within a free society. It becomes akin to a "stranded asset" in a changed world. The North Korean education system places a heavy emphasis on the personality cults of the Kim family (Hunter, 1999), information that may be useful for those who study North Korean education, but little else in South Korean society. Similarly, the relative technological backwardness of East Germany, but especially North Korea (Kim et al., 2020), makes integrating those with technical skills and work experience, i.e., upskilling, a major challenge.

[6]See Fuchs-Schündeln and Izem (2012) for discussion of the German case. The authors show that with eastern Germany, human capital depreciation does not seem to explain the mass job losses post-unification.

By contrast, the linguistic impediments to integration, though discussed extensively in the literature and considered by some to even be a source of racialization toward North Koreans (Hough, 2022), are quite slight compared to many migrant groups. This allows those interested in the study of migrant integration and the integration of diasporic/sub-national outgroups to control for a factor that is generally considered crucial in successful migrant integration. Obviously, the existence of dialects, accents, and other markers of intra-national/intra-ethnic out-groupness cannot be controlled for, but they should be significantly less onerous as barriers to successful socio-economic and political integration into the national community.

Alongside these objective measures of integration, such as linguistic capabilities, human capital, and citizenship status may also be associated with subjective measures of integration. Indeed, one of the key indicators of whether migrant groups and groups within society are integrated is whether they feel themselves to belong to the society they are in. Humans are social, and belonging is a basic human need (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Not all groups or individuals, however, are awarded the same status within society, either based on race, religion, or other attributes.

While objective indicators of migrant integration are no doubt important—potentially exerting a considerable influence on socioeconomic status, health, and psychological well-being—other studies indicate that subjective feelings of national belonging, identity, and pride, are important for the psychological health and social lives of people generally, and for migrants in particular, separately from objective markers of integration (Khan et al., 2019; Morris et al., 2011; Reeskens & Wright, 2011; Seppänen et al., 2022; Zdrenka et al., 2015). It is unsurprising that feeling connected to and invested in the future of the community you live in would be associated with better mental health.

Broader research within social psychology points to the importance of both the motivations and perceptions of individuals with respect to the communities or groups they are part of as to whether they feel a sense of belonging or not and the extent of such feelings (Allen et al., 2021). Within migration studies, research also points to the importance of migrants' own beliefs in the process of integration and the development of a sense of belonging (Hur, 2023). In other words, the extent to which migrants and other groups both perceive their capacity to integrate and their actual desire to do so has a major influence on their sense of belonging.

One aspect of national belonging is national pride. Pride can take multiple forms, including uncritical, "blind" patriotism, often associated with jingoism (Schatz et al., 1999), or xenophobia (Perry & Schleifer, 2023). In the US context, the expression "my country, right or wrong" sums up this idea of uncritical patriotism that is connected to jingoistic views of the country's role in the world, and sometimes attitudes toward non-white migrants (Perry & Schleifer, 2023). However, national pride is also an important aspect of identity and belonging. Feeling a sense of personal connection with an impersonal national community and having positive emotions toward this community are important elements of belonging. Being prideful of a nation implies that you identify with it (Evans & Kelley, 2002), and implies that you feel you belong to it (McDaniels et al., 2016).

In Germany, we see with the so-called "Ostalgie" how divisions between the two Germanies in identity terms have persisted post-unification (Grix & Cooke, 2002; Meinhof & Galasinski, 2005; Wittingler, 2010). This phenomenon describes a nostalgic, and notably romanticized, commemoration of life in the former GDR, the perception of economic security provided by the socialist state, strong communal bonds, and often simply personal memories. Yet, much of this research is qualitative, and reliable quantitative datasets that enable us to determine the relative prevalence or the determinants of such alienation from the majority of the national community.

National pride, identity, and belonging have been the subject of considerable exploration within political sociology and comparative political science. Some major barriers to the formation of such attitudes include the effects of naturalization and citizenship rules, which often marginalize specific migrant groups, keeping them legally excluded from the national community. Another major barrier identified is the role played by perceived social discrimination. Whereas laws have an official state identity that makes them easy to measure, and can be a form of structural discrimination (including but not limited to structural racism), individual-level discrimination is often more subtle and far more difficult to measure. Nonetheless, the perception of migrants, and how they feel they are seen and treated by the majority population, can potentially exert a powerful influence on whether they feel themselves to be a part of the nation in which they live.

Naturalization and citizenship have been singled out as a particularly important pathway for effective integration and creating a sense of belonging. Existing research examining national belonging in Europe among Muslim populations—a group subject to considerable discrimination and sometimes facing difficulties with integration (Adida et al., 2010; Husain, 2021)—are more likely to feel a sense of belonging to the country where they now live if they have citizenship, have contact with the natives, and perceive discrimination to be low (alongside religiosity) (Diehl & Schnell, 2006; Karlsen & Nazroo, 2013; Leszczensky et al., 2020).

Similar results on the importance of discrimination have also been reported for other groups (Hainmueller et al., 2017), and it seems to be a relatively uncontroversial theoretical claim backed up by considerable empirical evidence for groups across the Western world, including groups often subject to substantial social discrimination. This makes studying the two Koreas and Germany all the more helpful from the perspective of those interested in migrant integration. East Germans automatically became citizens of the unified German state in 1991. By the same token, North Koreans who manage to reach a South Korean consulate in a third country (except China) are granted South Korean citizenship automatically (except in extraordinary cases). This means that this objective marker of integration and potential determinant of subjective integration can be controlled for.

As noted above, perceived social discrimination is also widely considered to be a significant barrier to subjective integration and a sense of national belonging (Wu & Finnsdottir, 2021). Unsurprisingly, discrimination is also bad for the welfare of immigrant and minority groups generally (Safi, 2009). Whereas the literature on eastern Germany is relatively undeveloped in this area, existing work shows how North Korean migrants' experience of discrimination has had negative consequences for their mental health (Kim, 2016), and this may also block or impair subjective integration and a sense of national belonging.

It is plausible that eastern Germans, even though they are not a migrant group, may experience a similar distance from the national body politic. The literature on minority groups, in general, indicates that alternative group identities can emerge. For instance, minority groups face significant discrimination, like African Americans, where identification with a minority culture may alleviate the impacts of perceived rejection by the dominant group (Branscombe et al., 1999). Such a tendency has also been posited in the East German case, with the alleged emergence of a separate East German ethnic identity (Howard, 1995). This in-group identity formation can also block or stymie acculturation, as discussed above.

Alongside social discrimination, other important barriers to subjective integration and feelings of national belonging have been noted. These include language skills, with migrants and other groups unable to speak the language of their host society likely to be objectively and subjectively less integrated (Ager & Strang, 2008; Norris & Puranen, 2019). In the Korean case, linguistic differences may create a barrier to feelings of subjective integration to some extent, especially given the significant differences in the administrative and political

language used by the two Korean states. The gaps between the two Germanies are less extreme, however.[7]

Beyond this, human, economic, and social capital has been linked to subjective integration (Bruhn & Gonzales, 2023; Norris & Puranen, 2019). The link between social capital and a sense of national belonging has been known by scholars for some time (Crowley & Hickman, 2008; Devadason, 2011; Pearce, 2006). Newer literature has also noted the importance of human capital in subjective integration (Ambrosetti & Paparusso, 2020), while skills and other forms of human capital are also of notable importance for migrants' wages generally (Cantalini et al., 2023).

But this is not necessarily the case. High levels of human capital and even income do not necessarily lead migrants to feel more integrated into their host societies. Known as the "integration paradox", more successful immigrants may not feel attached and belong to their host society. This may be a consequence of discrimination, or exclusion experienced both from the host population and also potentially from one's own co-ethnic migrants, prior expectations, and a continued concern for one's country of origin (Geurts et al., 2021; Verkuyten, 2016).

Among North Korean migrants, existing work points to problems that North Koreans have with resettlement in South Korea and integrating into South Korean society, economically and socially. Existing datasets point to problems of persistently higher rates of poverty, unemployment, lower skills, and social capital (Korea Hana Foundation, 2017; 2021). Some of these issues are likely due to a lack of human capital. Yet, such objective measures do not preclude subjective feelings of integration and national belonging, nor would improvements in human capital necessarily lead to a greater sense of belonging (see above).

The literature review has examined integration challenges in societies transitioning from communist to democratic systems. It has addressed core issues like the inculcation of democratic values post-authoritarianism, the impact of discrimination on integration, and the personal sense of belonging within new political and social orders. As the focus shifts to the empirical findings, the research questions derived from these issues will be applied to a methodological framework. The next section will detail the empirical approach employed in this research.

[7] Instances of discrimination based on linguistic distinctions primarily arise during interactions between East and West Germans. This stands in contrast to the North Korean situation in South Korea, where linguistic differences are not merely a matter of regional variation but are constant and unavoidable, thereby creating persistent barriers to subjective integration different from those in unified Germany. This distinction underscores the varying impact of linguistic factors on integration experiences in different socio-political contexts.

4 Empirical Design

This section will review the empirical design, which serves as the analytical blueprint for the study, delineating the procedural logic and design of the data generation and analysis aspects of the study. In this section, attention is given to the following core components:

Objectives, Populations, and Scope Conditions. This component recaps the study's objectives with a focus on the overarching research question: can social integration be successfully achieved in societies that are divided or undergoing reunification? By setting these explicit parameters, the study not only delineates its scope but also offers a structured template for inquiry, ensuring that the exploration remains targeted yet comprehensive.

Analytical Framework. This design element explains how, precisely, the research will be conducted and explicitly motivates the experimental and observational design choices, drawing from the existing literature on post-socialist societies, transitional governance, and social integration, which were reviewed in the previous section. This section will connect the broader theoretical concerns motivated by previous literature with the specific design choices made for this study, specifically regarding the surveys.

We will also review the statistical and qualitative methods that will be employed to interpret the data, from measurement choices to regression analyses.

Data and Sampling. This section will offer an exhaustive overview of the data generation for the experimental and observational surveys. Alongside this, a detailed examination of the sample characteristics will be provided, highlighting the demographics and other attributes deemed relevant to the study. The overview will discuss certain measurement questions, sampling strategies, and other concerns (e.g., data quality).

The following subsections will explore each of these components before turning to the Research Findings section of the report.

4.1 Objectives, Populations, and Scope Conditions

As outlined in the Introduction and discussed throughout the Literature Review, the present study assesses the challenges of integrating divided countries and societies. The research focus speaks to scenarios that will face the Korean Peninsula and the government of a new unified nation-state, but given current conditions, our primary focus is on the Republic of

Korea (or South Korea), its current democratic government, and the resettlement and integration of North Korean migrants into South Korea (i.e., unification in action). We also examine Germany as a case in and of itself and as a potential future scenario for a unified Korea, given the country has had approximately an entire generation's worth of time and experience since its division from 1945 to 1990. What can we learn in this comparative endeavor regarding the integration of divided nations?

While the phenomenon of social integration is expansive, the research is methodologically focused on questions related to the opinion of the populations under examination: South Koreans, North Korean migrants, and Germans. To examine the intricate process of social integration in a unified Germany and regarding the assimilation of North Korean defectors into South Korea, we examine three dimensions:

1. Attitudes toward political, economic, and social order
2. Social acceptance or discrimination
3. Subjective integration

In exploring political attitudes, the study examines the congruence or incongruence of political beliefs among pertinent groups within South Korea and Germany regarding their attitudes towards hypothetical "emerging politicians" and the platform they offer voters regarding democracy, diversity, gender, and economic and redistribution policies. In the case of South Korea, the study focuses on both South Koreans and North Korean migrants as representing one or the 'other' Korea.

In Germany, the groups under investigation consist of individuals who were socialized either in West Germany or in the German Democratic Republic, as well as those raised in a unified Germany in states formerly belonging to West Germany and those that were once part of the GDR. These groups are particularly significant as they represent the complexities of attitudes in societies transitioning from socialist or authoritarian regimes to democratic governance systems. As discussed in the sections prior, we draw on relevant social science literature to motivate our measurement choices. We will review these choices in more detail in this section. Looking at the (mis)alignment of attitudes, we can seek insights into the successes and challenges of integrating different groups within a unified democratic structure. Table 4.1 presents a succinct overview of the populations under examination and briefly outlines their relevance to the overarching research objectives.

To complement the tabular representation and offer geographical context, Figure 4.1 displays maps of South Korea and Germany. These visual aids serve to clarify the geographical and political landscapes of our study populations, with demarcations in color for North Korea and former East Germany.

In addressing the dimension of social acceptance and discrimination, the study examines attitudes toward social assistance and redistribution, particularly as they relate to job training and support. Similar to the political attitudes dimension, the analysis in this segment focuses on groups in South Korea and Germany. The objective is to ascertain how predispositions for or against individuals from the divided 'other' — be it North Koreans in South Korea or those from former East Germany — manifest in support for public policies. Specifically, the study employs hypothetical job training programs to discern whether the attitudes of individuals from host societies demonstrate social inclusion or exclusion. By doing so, it aims to gauge the tangible levels of acceptance or discrimination within these societies, offering critical insights into the practical challenges and opportunities of social integration.

Lastly, in examining subjective integration, the study scrutinizes both the convergence or divergence of attitudes among specified (sub)groups, particularly concerning their sense of national belonging and national identity. The objective is not merely to assess the depth of individuals' connection to their nation but to discern whether this identification is uni-

Country	Population	Description	Measurement
South Korea	South Koreans	Residents of South Korea, without migration experience from North Korea. Depending on the analysis undertaken, this may constitute only native-born South Koreans, or it may include anyone in South Korea.[1]	Sample of current South Korean residents
	Post-DPRK citizens	Individuals who have defected from North Korea, relocated to South Korea where they are given citizenship. People belonging to this group are referred to in this study as 'North Korean migrants' or 'post-DPRK citizens.'	Sample of former residents of the DPRK who spent no fewer than 12 years there before defection
Germany	West(ern) Germans	Citizens from parts of Germany that were not part of the GDR, either born before or after German reunification in the jurisdictions associated with West Germany, including West Berlin. For the main analysis, no distinction is made between West Germans and those currently living in western Germany, but such considerations are made in the supplementary analysis.	At the age of 18, lived in a federal state or city-state not a part of East Germany or formerly so (i) AND currently a resident in the same or similar jurisdiction (ii)
	Eastern Germans	Individuals currently residing in the jurisdictions of Germany that were part of former East Germany (GDR), including East Berlin. These individuals were not socialized in the GDR and represent a group of Germans living in eastern Germany.	At the age of 18, lived in a jurisdiction formerly belonging to East Germany (i) AND currently a resident in the same or similar jurisdiction (ii)
	Post-GDR Citizens	Individuals socialized[2] in the GDR.	Born in the GDR (i) AND spent at least 12 years there (ii) AND at the age of 18 still resided in a jurisdiction belonging to East Germany or formerly so (iii)

Table 4.1: Populations Studied



Figure 4.1: Maps of the Korean Peninsula and Germany. Highlighted jurisdictions indicate North Korea (left) and former East Germany (right).

Data: Database of Global Administrative Areas (GADM) with custom mapping of Berlin.

formly felt across different community segments, such as North and South Koreans or the various German groups examined. This nuanced approach provides crucial insights into the challenges and successes of social integration efforts within divided societies.

The design and the three dimensions of integration considered—encompassing political attitudes, social acceptance or discrimination, and subjective integration—will provide a multi-dimensional analysis of the intricate challenges and opportunities associated with integrating divided societies, specifically within the contexts of South Korea and Germany. The study is positioned to offer valuable, evidence-based insights that can guide the formulation of targeted, inclusive policies and strategies. These insights aim to advance both scholarly understanding and practical applications for achieving successful social integration in South Korea specifically and also in societies that are divided or undergoing integration. In the subsections to follow, we provide a detailed overview of the experiments in English. All original data generated was done in the target population's native language (Korean or German). Appendices A and B provide a selected overview of the survey language used in Korean and German, focusing on the three main experiments.

We turn now to the design itself, the methods used, and the data collected. The subsections that follow will describe to the reader how and why the surveys were designed, the method of data collection, and then how the data was analyzed.

4.2 Analytical Framework

This section reviews the design choices made for the experimental and observational surveys. It includes a detailed overview of what was done, how, and why. The objective is to provide

a thorough account of the procedural choices and their underlying rationales. Not only will the discussion encompass overviews of the individual components that make up each survey, but it will also feature selected visual representations of the survey interface to facilitate an understanding of what survey respondents saw when taking the surveys. Importantly, the design choices are linked with the established methods and social science literature. Thus, this section contextualizes the research within the broader academic discourse, highlighting its contributions and methodological rigor.

Experimental Design and the Choice-Based Conjoint

The bulk of this research's contribution rests on insights derived from choice-based conjoint experiments. The choice-based conjoint (CBC) method is a quantitative research method to understand how individuals make complex decisions. It is widely applied in the social sciences, especially political science, to understand decision-making processes and estimate causal effects (Hainmueller et al., 2014). It has been used in various fields, such as consumer research (Green & Srinivasan, 1978), marketing (Green & Srinivasan, 1990), health economics (Bridges et al., 2011), and psychology (Hainmueller et al., 2015).

Conjoint analysis has also been used to study topics such as compromise and choice sets (Dhar & Simonson, 2003), immigration decisions (Denney & Green, 2021; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2015), and causal inference in political communication research (Knudsen & Johannesson, 2018). The method has been validated against real-world behavior Hainmueller et al. (2015) and has been applied successfully in measuring preferences in diverse areas (Bridges et al., 2011). However, despite its increasing popularity, conjoint analysis is still not widely practiced in certain fields, such as political communication research (Knudsen & Johannesson, 2018).

The CBC method decomposes a decision-making process by presenting respondents with sets of alternatives, known as 'profiles,' that vary across multiple attributes. Attributes are defined by a varying number of values or levels, which are randomly assigned, fully or, for purposes of profile realism, with constraints. Respondents are asked to choose the most preferred option from each set, usually called a 'task.' By analyzing these choices, researchers can determine the relative importance of each attribute and its level and predict the probability of choosing specific profiles under different conditions using Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs)[3] or Marginal Means.[4] We will use both in this study.

[3]Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) are a specific analytical output derived from choice-based conjoint analysis. In the context of CBC research, each profile presented to respondents consists of a combination of multiple attributes, each with varying levels. The AMCE for an attribute level measures the average change in the probability that a profile is chosen when that attribute level is included, holding all other attributes constant at their average levels. Essentially, AMCEs quantify the isolated impact of each attribute level on the choice outcome. By isolating the effect of each attribute, AMCEs offer a rigorous means to untangle the complexities of decision-making. They provide insights into not just the direction (positive or negative) but also the magnitude of an attribute's impact. Consequently, AMCEs are instrumental in elucidating intricate choice behaviors, making them a vital component of CBC analysis. AMCEs are commonly estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level to account for the repeated task nature of the experiment.

[4]Marginal Means, often referred to as least squares means or adjusted means, are the predicted means for each level of a categorical variable, adjusted for other variables in the model. In social science research employing CBC analysis, marginal means are useful for understanding the central tendency of each attribute level when multiple other factors are at play. They provide a simple, interpretable summary statistic that shows the average predicted outcome for each level of a categorical attribute while holding other variables at their means or other specified values. Marginal means are computed by taking the estimated regression coefficients and calculating the average predicted outcome for each level of the focal attribute, while keeping all other attributes at their mean values or other specified levels.

One of the key advantages of CBC analysis is its ecological and construct validity, an important and sometimes overlooked element of experimental design in social science (McDermott, 2002). Unlike traditional survey methods that ask respondents to directly rate the importance of attributes, CBC mimics real-world decision-making scenarios where choices are typically made by evaluating multiple factors simultaneously. This enhances the external validity of the findings, making them more generalizable.

Conjoint analysis has become a popular tool to address social desirability bias (Krumpall, 2013), which refers to respondents giving answers they believe researchers—or society more broadly—will find more socially acceptable (Horiuchi et al., 2021). Social desirability bias is a related issue in which survey respondents present themselves in a way considered socially desired or less psychologically distressing, including denying or concealing socially undesirable prejudices (Hainmueller et al., 2014). Measuring survey preferences based on direct questions raises concerns about social desirability bias, as respondents may provide socially acceptable answers. The choice-based conjoint method presents respondents with a set of choices and asks them to make trade-offs, thus providing a more realistic and indirect approach to measuring preferences, likely reducing the likelihood of socially desirable responses (Horiuchi et al., 2021). This is especially the case when choice sets include items that are known to be sensitive, or plausibly so.

Furthermore, the CBC approach can deal with a large number of attributes (and their accompanying values) without overwhelming respondents, thanks to its factorial design. This makes it well-suited for exploratory research that identifies key factors from a broad set of possibilities. Relatedly, the method allows for the measurement of interaction effects between different attributes, thereby enabling a nuanced understanding of the decision-making process. It is particularly useful in cases where the subject matter is multifaceted and decisions are influenced by myriad factors, such as in the study of social integration, where political attitudes, social acceptance, and subjective feelings of belonging all play a role.

We employ several different conjoints to assess the dimensions of integration explored in this research. We will review them in order before discussing additional survey instruments (e.g., the list experiment) and selected direct questions used.

4.3 Survey Design #1 — Emerging Politician Conjoint

As assessed in the Literature Review, the echoes of past political systems, particularly socialism, play a defining role in determining contemporary political attitudes. Despite their unique historical trajectories, North Korea and former East Germany serve as cases of former socialist countries. Historically, those who have directly experienced socialism might hold perspectives and opinions on modern democratic processes, economic systems, welfare/redistribution, gender norms, and perceptions of diversity.

For this experiment, we ask respondents to consider the opinions of two emerging politicians, shown in a choice set. They are asked to read the positions of each and then choose which of the two they agree with most. While previous work has relied on observational survey data from repeated cross-sections of populations, we reuse some of the questions commonly asked and update them given current politics and cultural developments. We use five attributes in total, with varying levels meant to represent opinions that politicians in either country may articulate to court voters. The hypothetical politician vignette is meant to give respondents an alternative way to express their political attitudes, beliefs, and preferences in a multidimensional design, thus introducing trade-offs and complexity, which is more representative of political life. Table 4.2 presents the attributes and associated values. A short design rationale is provided to further explain the purpose of the attribute.

Given the 'divided country' basis of this research, our motivation for this experiment comes primarily from the post-socialism literature (see the preceding section for a review). Thus, we describe our exploratory expectations for each level as follows:

> *Views on Democracy.* Historically, those who faced economic downturns under socialism might be skeptical of democratic processes, associating them with these hardships. Consequently, one might expect older North Koreans and East Germans to be more critical of democratic systems, while younger generations, less influenced by direct experiences of socialism, might view democracy in a more positive light.
>
> *Views on the Economy.* Individuals who endured economic challenges under socialism, like severe material shortages, may lean towards market-oriented reforms. But if they've also seen the pitfalls of rapid market reforms, caution towards a complete free-market embrace might arise. East Germans, who faced the economic turbulence of reunification, and North Koreans, with limited market exposure, could both show such reservations.
>
> *Views on Social Welfare.* Given the comprehensive state-driven welfare mechanisms under communism, both groups might lean towards appreciating robust state intervention in welfare. Their historical experience with socialist welfare might influence this stance.
>
> *Views on Gender.* Though socialist regimes emphasized labor equality, deep-seated gender norms persisted. For instance, despite East Germany's pro-women workforce policies, some traditional gender perspectives might linger. Similarly, North Korea's historically pronounced stance on gender might translate into more rigid gender role expectations. For this experiment, we have updated the positions to better reflect current social currents and debates.
>
> *Views on Diversity.* The expectations on this attribute are unclear, although given increases in immigration in both countries and especially Germany, it is important to explore. Authoritarian regimes tend to emphasize national unity and homogeneity, thus there may be reason to believe post-socialist citizens will harbor skepticism toward the benefits of cultural diversity — economic, cultural, or otherwise.

Participants were presented with a pre-specified number of distinct tasks. In each task, they were shown the positions of two hypothetical politicians on various political matters — spanning views on democracy, economy, social welfare, gender, and diversity. Given the positions of these politicians, the participants were asked to choose with whom they most agreed — this is the forced-choice component.[5] Open-text manipulation checks were also included, where respondents were asked after one of the tasks to explain why they made the choice they did. This provides an additional check on the seriousness with which respondents took the survey. Table 4.3 (below) shows the experimental design, showing an English-language equivalent of what a respondent would have seen in taking the survey.

South Korean residents completed seven (7) tasks per respondent, North Koreans ten (10), and Germans (8). The final number of tasks for each sample population was determined by

[5]Respondents were also provided a way to express relative agreement or disagreement with a ratings-based measurement for each politician so they could, in theory, disagree with both. In this report, we report on the force-choice answers. North Korean migrants, due to attention concerns, were only asked to answer the forced-choice and the open-text questions.

concerns for statistical power and the total length of the survey.[6] The order of each attribute and the value assigned are randomized per task, and in this case, as in all the CBC experiments run in this research, there were no duplicate profiles shown in any given task. In choice-based conjoint experiments, implementing the repeated task exercise is fundamental for enhancing the robustness of the findings. One primary advantage is the increased reliability it offers. By having respondents evaluate multiple sets of choices, researchers can better gauge the consistency of a participant's preferences and assess if these preferences remain stable across different scenarios. Furthermore, the multiple tasks furnish a dataset with a greater effective sample size. Additionally, as participants are presented with varied combinations of attributes throughout the experiment, they inherently make trade-offs. This process reveals the relative importance of each attribute in their decision-making, helping to indicate which attributes hold the most sway.

4.4 Survey Design #2 — Social Discrimination and Jobs Training Conjoint

Measuring social discrimination, particularly in the context of employment assistance, can be achieved through experimental methods such as audit studies and correspondence experiments. These approaches involve creating controlled scenarios where individuals with different characteristics, such as criminal records or ethnic backgrounds, apply for the same job positions. The impact of these characteristics on employment opportunities can then be measured and analyzed (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003; Guul et al., 2019; Pager, 2003; Quillian et al., 2017). These experiments provide valuable insights into the extent of discrimination in social attitudes and can help identify areas where improvements, attention, and additional understanding are needed. Additionally, such research has explored the acceptance of people with disabilities at work (Vornholt et al., 2013), the impact of gender identity-related discrimination on employment (Bradford et al., 2013), and the antecedents of ethnic employment discrimination (Guul et al., 2019).

We take inspiration from existing studies in the design of our own. The social discrimination experiment regards South Korean and German preferences for providing employment support. We are not strictly interested in discrimination in the labor market but rather using a hypothetical scenario that leverages considerations about employment and job training support provided by the (hypothetical) state to measure what people think about others. This experiment aims to investigate social discrimination against new citizens in the context of providing job training support. Respondents are tasked with evaluating profiles of two hypothetical candidates based on several attributes like age, family status, sex, occupation, criminal record, and origin at birth. After evaluating the profiles, respondents decide which candidate to prioritize for job support.

In this choice-based conjoint design, respondents are exposed to combinations of attributes across different profiles, enabling us to understand the individual and combined effects of

[6] A pre-survey power analysis was conducted to determine the minimum viable sample size for each sample population. Power analysis is a statistical method used to calculate the sample size required to detect an effect of a given size. In this context, an effect could refer to a difference in preferences between two groups or a statistically significant relationship between variables. A statistical power of 0.8 was chosen as the benchmark. The value of 0.8 is a widely accepted standard in the research community, denoting an 80 percent chance that the study will detect an effect if there is one. In simpler terms, with a power of 0.8, there's a 20 percent risk of committing a Type II error—failing to detect an effect when one genuinely exists. Determining the number of tasks based on this minimum viable sample size ensures the research's statistical robustness while maintaining feasibility and efficiency. Given the focus on subgroups, especially in the German case, made it more difficult to ensure the threshold was met. This challenge is discussed more in the Data and Sampling subsection.

Attributes	Values	Design Rationale
Views on democracy	1. In a democracy, the economic system runs badly 2. Democratic systems are indecisive and bad at maintaining order 3. Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government	Evaluate perceptions of the effectiveness and value of democratic systems. It is meant to capture anti-democratic feelings.
Views on the economy	1. The state should give more freedom to firms 2. The state should control firms more effectively	Measure attitudes toward economic freedom and state intervention. This provides insights into their economic ideology and beliefs about the market economy.
Views on social welfare	1. People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves 2. The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for	Determine beliefs regarding the state's social responsibility (and welfare) and individual self-reliance. Seek to measure attitudes toward personal responsibility and state responsibility.
Views on gender	1. Gender should not be important in determining social roles 2. To promote equity, women should be prioritized over men for hiring decisions if equally qualified 3. When jobs are scarce, men should have more of a right to a job than women	Assess gender role perceptions and beliefs about gender equity. This offers a lens into prevailing societal views on gender roles and gender-based opportunities.
Views on diversity	1. Ethnic and cultural diversity erodes a country's unity 2. Ethnic and cultural diversity should be accepted because it is an economic benefit to the country 3. Ethnic and cultural diversity enriches the lives of people in our country	Investigate perceptions of the implications of ethnic and cultural diversity. This measures the perceived value or threat of diversity in the socio-economic and cultural fabric of a society.

Table 4.2: Attributes and Levels for Emerging Politicians Choice-Based Conjoint

1/n

Consider the following opinions from two emerging politicians. Read each person's position and then choose which of the two you agree with most.

These are hypothetical positions. You might not entirely agree with either politician but choose the person you most agree with.

	Politician A	Politician B
Views on democracy	Democratic systems are indecisive and bad at maintaining order	Democracy may have problems, but it's better than any other form of government
Views on markets	The state should give more freedom to firms	The state should control firms more effectively
Views on social welfare	The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for	People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves
Views on gender	To promote equity, sometimes women should be prioritized over men for hiring decisions	When jobs are scarce, men should have more of a right to a job than women
Views on diversity	Ethnic and cultural diversity erodes a country's unity	Ethnic and cultural diversity enriches the lives of people in the country
With whom do you most agree?	○	○

Table 4.3: The Emerging Politician Experimental Design

these attributes. Unlike the previous experiment, where we are provisionally interested in all attributes of the design, for the study focusing on discriminatory attitudes in South Korea and Germany, the primary attribute of interest is the individual's origin — whether they are from North Korea or a jurisdiction of the former GDR and current eastern Germany. The conjoint design showcases profiles of common working-class individuals.

While most attributes are designed to be comparable between the Korean and German contexts, the individual's origin matches national context and geography. By assessing South Korean respondents' reactions to these profiles, the design aims to identify any differential treatment or opinions arising from North Korean origins, thus uncovering potential prejudice against individuals of North Korean descent. The same logic of design holds for Germany, where the focus is on individuals hailing from the origins of former East Germany. Table 4.4 outlines the attributes and values for the design.

The conjoint experimental design, with its capability to present realistic profiles, is particularly suited for assessing discriminatory attitudes based on origin. By presenting respondents with profiles that mirror actual residents in their respective countries, without explicitly emphasizing any single origin, the conjoint design adeptly navigates around potential issues of social desirability bias. When presented with such profiles, respondents may express their genuine perceptions without the psychological pressure of conforming to societal norms.

For instance, a respondent who harbors biases might exhibit discriminatory judgments and feel more comfortable doing so given the main (sensitive) quantity of interest—origins—is embedded within the multifaceted profile. Furthermore, by maintaining consistent at-

tributes across both South Korean and German contexts—except for the pivotal origin variable—the design ensures that any response differences are most likely attributed to origin-based biases. This consistency enables a robust assessment, drawing confident conclusions about the discriminatory attitudes prevalent in both countries.

South Korean respondents assessed a total of seven (7) tasks, and Germans completed six (6) tasks. Table 4.5 shows an example of the experimental design. As before, the order of the attributes and the values assigned were random. However, for the attribute 'Criminal record', we place randomization constraints to better reflect reality. 70 percent of all profiles contained the 'No record' value, with 15 percent each rounding out some kind of record, either 'Petty theft' or 'Tax evasion.' In the Empirical Findings section, we look at whether criminal records have a moderating effect on preferences (i.e., whether some people are more 'punished' over others, or if the past record enables more discriminatory attitudes).

Attributes	Values	Design Rationale
Age	1. 25 2. 36 3. 45 4. 62	Control attribute but offers insights into age-based preferences or prejudices.
Family status	1. Single, no children 2. Married, 1 child 3. Married, 2 children 4. Single, 1 child	Control attribute but examines biases connected to being single or married and the number of dependents.
Sex	1. Male 2. Female	Control attribute but can show sex-based biases.
Current or recent occupation	1. Part-time convenience store employee[7] 2. Department store employee 3. Security guard 4. Store manager	Control attribute but by including diverse job roles, from entry-level to managerial positions, this attribute assesses biases tied to employment status and occupation type.
Criminal record	1. No record 2. Petty theft 3. Tax evasion	Shows the impact of past criminal records on contemporary perceptions. Used primarily as a control attribute, but also considered as a moderating attribute.
Origin at birth	South Korea: 1. North Hamgyong, DPRK* 2. Busan, ROK 3. Gyeonggi Province, ROK 4. Hanoi, Vietnam Germany: 1. Saxony, DE* 2. Hamburg, DE 3. Bavaria, DE 4. Bucharest, RO	This attribute is the focus of the experiment. By incorporating diverse geographical origins from both Germany and South Korea, along with an external non-native origin, this attribute shows the extent of origins-based discrimination, especially against those from North Korea or a jurisdiction in the former GDR.

* Main attribute level of interest

Table 4.4: Attributes and Levels for Jobs Training Conjoint (Discrimination)

1/n

Studies have demonstrated that for a country to achieve and sustain well-being, its citizens must be engaged in suitable and meaningful jobs. Imagine the [South Korean/German] government will introduce a new jobs training support program. Recipients chosen for support will receive monetary aid for skills acquisition and be assigned a special employment counselor.

You have been chosen as a judge for the program.

After evaluating the two candidates below, please select who should be prioritized for job support.

	Candidate A	Candidate B
Age	36	45
Family status	Single, no children	Married, 2 children
Sex	Male	Female
Current or recent occupation	Security guard	Store manager
Criminal record	No record	Petty theft
Origin at birth	Saxony, DE	Hamburg, DE
Which candidate would you prioritize?	◯	◯

Table 4.5: The Experimental Design for Jobs Training Conjoint

4.5 Survey Design #3 — National Identity Conjoint, List Experiment, and Observational Questions

Subjective integration pertains to the individual's internal experience of connectedness, perceived acceptance, and alignment with the cultural and societal norms of a given community or nation. This contrasts with 'objective' integration, which involves indicators such as employment status, language skills, or political behavior. Subjective integration is intrinsically tied to one's emotional and psychological state, reflecting a personal sense of belonging, worth, and congruence with the prevailing customs or society where one lives. We explore this concept through national identity and, relatedly, a measure of national pride.

National identity is a complex, multifaceted, and sometimes vague construct of an idea. It is meant to reflect individuals' ideas about their nation — what it is and, notably, who can belong to it. It encompasses cognitive and emotional components, reflecting how individuals perceive their membership in a nation. Given its centrality in influencing many social, political, and intergroup behavior, it has garnered significant attention from researchers and organizations worldwide.

To empirically explore the nuances of national identity, we employ a two-pronged approach. First, we use a choice-based conjoint analysis, a methodology that allows respondents to indicate their preferences by choosing between different combinations of attributes defining what it means to be a 'true national'. The conjoint analysis will serve as the foundation of our findings for the third dimension of integration, offering insights into the weighted significance of various components of national identity.

Subsequently, we examine various observational measures of national pride. Respondents from Korea are prompted with a straightforward query: "Are you proud to be South

Korean?" and "Are you proud to be from North Korea?" To explore the presence (or absence) or social desirability of these estimates, we compare direct estimates to those obtained from an indirect method of measuring preferences and attitudes — the list experiment. Lastly, for Germany, we look at the national pride battery of items, which explores 'pride' in specific aspects of German history, culture, and national achievements. For Germany, we look at pride in the country's accomplishments overall and ask all respondents. We do not do this in the Korea case, because we spend time in the survey on the list experiment and alternative measures of pride.

National Identity Conjoint

To operationalize and measure national identity, various studies have relied on the 'national identity battery' of questions (Jones & Smith, 2001; Kunovich, 2009). These questions are designed to operationalize different facets of national identity, focusing on items like birthplace, ancestry, and cultural adherence. For example, these questions might assess the importance respondents place on being born in a particular country as a criterion for true national belonging, or the value they assign to speaking the nation's primary language. Items within this battery are meant to tell us respondents' views of 'true' national identity and belonging. Over time, there have been different uses of the battery. Some approaches emphasize straightforward measurements of identity types (Dawkins & Hanson, 2022). Others adopt a more sophisticated stance, building on these foundations and refining the metrics (Bonikowski & DiMaggio, 2016). More recent works, like that of Bonikowski, Feinstein, and Bock (2021), align with the latter, offering nuanced insights into the evolving nature of national identity.

These studies also highlight the complexity and diversity of national identities across different contexts. Research has shown that different national identity items are associated with alternative kinds of national identities. A 'blood and soil' kind of ethnic nationalism may be associated with birthplace and ancestry, whereas cultural adherence or national sentiment may be associated with more open ideas of nationality. These are, respectively, typically referred to as ethnic and ascriptive identity types and voluntarist, civic identities. For instance, more democratic countries with liberal and constitutional traditions centered on the rule of law are associated with the latter, whereas more closed or autocratic societies that base their right to rule on 'purity' conceptions of nationality tend towards the former (Kunovich, 2009). These distinctions, however, are anything but certain. Wright et al. (2012), for example, find that while ethnic nationalism tends to be correlated with more restrictive and exclusionary preferences about immigration, a finding consistent with expectations given the identity type, the expectation that civic nationalism engenders more open and tolerant policy preferences is not always supported.

The repeated use of the national identity battery underscores its robustness as an 'objective' measure. The direct question method used in the national identity battery undeniably brings a structured approach to an otherwise fuzzy concept. However, it is not without methodological problems. Notably, the direct question method does not allow for the simultaneous evaluation of multiple attributes. In real-world scenarios, individuals often form perceptions based on a combination of factors, not in isolation. As noted, and with specific reference to South Korea, surveys often find that individuals will answer that all items in a battery are very or mostly important (Denney, 2023). While this is sometimes called identity credentialism (Indelicato & Martin, 2022), it is not particularly revealing.

Integrating items from the conventional national identity battery into a choice-based conjoint (CBC) design offers several benefits, particularly when the objective is to understand the intricacies of national identity. In this case, the particular strength of a conjoint analysis lies in its ability to unpack trade-offs. When respondents are presented with combinations of

attributes concerning national identity, it becomes possible to discern which elements are relatively most important in their decision-making or judgment processes—even if items might all otherwise be some degree of 'important' to the respondent. Such quantification offers a clearer perspective on the relative significance of elements like "being born in the country" relative to "speaking the country's language."

Furthermore, the CBC approach is especially appropriate because directly probing sensitive subjects like items defining a national identity can invoke socially desirable answers. In such a design, evaluating profiles in a multidimensional choice set, rather than isolated direct questions as typically done, can mitigate this potential bias. As far as the researchers know, this method of measuring national identity has not yet been attempted. This constitutes a fairly considerable methodological gap the current research is filling.

For all population samples involved (North and South Korean respondents as well as Germans), we employ a common design based on seven of the most common core items from the national identity battery. This approach ensures a consistent, comparative framework across diverse demographic segments. Table 4.6 lists all attributes and values we use in our conjoint design and an overview of their basic construct, meaning as an item measuring national identity, and/or a short rationale for including them.

Notably, we use 'South Korean' (hankukin) when asking questions about 'Korean' identity.[8] In surveying North Koreans about their sentiments toward adopting a South Korean identity, the term is the most suitable and precise. It specifically refers to the identity associated with South Korea, which is essential for the survey's objective: to understand how North Koreans, now in South Korea, perceive and adapt to this new national identity as part of a 'unification in action'. The use of 'German', then, should be clear.

Collectively, these attributes, drawn from the established national identity battery, provide a comprehensive lens to examine the multifaceted nature of national identity across different population samples. While our empirical expectations remain largely agnostic, existing literature and theoretical considerations suggest specific tendencies based on the nature of political and social institutions under which individuals are socialized. Specifically, individuals who have been socialized under autocratic regimes or institutions are more likely to emphasize ascriptive components of national identity, such as birth or ancestry (Kunovich, 2009). This inclination can be attributed to autocratic regimes' often rigid definitions of nationality and the emphasis on lineage or racial 'purity' as telltale markers of true nationality. North Korea is a case-in-point (Myers, 2011).

Conversely, those who have grown up under democratic institutions may prioritize voluntarist components of national identity. Such elements encompass national sentiment or an individual's alignment with democratic political values and institutions. The rationale here is that democratic societies often emphasize individual agency, choice, and shared values over inherited traits when defining national belonging (Snyder, 1993).

However, while these general patterns provide a backdrop, the primary emphasis of our research is not to validate these tendencies categorically. Instead, the central concern is to discern the extent to which our groups of interest converge or diverge in their perceptions of national identity. The patterns of convergence or divergence, and the nuances therein, may offer insights into the complexities of national identity formation and its interaction with broader political and social contexts.

The crux of our research does not solely rest on validating these general tendencies. Our primary focus is on groups hailing from the divided 'other' — Germans from the GDR

[8]There is some question as to whether North Korean migrants also understand hankukin to also mean 'South Korean', or perhaps something else. A careful discussion with leading civic leaders within the North Korean migrant community in South Korea and a focus group of North Korean migrants themselves indicates the word is understood as presumed.

and Koreans of North Korean origin. By examining their national identity preferences, we aim to comprehend their subjective understanding of self within the nation. A person who perceives themselves as subjectively integrated would demonstrate a national identity that aligns closely with the predominant sentiment of the 'host' nation. Thus, exploring the national identity preferences of these specific groups offers critical insights into their integration processes and the broader dynamics of national identity formation in divided societies.

Table 4.7 shows an example of the experimental design as a Korean survey taker would have seen it.

Attributes	Values	Design Rationale
Origin	1. Born in South Korea/Germany 2. Not born in South Korea/Germany	Birthplace as a condition for membership. Associated with ethnonational conceptions of identity, but also birthright citizenship.
Residence	1. Has lived most of life in South Korea/Germany 2. Has lived most of or all of life outside of South Korea/Germany	Duration of stay reflects commitment and connection to the nation. Longer residence strengthens the case for genuine membership.
Family origin/Ethnicity[9]	1. Has South Korean/German ancestry 2. Does not have South Korean/German ancestry	Ancestry or 'blood'-based conceptions of membership. An unambiguous form of ascriptive nationality.
Citizenship status	1. South Korean/German citizen 2. Not a South Korean/German citizen	Membership by citizenship. Typically civic, but given the link between ancestry and citizenship, not always considered so.
Understanding of history and tradition	1. Understands national history and traditions 2. Does not know much about national history and traditions	A voluntarist or civic marker: those who choose to know the nation are considered part of it. Showcases investment in the nation's collective memory.
Attitudes towards the political system and laws	1. Has respect for the country's political institutions and laws 2. Shows little regard for or knowledge of the country's political institutions and laws	Institutional and legal conception of belonging, with additional meaning for democracies (support for the democratic way of life).
Language capacity	1. Speaks Korean/German 2. Does not speak Korean/German	Language-based belonging, ethnocultural or civic depending on context. Signals willingness to participate in societal discourse.
National sentiment	1. Feels South Korean/German 2. Does not feel South Korean/German	Sentiment-based belonging: imagining oneself part of the national community. A voluntarist conception.

[1] A religion attribute was randomly assigned to the German sample (Christian/Not Christian). For purposes of comparability and presentation, we do not analyze that data in this report.

Table 4.6: Attributes and Values for National Identity Conjoint

National Pride

Assessing pride can offer insights into the elements that contribute to social cohesion and national identity. Indeed, measuring national pride provides insights into social cohesion and national identity by identifying shared values and achievements that unite citizens. We conceive pride as a social glue, creating a collective sense of belonging and trust. These elements

1/n

There are many things that people think make you a true national. Below, you will see the profiles of two hypothetical people. Choose among the two you think is the most truly [South Korean/German].

This exercise is entirely hypothetical. Even if you are not entirely sure, please pick one.

	Person A	Person B
Origins	Born in South Korea	Not born in South Korea
Residence	Has lived most of their life outside of South Korea	Has lived most of their life in South Korea
Family origin	Has South Korean ancestry	Doesn't have South Korean ancestry
Citizenship status	Not a South Korean citizen	South Korean citizen
Understanding of history and traditions	Does not know much about South Korean history and traditions	Understands South Korean history and traditions
Attitudes towards the political system and law	Shows little regard for or knowledge of the country's political institutions and laws	Has respect for the country's political institutions and laws
Language capacity	Doesn't speak Korean	Speaks Korean
National sentiment	Doesn't feel South Korean	Feels South Korean
Which person is more truly Korean	○	○

Table 4.7: The Experimental Design for the National Identity Conjoint

become markers of national identity, influencing both domestic policies and international relations. However, the facets of pride can also reveal exclusions, spotlighting marginalized groups and guiding targeted policy interventions.

National pride is commonly measured using a pride battery of questions that capture different dimensions of pride and national identity (Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Kavetsos, 2011; Miller & Ali, 2013). These questions assess individuals' feelings of attachment, loyalty, and positive emotions toward their nation. The pride battery of questions often includes items that measure patriotism, nationalism, cultural pride, political pride, and pride in a country's achievements.

For example, some studies distinguish between civic national pride, which relates to pride in a society's political system and economic performance, and cultural national pride, which relates to pride in a country's history and achievements in the arts and sciences (Miller & Ali, 2013). Other studies examine the qualitative content of national pride, including pride in soft power (e.g., culture, education, sports) and hard power (e.g., military victories, power politics) (Kasamara et al., 2019; Sorokina et al., 2022). These multidimensional measures of national pride provide insights into individuals' emotional connection to their nation and the factors contributing to their sense of pride.

Using a 4-point Likert scale for responses, where respondents are asked to indicate whether they are very proud, somewhat proud, not particularly proud, or not proud at all, the following pride items were explored for the German sample:

- Its achievements in the arts and literature
- The way democracy works

- Germany's economic achievements
- Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society
- Its history
- Germany's armed forces
- Its political influence in the world
- Its scientific and technological achievements
- Its achievements in sports
- Its social security system

Measuring Pride Among North Korean Migrants

In exploring the concept of 'pride' in being Korean among North Korean migrants, particularly in the context of 'being South Korean' and 'being from North Korea,' we use both direct and indirect measures to ensure comprehensive and unbiased data is measured. Given our overarching concern with Korea, we focus on North Korean migrants.

The direct measure is a conventional method wherein respondents are presented with straightforward questions regarding their pride in being "South Korean" or "from North Korea". By posing direct questions, we aimed to gauge their overt sentiments towards these identities in a simple way. This intuitive method often yields clear-cut responses, making it a staple in many surveys. However, when respondents are confronted with direct questions about sensitive topics — like identity questions for North Korean migrants—there is an inherent risk that their answers will be influenced by social desirability bias. This means that individuals may respond in a manner that they believe is socially acceptable or expected, rather than providing their true feelings or beliefs.

This is due to psychological, social, or cognitive factors. For online surveys of the kind used here, cognitive dissonance is very likely playing a role. When confronted with a direct question, respondents might experience discomfort if their true beliefs or behaviors are at odds with what they perceive to be socially accepted norms.[10] To reduce this cognitive tension, they might provide responses that align more closely with perceived norms, rather than revealing their genuine views. For not altogether different questions regarding Korean identity and questions of belonging, see Denney et al. (2020). How, then, can we deal with this measurement problem?

To address the potential social desirability bias, an indirect method can be employed through a list experiment. The list experiment is a subtle, yet useful tool designed to elicit

[10]North Korean migrants in South Korea represent a unique intersection of identities. They must navigate their North Korean origins with efforts to integrate into South Korean society. Their early life experiences, shaped by North Korean culture and politics, contrast starkly with the values and lifestyles they encounter in the South. The dominant societal narrative in South Korea may place an expectation on these migrants to demonstrate gratitude and allegiance, leading to pressure to assert their South Korean pride, even if their feelings about their homeland remain intricate, as research suggests (Green & Denney, 2021).

Furthermore, stigmatization and stereotypes, whether related to their accent, background, or other characteristics, can influence their responses. While these individuals may have disagreements with the North Korean regime, many retain emotional connections, often rooted in familial ties or cherished memories from their homeland. Directly expressing pride in North Korean origins could inadvertently be misconstrued as regime support, leading to reluctance to overtly share such sentiments. The precarious political dynamics between North and South Korea further compound these complexities, with some migrants fearing potential mistrust, surveillance, or legal consequences for expressing their true feelings even if they are told the environment in which they are sharing their thoughts is secure, anonymous, etc. Over time, a phenomenon known as adaptive preference formation might also play a role (Bruckner, 2007; Moses & Wiley, 2019). Having experienced the constraints and challenges in North Korea, some migrants might adapt their preferences to value the opportunities they encounter in the South, even if deep-seated connections to their North Korean heritage persist. Given these multifaceted challenges, direct questions about national pride become especially sensitive, intertwined with broader issues of identity, societal norms, and potential repercussions.

honest answers on sensitive topics. Survey respondents are divided into two groups: a control group and a treatment group. The control group is presented with a list of neutral statements and asked to state how many, but not specifically which, they agree or disagree with. The treatment group receives the same list, but with an additional statement related to the sensitive topic—in this case, feelings of national pride in South Korea or in being from North Korea. By comparing the average number of statements agreed upon by both groups, we can deduce the proportion of the treatment group that aligns with the sensitive statement without any individual explicitly acknowledging it as they must do via a direct question.

The primary advantage of this indirect method is that it allows respondents to express potentially controversial or stigmatized views without explicitly doing so, reducing the influence of societal and psychological pressure. By not forcing individuals to directly declare their stance on a sensitive topic, we can more accurately measure true preferences. Incorporating both the direct questions method and list experiment together provides a robust framework whereby we can compare estimates from each in order to determine whether social desirability is biasing answers or not.

The list experiment was framed as follows. North Korean migrant respondents were presented with a set of personal statements, reflecting a range of activities and beliefs. They were then instructed to count the number of statements that were not true about themselves without specifying which ones.

For the control group, a list of three neutral statements was provided:

- "I believe hard work is important for success."
- "I regularly chat with my friends about current events."
- "I enjoy working in groups."

For the treatment group, in addition to the three neutral statements, a statement related to national pride was included, reading:

- "I am proud to be South Korean."

Then, in a separate iteration, the following list was provided:

- "I have read a book or a novel in the past month."
- "I have attended a cultural or community event in the past six months."
- "I have traveled outside of my city of residence in the past three months."

And then, for those in the treatment group, the following statement was included:

- "I am proud to be from North Korea."

The underlying mechanism of this design is that by comparing the average counts between the control and treatment groups, we can infer the proportion of participants who agree with the sensitive statement. By not explicitly indicating their stance on the matter, participants can express their 'true' preferences and feelings without psychological distress. If there is a difference in the direct and indirect estimates of similar questions, we can conclude social desirability biases direct measures and consider the implications of those findings methodologically and more substantively.

4.6 Data and Sampling

In this section, we describe the data collection process and provide an overview of the descriptive statistics for the population samples. The Empirical Findings follow this section.

North Korean Migrants

The sample of North Korean migrants was sourced through a collaborative effort with Woorion, a non-profit organization based in South Korea. Woorion specializes in providing comprehensive support to North Korean defectors who have resettled in the South, making them an invaluable partner in recruiting a relevant and engaged participant pool (Lee, 2022). Their organization's reach and reputation within the North Korean migrant community facilitated a targeted and efficient recruitment process, thereby ensuring the sample's relevance and authenticity.

The sample includes North Korean migrants who have navigated the complexities of resettlement and integration within South Korean society. Given Woorion's focus on educational support, vocational training, and community outreach, the sample is diverse in terms of age, background, and time since defection, allowing for a comprehensive exploration of the study's key dimensions: political attitudes, social acceptance or discrimination, and subjective integration. Including this participant pool enriches the study by introducing perspectives deeply rooted in the lived experiences of those facing the challenges of integration that this research aims to understand.

The researchers worked closely with Woorion staff to ensure the reliability and quality of the sample. Woorion staff maintained personally identifiable information on the respondents to check their identity and follow up with them in case of quality control concerns. The researchers provided response data, including information on possible duplicates and incomplete or invalid responses. Through this collaboration, the researchers can be sure their respondents and data are of the highest quality. From September 15–October 29, 2023, a total of 245 North Korean migrant respondents were tallied. Table 4.8 provides an overview of the sample.

Statistic	N	Average	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	245	46.48	14.22	21	93
Woman	245	0.74	0.44	0	1
Borderlands[11]	245	0.61	0.49	0	1
Pyongyang	245	0.06	0.23	0	1
Some college+ in DPRK	245	0.32	0.47	0	1
Market experience	245	0.43	0.50	0	1
SES in DPRK[12]					
High	245	0.05	0.22	0	1
Middle	245	0.34	0.47	0	1
Low	245	0.37	0.48	0	1
Year of defection	245	2011	7.36	1970	2022
Year arrived ROK	245	2013	5.28	1997	2023
Years spent in DPRK	245	34.76	12.17	12	75
Years spent in ROK	245	9.81	5.28	0	26
Unemployed[13]	190	0.17	0.38	0	1

Note: Proportions may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

Table 4.8: North Korean Migrant Sample

South Koreans and Germans

For South Korean and German samples, the project employed Qualtrics, a widely recognized company specializing in online platform data collection and survey research. Qualtrics was instrumental in ensuring a methodologically rigorous and demographically diverse sample by implementing quotas for age, region, and gender.

In collecting samples for South Korean and German panels, Qualtrics tracks the time spent by respondents on each question and the survey as a whole. Such time tracking is important in identifying survey satisficers, indicating potential inattentiveness. Furthermore, the platform is fortified with mechanisms that detect and preclude duplicate responses. In addition to attention checks implemented by the researchers, high-quality and valid samples were recruited. Semi-representative samples were collected for South Korea from September 24 – November 4, 2023. The total number of respondents after quality control check was 1,813. Respondents were recruited in Germany from September 4 – November 4, 2023, with a total sample size of 2,325 after quality control checks. For the national identity conjoint, a separate but concomitantly run survey with Qualtrics' South Korean panel was run over the same period of time and with the same survey parameters. The panel characteristics are insignificantly different.

Tables 4.9 and 4.10 provide an overview of the South Korean and German samples.

Statistic	N	Average
Age	1813	38.11
Woman	1813	0.48
University+	1813	0.80
Region		
Seoul	589	0.32
Gyeonggi Province	386	0.21
Incheon	138	0.08
Busan	128	0.07
Daegu	87	0.05
South Gyeongsang	76	0.04
North Gyeongsang	56	0.03
Daejeon	55	0.03
Gwangju	51	0.03
North Chungcheong	43	0.02
Gangwon Province	37	0.02
Ulsan	37	0.02
South Chungcheong	36	0.02
North Jeolla	31	0.02
South Jeolla	27	0.01
Jeju	18	0.01
Sejong	15	0.01

Note: Proportions may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Table 4.9: South Korean Sample

Statistic	N	Average
Age	2,325	48.25
Cohort		
Western German	1832	.78
Eastern German	245	.10
Post-GDR	248	.11
Woman	2,325	.52
University+	2,325	.36
Region (current)		
North Rhine-Westphalia	512	0.22
Bavaria	279	0.12
Baden-Wuerttemberg	232	0.10
Lower Saxony	206	0.09
Berlin	174	0.07
Hesse	160	0.07
Saxony	150	0.06
Rhineland-Palatinate	132	0.06
Saxony-Anhalt	87	0.04
Brandenburg	81	0.03
Thuringia	81	0.03
Hamburg	72	0.03
Schleswig-Holstein	60	0.03
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania	47	0.02
Saarland	38	0.02
Bremen	13	0.01

Note: Proportions may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Table 4.10: German Sample

5 Empirical Findings

This section analyzes the integration dynamics across our three dimensions in Korea and Germany. For each subsection, we proceed as follows. First, we conduct an intra-country analysis, focusing on the integration of new citizens from North Korea into the Republic of Korea and Germans from or residing in Former East Germany. We aim to determine if the attitudes, preferences, and identities of these new(er) citizens converge or diverge with the broader "receiving" population. This constitutes the main empirical focus.

Second, we entertain selected inter-country comparisons between South Korea and Germany and our two "post-communist citizen" groups. In this comparison, Germany is an illustrative example of what a unified Korea might resemble. This comparison sheds light on the broader implications of democratic governance in both countries and the lasting effects of communist or socialist legacies in each case. Using intra- and inter-country analyses, we aim to provide a thorough understanding of integration in these distinct national contexts and what the comparative implications are.

Throughout the Empirical Findings section, we will descriptively assess data visualizations created to convey the research findings. We will provide additional context on what the visualizations mean, technically, and also how best to read and understand them. The purpose of this section is to present the findings. The Conclusion will consider their broader meaning and implications. When reporting the results below, we refer to "North Koreans" as a shorthand to mean new citizens of South Korea born and raised in North Korea (i.e., North Korean migrants, defectors, or refugees).

5.1 Integration Dimension I: Political Attitudes

First, we examine the political attitudes of Koreans and Germans. Based on the choice-based conjoint methodology, we look at preferences among our main interest groups and focus on the convergence or divergence of attitudes. We start with Korea.

South Korea

Figure 5.1 shows the marginal means from the emerging politician choice-based conjoint (CBC). Marginal means are the adjusted means of the outcome (i.e., politician choice) for each profile attribute level while controlling for or holding constant the other attribute levels in the regression model used to estimate the means. It offers a standardized view of the effect of an attribute level, removing the variability introduced by other attributes. To interpret the marginal mean of a specific profile attribute level, one should understand it as the probability that a profile is selected.

The way the marginal means between groups are read and interpreted is twofold. First, for any given group (e.g., South Koreans), we look at whether the attribute value is more significant than .50. As a rule of thumb, if the confidence interval overlaps with 0.5, the effect should be considered (statistically) insignificant. Then, we examine intergroup estimates, eyeing for convergence or divergence. For select group comparisons, we perform z-tests for statistical significance.

Regarding our first figure for the analysis below, and starting with views on democracy, we observe a noticeable distinction between the two samples. Both populations believe that "democracy is the best system despite having problems," with South Koreans expressing stronger agreement evidence by a marginal mean of .60 (i.e., 60 percent of all candidate profiles containing this viewpoint are chosen). North Koreans agree, but slightly less so (a marginal mean of .56).

In contrast, when considering the belief that "democratic systems are indecisive and bad at maintaining order," North Koreans are moved in the direction of opposition but not significantly so. This suggests a nuanced appreciation of democracy in the North Korean sample, where there is recognition of its benefits but also its perceived inefficiencies. This is not a view shared by South Koreans, who are more decisively opposed to opinions suggestive of democratic alternatives.

Economic views further underscore some intergroup distinctions. There is a divergence in views about state intervention in the economy. South Koreans prefer the state to control firms effectively (.51 marginal mean). This preference, although relatively weak compared to other effects, might be a reflection of South Korea's historical trajectory, where government intervention played a pivotal role in economic development during its rapid industrialization phase, or could indicate some desire for the state to reign in the monopolistic tendencies and excesses of its larger firms, such as the chaebols.[1] Conversely, North Koreans, despite hailing from a traditionally centralized economy, do not lean either way on this attribute.

Despite the small but significant divergence in opinions regarding political and economic systems views, the rest of the results show convergence between the South Korean and North Korean samples on the other attributes. None of the intergroup differences observed in the figure are statistically significant. This suggests an alignment in opinions across the other attributes representing ideal social and political order. Regarding redistribution, both groups display a tendency towards the belief that the government should take more responsibility for everyone, indicating a collective preference for stronger state intervention in social welfare. In the gender domain, both South Koreans and North Koreans demonstrate shared opinions, including the view that gender should not determine social roles. Both groups strongly hold this view.

Lastly, regarding diversity, both samples recognize the enriching value of racial and cultural diversity. The consensus between the two groups might be attributed to an increasing global interconnectedness, where societies are more exposed to and influenced by a global ethos that champions diversity and the economic value high-skilled immigrants can bring to a host country. Moreover, such converging views might symbolize the permeation of liberal democratic values in Korea's political culture, which emphasizes pluralism and the richness of diverse perspectives. It is, perhaps, especially notable that North Koreans, hailing from an ethnically homogeneous nation-state that emphasizes the value of racial purity and ethnonationalistic fervor, demonstrate such a convergence with South Korean perspectives on diversity. The findings challenge monolithic perceptions of North Koreans and highlight the

[1] Chaebols are large, family-owned business conglomerates in South Korea, characterized by their powerful influence on the country's economy. They are typically multinational corporations with a diverse set of affiliated companies controlled by a single family. The term "chaebol" is a combination of the Korean words "chae" (wealth) and "bol" (clan), which accurately describes the family-centered structure of these entities.

potential influence of global liberal democratic ideals even within the confines of one of the world's most closed-off societies.

In summary, outside the realm of economic beliefs, the two populations display a surprising cohesion in views across diverse attributes, suggesting underlying shared cultural, historical, or social factors that transcend their distinct political histories and systems.



Figure 5.1: Emerging Politician Conjoint Analysis Results — South Korean vs. North Korean Samples.

Marginal means quantify how each attribute value influences the likelihood of preferring a politician. The estimates are based on OLS models with clustered standard errors. Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates.

To better illustrate the inter-group differences, Figure 5.2 plots the differences in the marginal means per attribute value between North and South Koreans. A value above the central line indicates that South Koreans hold the stated view more strongly than North Koreans (color red). In contrast, a value below the line signifies a stronger endorsement of that view by North Koreans (color blue). Where the confidence intervals cross '0', the differences are not statistically significant (color black).

We can more clearly see the differences in opinion regarding political systems and the slight preference South Koreans have for greater state involvement in economic planning and firm freedom. North Koreans are slightly more supportive of politicians who voice views in favor of racial and cultural diversity—something perhaps indicative of their status as part of

a new "multicultural" South Korea. We will explore the implications of such findings more below.



Figure 5.2: Difference in Marginal Means Between Samples — South Korean Estimates − North Korean Estimates.

The blue and red point estimates and error bars indicate where the differences are statistically significant. Black indicates they are not. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

To present a more substantive and intuitive summary of the findings shown thus far between the two Korean groups, we present the estimated probabilities of profile preference across the distribution. We determine the combination of attribute values that constitute the minimum, 50th percentile, and maximum positions, which we can alternatively interpret as the politician least likely (minimum) and most likely (maximum) to be supported. The middle point then represents the equivalent of a "coin flip." Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the findings.

In the figures, the hypothetical politicians' profiles are defined on the y-axis. There is a convergence of preferences between North and South Koreans regarding the most preferred politician's view of an ideal political, economic, and social order. We see that the profile most likely to be accepted (>75 percent probability) is someone who advocates strongly for democracy, thinks the state should control firms more effectively and take responsibility for providing for its citizens through greater redistribution, and holds a neutral position on gender in society. There is a small difference regarding diversity, with South Koreans viewing

it more instrumentally (good for the economy) and North Koreans seeing it as a good unto itself (enriches society).

However, once we move on to less preferred but not totally rejected combinations of positions, differences emerge. This is important to note, as it is realistic that any given person in a democracy is going to come across a political platform that they do not entirely agree or disagree with. Even still, it is only a profile respondents are likely to accept 50 percent of the time (i.e., not very popular). Regarding the "coin flip" politician's profile, North and South Koreans are both willing to concede a critical view of democracy. South Koreans will support equity hiring, and North Koreans revert to a patriarchal or traditionalist view on gender in the labor market. Another difference is on diversity, where their views flip from the most supported candidate.

Regarding the least preferred political platform, we see convergence again, and this time completely. Both North and South Koreans are opposed to political platforms that include the idea that democracies are bad for economic management, agree that giving too much free to firms and not enough support to individuals is undesirable, do not agree that women should be preferred over men during trying times,[2] and disagree that diversity erodes a country's unity.

Overall, the two figures illustrate the largely overlapping but sometimes contrasting preferences between North and South Koreans regarding their political attitudes and preferences for political, economic, and social order. These insights, which we will discuss in more detail below, can pave the way for more nuanced discussion regarding integration, unification, and broader policy-making endeavors.



Figure 5.3: Politician Profiles Across the Distribution — Who South Koreans Most and Least Prefer.

Plot shows the predicted probability of choosing at the minimum, 50th, and maximum quantiles of the distribution. The error bars show 95% confidence intervals.

South Korea presents a good case for a generational analysis of political preferences, primarily due to its political transition from an authoritarian regime to one of Asia's few consolidated, liberal democracies. As we have reviewed, theory indicates that coming of age under differing political systems matters. It is justified, then, to consider not only Koreans

[2]It is, of course, important to note that most of the sample and of the North Korean migrant population are women, so this is not necessarily a surprising finding. It is not beyond a doubt, however, that one sex may hold traditional or patriarchal views on gender, so it is still a finding worth reporting. The sample size is not large enough to conduct subgroup analysis on, otherwise it would be worth exploring gender-based differences in attitudes among North Korean migrants.



Figure 5.4: Politician Profiles Across the Distribution — Who North Koreans Most and Least Prefer.

Plot shows the predicted probability of choosing at the minimum, 50th, and maximum quantiles of the distribution. The error bars show 95% confidence intervals.

socialized under North Korea's authoritarian institutions but also those born and raised during South Korea's authoritarian period. This is an especially important basis for subgroup analysis among South Koreans, given that South Korea is now and will most likely continue to be a democracy. In a future unification scenario similar to the German case, individuals will likely integrate with South Korean democrats and its democratic political culture.

To conduct this subgroup analysis, we divided the South Korean sample into those who spent at least 12 years of their adult life under democratic rule (the "Democratic Generation") and those who did not, following the same measurement logic as used throughout this research.[3] The "Authoritarian Generation" will have come of age during an era of greater political instability, stricter government control, and within a broader social milieu likely to have engendered different political norms and values. This method constitutes a forgiving measure of political generation but should suffice for the intended purpose. We then re-run our analysis on the two resulting groups and re-plot the findings. Figure 5.5 shows the results.

The findings suggest that differences in opinion are not considerable. As would be expected among those who came of age in the democratic era, those in the Democratic Generation view democracy as the most favorable system despite potential problems and are more likely to oppose views suggestive of an anti-democratic idea, namely, the idea that democratic systems are bad at maintaining order.

A few differences stand out as notable. First, regarding gender preferences, we see that democrats are less likely than the other groups to support equity hiring (women over men) given equal qualifications. Second, on diversity, we see that support for the position that diversity is enriching, while still registering a positive effect, is significantly lower than the North Korean migrant group and appears to be trending towards the middle point. We pick back up on some of these points and their significance in the final section of the report.

Germany

We turn now to Germany, where we will focus on intergroup differences within a once divided and now unified society. As explained in detail throughout this report, the point of this comparison is mainly to envision a future scenario for Korea. The differences between the

[3] We exclude respondents who are not native-born South Koreans.



Figure 5.5: Emerging Politician Conjoint Analysis Results — South Korean Generations vs. North Koreans.

Marginal means quantify how each attribute value influences the likelihood of preferring a politician. The estimates are based on OLS models with clustered standard errors. Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates.

countries are many and considerable, so we proceed cautiously. The findings are, however, worthy of consideration in their own right, and there is much to learn about divided countries and societies generally from a close look at the German case. We focus on three groups in total: those who were born in and came of age in West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany before unification) or jurisdiction formerly belonging to that country (i), those born and raised in jurisdictions formerly belonging to East Germany (ii), and those who were fully socialized in the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany) (iii). We refer to these groups as Western Germans, Eastern Germans, and Post-GDR Citizens, respectively. For more on these groups and the rationale behind our definitions, see the previous section.

Figure 5.6 shows our main results. Regarding democracy, all three groups agree that despite its challenges, democracy remains the ideal system. However, Eastern Germans tend to diverge slightly but not insignificantly from Western Germans and those from the GDR. They show less enthusiasm for democracy as "the best system" and are less dissuaded from a position that the economy is run poorly in a democracy—perhaps registering some protest and discontent with the direction of things post-unification. The differences are not noticeably large; for example, Western Germans and Post-GDR Citizens register a marginal means of

.58 for the pro-democracy position, whereas Eastern Germans come in at .55. The difference of .03, or three percentage points, in read as a proportion of profile likely selected conditional on this level being present, is notable but one should be careful to make too much of the finding. The trends in the directions of the estimates, however, indicate some reportable differences in opinion.

Regarding the state's role in the economy, none of the groups are noticeably moved in either direction. For the welfare attribute, both Eastern Germans and Post-GDR Citizens manifest a marginally stronger inclination for the government to assume greater responsibility for its citizens when juxtaposed with Western Germans. Yet, all groups uphold the importance of individual responsibility for personal well-being. There is a shared belief in gender's irrelevance in determining social roles. Still, Western Germans can be moved in favor of supporting equity hiring decisions and, relative to Post-GDR Citizens, are less agree that gender is an irrelevant factor in society. The findings for Germany overall regarding equity hiring decisions present a rather notable difference from the Korean data; we will explore this more below.

Lastly, in preferences for diversity, we see some of the most notable differences in opinion yet. All groups acknowledge the economic benefits derived from ethnic and cultural diversity, although the Post-GDR group position cannot be stated with confidence.[4] Regarding diversity as a culturally enriching aspect of society, we see notable and significant differences in preferences. Western Germans are moved in favor of hypothetical politicians expressing such views, and Post-GDR Citizens are agnostic—entirely unmoved in either direction. Eastern Germans may oppose such ideas, although we again state so cautiously. The effect is negative, but we cannot be confident this is the effect on the sample population statistically. Consistent with the other two levels, we see Western Germans oppose positions that posit diversity as a net negative for society. They are moved to oppose the position that "diversity erodes a country's unity." The effect of the other groups, too, is similarly negative but much less clearly so.

Next, we examine preferences for politicians' positions across the outcome distribution, as was done above for the Korean samples. We look at preferred politician profiles across our three groups of interest (Figures 5.7–5.9). From "most" preferred through "least", we focus here on where the groups diverge. We see that regarding the most preferred profiles (profiles that are chosen >75 percent of the time), there is nearly complete alignment. All groups support politicians who support a market-based democracy order with redistribution policies that ensure people are taken care of without any particular attention paid to gender as a socially determinative idea. On diversity, all three groups favorably appraise profiles containing positive positions. However, for Post-GDR Citizens and Eastern Germans alike, there is an apparent preference for diversity to bring some economic benefit—likely a proxy for skilled immigration. Western Germans view diversity as a generally enriching thing.

Regarding politicians whose ideas might cut either way—positively or negatively—we see more variation and a change in what one is willing to support. For Western Germans, the politician's profile at the 50th percentile concedes that democracy might not always be the best political system, a position with which the other groups agree but for different rea-

[4]Statistically speaking, when the lower bound of the confidence interval (CI) for the Post-GDR position crosses the threshold of 0.5 on the scale, it introduces ambiguity about the effect's true magnitude and direction for the statement "ethnic and cultural diversity is of economic benefit." Specifically, the crossing of this threshold means that we cannot be sufficiently confident at a conventional significance level (95%) that the population mean effect for the Post-GDR group is positive. Instead, there is a possibility that the true effect could be neutral or even negative. It's worth noting that this uncertainty does not invalidate the effect but rather indicates that more data or refined methods might be necessary to establish a definitive stance on the issue for the Post-GDR group.



Figure 5.6: Emerging Politician Conjoint Analysis Results — By German Population Groups.

Marginal means quantify how each attribute value influences the likelihood of preferring a politician. The estimates are based on an OLS model with clustered standard errors. Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates.

sons. Those in the East see it as bad for democracy, a view arguably consistent with the post-communist literature. The other attribute levels vary. Notably, for this profile, we see that Eastern Germans support an anti-diversity position. Post-GDR Citizens and Western Germans do not. There are diverging views on gender, with Western Germans supporting a "male breadwinner" model during trying times.

For the profiles least preferred, we see complete alignment except for one one value: Eastern Germans do not support the state giving complete freedom to firms, perhaps reflective of negative experiences in the post-unification economic re-ordering. None of the groups agree that democracies are bad at managing an economy. Overt preferences for men in trying times are rejected, as is the idea that ethnic and cultural diversity are bad for society.

For the next step, we address a structural issue with the German sample. Among the verified and completed responses, those belonging to the Post-GDR Citizen group in particular, but Eastern Germans more generally, are significantly older, disproportionately women, and less well educated. Sample imbalance is a fundamental challenge that can compromise the validity of the results. In the context of this study comparing Eastern and Western Germans, significant imbalances in age, gender, and education can introduce biases in the results. Such discrepancies can distort the causal relationship we seek to establish in our experiments. If



Figure 5.7: Politician Profiles Across the Distribution — Who West Germans Most and Least Prefer.

Plot shows the predicted probability of choosing at the minimum, 50th, and maximum quantiles of the distribution. The error bars show 95% confidence intervals.



Figure 5.8: Politician Profiles Across the Distribution — Who Eastern Germans Most and Least Prefer.

Plot shows the predicted probability of choosing at the minimum, 50th, and maximum quantiles of the distribution. The error bars show 95% confidence intervals.



Figure 5.9: Politician Profiles Across the Distribution — Who Post-GDR Citizens Most and Least Prefer.

Plot shows the predicted probability of choosing at the minimum, 50th, and maximum quantiles of the distribution. The error bars show 95% confidence intervals.

left unaddressed, the sample's imbalance would not only undermine the reliability of the study but also its generalizability—and potential for policy implications. Therefore, to enhance the internal validity of the study and ensure that comparisons between Eastern and Western Germans are meaningful, a method to address and, to some extent, correct these imbalances is pursued. This is where the concept of matching comes into play.

Matching is a statistical technique used primarily to control for confounding variables in observational studies, but the applied logic here is the same. It ensures that the treated and control groups (or, in this context, the Eastern and Western Germans) are comparable on observed characteristics, thus bringing balance to the groups analyzed from the sample. It is, in effect, adding controls and bringing structural balance to the groups.

In the matching process, for every observation (or individual) from the group of interest (Eastern Germans, including Post-GDR Citizens), two comparable observations from the reference group (Western Germans) are identified based on specified characteristics like age, gender, and education. This study employed a 2:1 nearest-neighbor matching approach, selecting two Western Germans with the closest characteristics for every Eastern German in the sample.

The matching ensures the characteristics are distributed similarly across both groups or at least adjusts for an imbalance. Matching addresses the confounding problem, where an external factor might be responsible for the observed effect rather than the independent variable of interest. By ensuring that the distribution of potential confounding variables is similar across the two groups, we can be more confident in attributing observed differences to the group distinction rather than some confounding factor, like age. Furthermore, when groups are balanced, the statistical power of tests is typically increased, and estimates are less biased.

Table 5.1 shows the statistical output from the nearest-neighbor matching procedure. The table shows the proportion of each sample by age, sex, and education for Eastern Germans ("treated group") and the Western Germans ("control group") before and after implementing a nearest-neighbor matching procedure. This method's primary objective is to mitigate observed discrepancies between the groups on certain covariates. The "distance" metric showcases the dissimilarity between the two groups. Before matching, a noticeable disparity ex-

isted, but after matching, this gap was substantially narrowed, indicating a more balanced match between the two groups.

Variable	Means Treated (All Eastern Germans)	Means Control (All Western Germans)	Std. Mean Diff. (All Data)	Means Control (Matched Western Germans)	Std. Mean Diff. (Matched Data)
Distance	0.39	0.13	1.13	0.24	0.66
Age	46.30	38.20	0.57	42.55	0.27
Women	0.73	.48	0.56	0.63	0.23
Some university	0.33	0.80	−1.01	0.55	−4.80

Table 5.1: Matching Outcome for the German Population

Using the adjusted dataset, we re-run the conjoint analysis and report the marginal means for both groups in Figure 5.10. Looking at just the Western and Eastern German populations instead of the three groups, we can observe two main points of divergence between the groups. The first is regarding state redistribution ("welfare"), where Eastern Germans are more supportive. The second is, again, regarding diversity. While both groups are moved positively by an "economically beneficial" framing of diversity, we see clearly that Eastern Germans are not encouraged to support a politician if their position is that diversity is enriching for citizens, and neither are they particularly moved to oppose the view that diversity erodes a country's unity.

It is important to note what this adjusted analysis is considering and what it is correcting. First, it examines respondents representing Eastern Germany, including those from the former GDR, which was not an analytical categorical used prior. In this sense, it is a new group, but one whose construction is justified because those currently living in former East Germany share, to some extent, an institutional legacy that continued even after the Berlin Wall fell. Second, the adjusted sample ensures that our conclusions about Eastern Germans relative to Western Germans are not a function of age imbalance or education. There are other variables one might include, but those used should capture a wide swath of population differences and correct for the imbalances. We do not report the outcome of the same kind of matching exercise with the Korean population as, in that case, we are looking at the resettlement and integration of what is ultimately a migrant group.[5]

In Figure 5.11, we show the differences in the marginal means (Wester German estimates minus Eastern German estimates). We can see that the bookends of the differences are diversity concerns, as indicated (nearly a difference of .04 each, or 4 percentage points), followed by political economy concerns, such as the political system itself of how much the state should be responsible for people in society.

Inter-Country Analysis and Findings

Finally, for the political attitudes analysis, we examine the political perspectives of the "receiving societies" of South Korea and Western Germany and the "post-communist citizens" of North Korea and the GDR. We seek to underscore any comparative differences or notable divergences in opinion. While each of the countries under consideration—South Korea and Germany—have undergone unique socio-political transformations over the course of their

[5]We did, in fact, do this analysis and found that it made little substantive difference in the outcome.



Figure 5.10: Emerging Politician Conjoint Analysis Results — By Matched German Population Groups: Eastern vs. Western German.

Marginal means quantify how each attribute value influences the likelihood of preferring a politician. The estimates are based on OLS models with clustered standard errors. Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates.

recent histories, there are underlying commonalities in their experiences, namely the confrontation of socialist and authoritarian legacies within their democratic frameworks. We seek to underscore any comparative differences or notable divergences in preferences for both the sake of knowing our samples and findings and also for additional comparative insights.

For South Koreans and Western Germans, distinct preferences emerge (Figure 5.12). Both populations value the belief that democracy, despite its challenges, is the best system, but South Koreans are more likely to support intervention to regulate private companies, as identified above. The main differences are on the welfare and gender dimensions. Regarding the former, we see that while both prefer a greater or more involved state role in ensuring greater redistribution and responsibility for people, it is South Koreans who are much more in favor of an active state on this front. For gender, both populations agree that gender should not be socially determinative, but there is a positive effect for Germans regarding gender equity decisions and a negative one for South Koreans. Furthermore, Western Germans are less likely to think in times of employment scarcity that men should be prioritized—a more traditional "breadwinner" idea of gender relations and labor market participation.



Figure 5.11: Difference in Marginal Means — West German Estimates − Eastern German Estimates.

The black and red point estimates and error bars indicate where the differences are statistically significant. Grey indicates they are not. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Turning to the post-communist citizens of North Korea and the GDR (Figure 5.13), we see, by a large, a carbon copy of the receiving society outcomes, indicating that these subgroups hold political opinions largely in line with the new(er) compatriots. The only significant difference that emerges is the one already identified—diversity. We see that Post-GDR Citizens are not positively moved in favor of diversity on grounds that it is socially enriching, and neither are they definitively against the position that ethnic and cultural diversity is socially erosive. North Koreans are more in favor of diversity as a social good and against the idea that it is erosive. We will return to these considerations in the Conclusion.

5.2 Integration Dimension II: Social Discrimination

We now transition to the social discrimination part of the study. Having outlined the conceptual framework and motivation behind the choice-based conjoint method to explore social discrimination in the previous section, we will go right to the findings derived from the conjoint experiment, focusing on South Korean and Western German preferences for providing employment support. We aim to understand how origin-based discrimination might mani-



Figure 5.12: Emerging Politician Conjoint Analysis Results — "Receiving Societies": South Korean and Western German.

Marginal means quantify how each attribute value influences the likelihood of preferring a politician. The estimates are based on benchmark OLS models with clustered standard errors. Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates.

fest and affect the prioritization of candidates for job support. Drawing on our results, we will critically analyze the extent and nature of discriminatory attitudes prevalent in both South Korean and German contexts. Subsequently, we will situate our findings within the broader literature on social discrimination in the Conclusion, where we also reflect on the insights the findings provide into the challenges faced in integrating divided societies and the role of discrimination therein.

South Korea

Figure 5.14 presents our findings for the South Korean population. As before, we present the marginal means for the profile attribute levels, which quantify how each value influences the likelihood of the hypothetical candidate being preferred for job training assistance by the respondents. When we examine the section on origins, four are listed: Gyeonggi (the province), Busan, North Hamgyong, and Hanoi. We see clearly that native origins are most preferred; in other words, notable origins-based discrimination is observed. Gyeonggi has the highest marginal mean of .58, meaning that 58 percent of profiles with candidates from this location



Figure 5.13: Emerging Politician Conjoint Analysis Results — "Post-Communist Citizens": North Korean and Post-GDR.

Marginal means quantify how each attribute value influences the likelihood of preferring a politician. The estimates are based on OLS models with clustered standard errors. Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates.

were selected. Individuals from this region in South Korea are highly preferred regarding job training assistance. The second most preferred is Busan at .58 (effectively identical to the Gyeonggi value).

For non-native origins, there is a considerable decline in support. There is an unambiguous aversion to supporting individuals from North Hamgyong, a province in North Korea from which most North Korean migrants hail. This indicates a certain degree of bias or discrimination against those of Northern origin (the marginal mean of .43 indicates that only 43 percent of such profiles were chosen). The least preferred is Hanoi, Vietnam (.41), suggesting that people of foreign background are likely to face more pronounced discrimination compared to local or regional origins. The effect size difference between people from North Korea and Vietnam is, however, relatively small. South Koreans likely view migrants of North Korean and Vietnamese origin somewhat similarly. We will return to this finding later to consider its broader implications.

In addition to origins-based effects, we see that whether one has a previous (criminal) record is extremely important. Candidates without prior records are chosen 59 percent of the time, whereas those with records are discounted heavily and equally. The marginal means

for petty theft and tax evasion are both .29. We explore the importance of this particular type of discrimination next. For this research, we are not interested in interpreting the other attributes' effects.



Figure 5.14: Discrimination Conjoint Analysis Results — South Korean Preferences for Job Training Assistance.

Marginal means quantify how each attribute value influences the likelihood of preferring a candidate. The estimates are based on an OLS model with clustered standard errors. Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates.

We have reason to believe, both in the literature on the subject and intuitively, that hypothetical candidates with previous records will not be preferred for state support for jobs training and employment support—even if, arguably, such people might be those who most need it. Furthermore, it is worth exploring whether certain origins—such as foreign ones—are more heavily discriminated against conditional on criminal records. To investigate this question, we focus on the interaction effects of the origin and previous record attributes. Figure 5.15 presents the results.

The interaction is clear and strongly suggests that discrimination is conditional. If a respondent is shown a profile with a previous record, it strongly conditions their view of the candidate's origin. Take those from North Hamgyong—our primary origin of interest in this research. Suppose a candidate coming from this Sino-North Korean borderland province has no previous record. In that case, the effect is actually slightly positive (marginal mean of .51), but if they have a previous record, they are strongly discriminated against (.24 for both types

of previous records). For what are likely presumed to be non-co-ethnic migrants from Vietnam, a similar difference is observed, but the "no record" point of reference is to the left of 0.5, indicating that a candidate of Vietnamese origins is not preferred even without a previous record.

Notably, the discrimination is strongly applied regardless of origin. A candidate from either Gyeonggi or Busan without a record is chosen 68 percent of the time. But if those candidates were previous tax evaders or were punished for petty theft, they are no longer preferred. However, despite the equally applied principle of "record discrimination", it is important to note that for North Koreans resettling in South Korea, the consequences of having a record—or even perhaps of being perceived as someone more likely to have a record—are greater than native residents. As evidenced by Vietnam in this case, the same applies to other newcomers to South Korea.



Figure 5.15: Interaction Effects for South Korean Discrimination Conjoint — Candidate Origin × Previous Record.

Marginal means quantify how each attribute value influences the likelihood of preferring a candidate. The estimates are based on an OLS model with clustered standard errors. Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates.

Lastly, we look at one subgroup for South Korea: groups defined by political identification. Specifically, we look at differences in preferences between conservatives and progressives.[6] The reason we do this is the theoretically relevant nature of domestic politics in the country. North Korean defectors have a distinct political and cultural background; in the eyes of the South Korean public and the migrants themselves, they often face challenges similar to other migrant groups, such as integration, employment, and societal acceptance. Their unique position as both political defectors and migrants means they might experience a dual form of marginalization.

Given their skepticism toward the North Korean regime, conservatives may view defectors favorably as they have renounced their association with the DPRK. They could be seen as testimonies to the failures of the North Korean system. However, the same conservatives might also harbor suspicions, viewing defectors as potential spies or doubting their loyalty to the South. More generally, conservatives might be wary of immigration and demographic

[6]We measure these two groups by, first, defining as progressive and conservative those who self-identify as such using a simple question. The question also gives them an option to self-identify as centrist. Then, given what we know about the phenomenon of "partisan leaning", we code as conservative or progressive those who self-identified as centrist but, in a follow-up question, aligned with one of the conservative (People's Power Party) or progressive (Minjoo Party or Justice Party) parties.

changes, emphasizing the importance of cultural assimilation and often expressing concerns about job competition or potential strain on welfare systems.

Then, for progressives, while they might be supportive of reconciliation with the North, they tend to showcase mixed feelings about defectors. On one hand, they might empathize with their plight and champion their cause for human rights reasons. On the other hand, they might view high-profile defectors, especially those who are outspoken against the North Korean regime, as obstacles to peaceful reconciliation and thus apply a less-than-welcoming attitude to the rest of the population. For immigration generally, they might be more welcoming of diversity and often advocate for policies that support migrants' rights, integration, and welfare—although immigration in South Korea is not quite the social wedge issue that it is in North America or Western Europe.

Figure 5.16 presents the findings, again with a focus on origins. We see the same pattern as before, with native residents strongly preferred by both conservatives and progressives. Conservatives may slightly prefer those of North Korean origin, but the effect difference between them and progressives is small and statistically insignificant. We see a small heterogenous effect between the two political ID groups, with progressives discriminating slightly less than conservatives for those from Vietnam (.42 vs. .39), thus aligning Vietnamese immigrants with North Korean migrants in the minds of progressives.



Figure 5.16: Discrimination Conjoint Analysis Results — South Korean Preferences for Job Training Assistance by Political ID.

Marginal means quantify how each attribute value influences the likelihood of preferring a candidate. The estimates are based on an OLS model with clustered standard errors. Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates.

Germany

Now, we turn to Germany. Figure 5.17 shows the full results for those from Western Germany or Eastern Germany. We see again the effects of origin are not uniform—where one is from matters, and it matters differently depending on where the respondent is from. As in the Korean case, residents of an unambiguously foreign origin—Romania, in this case—are the least preferred and slightly less preferred by Eastern Germans (marginal means of .40) compared to those from the West (.42).

However, regarding our main quantity of interest (candidates from Saxony), we note two findings. First, both groups view candidates from former East Germany positively. However, there is a significant effect size difference between the two German groups. Eastern Germans

are much more likely to prefer fellow compatriots from the East, whereas, for Western Germans, those from Saxony are the least preferred among the native-born residents (a marginal mean difference of .04, or four percentage points). Based on the position that origin should not matter, we can say there is some discrimination by Western Germans against those from former East Germany—and vice-versa; those from East Germany show some in-group favoritism based on origin, although the effect size differences between the various candidate origins are smaller.

Yet again, candidates with previous records (theft or tax evasion) are strongly punished by respondents and more or less equally by both groups. There is evidence that Eastern Germans care less about petty theft (a marginal mean of .35 compared to .32 for Western Germans), but the takeaway is effectively the same. Like above, we look more closely at the importance of a previous record.

Then, in Figure 5.18, we consider origins-based discrimination conditional on prior records using interaction effects. We then plot for Western and Eastern Germans, specifically focusing on Western German preferences for candidates from former East Germany. Again, we see that any candidate with a prior record is largely disqualified in the eyes of Germans for job training support assistance from the state. The difference in preference between Western and Eastern Germans holds for the interaction model effects, too. For candidates from Saxony with no record, the marginal mean for Western Germans is .58 and .61 for Eastern Germans. Regarding those with previous records, the same effect size difference remains. The difference is less great than that between native-born residents and those of foreign origin, but the difference remains.

Inter-Country Analysis

Lastly, we consider inter-country findings between South Korea and Western Germany, the "receiving societies". Figure 5.19 presents the results. Given the strong negative effects of candidates having a previous record, combined with the fact that such profiles only constituted 30 percent of all profiles shown, we choose to show the findings based on "no record" profiles only. We can see between the groups that South Koreans exhibit a much stronger native-born preference. There is an exceptionally wide gap between support for those from South Korea compared to North Korea, although both groups are South Korean citizens, more or less by birthright.[7] We read into this evidence of considerable discrimination against South Koreans of North Korean origin (i.e., North Korean migrants); this group is only marginally more preferred over the immigrant group, indicating that North Koreans in South Korea are likely perceived as such. It is notable, too, that Western Germans also exhibit some discriminatory attitudes against those from former East Germany, preferring those from West(ern) Germany

[7]Strictly and legally speaking, South Korea does not practice birthright citizenship in the manner of jus soli, which grants citizenship to individuals born on the territory of a country regardless of the nationality of their parents. A child born to at least one South Korean parent (an ROK national) is typically granted South Korean citizenship, regardless of the place of birth. South Korean nationality law is evolving towards a more mixed regime but currently is still classified as adhering to a principle of jus sanguinis, wherein citizenship is conferred through parentage. See more on the Nationality Act here: `https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=18840&type=part&key=7`.

As discussed in previous sections of the report, individuals born in North Korea who defect to South Korea are treated under a unique legal and administrative framework. The South Korean Constitution effectively considers the entire Korean Peninsula, including North Korea, as its constitutional territory, implying that North Koreans are also considered nationals of South Korea (with some exceptions). The legal foundation for these practices is rooted in the South Korean Constitution and the National Security Act, which effectively grants North Koreans the right to South Korean citizenship. This policy is predicated on the South Korean government's official perspective that North Koreans are not foreigners but rather citizens of the same country who happen to live under a different regime. As such, our findings presented here are particularly notable.



Figure 5.17: Discrimination Conjoint Analysis Results — German Preferences for Job Training Assistance.

Marginal means quantify how each attribute value influences the likelihood of preferring a candidate. The estimates are based on the benchmark OLS model with clustered standard errors. Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates.

instead. The difference is not nearly as great as in the Korean case, but it exists. We explore the implications of these findings in the concluding section of the report.

5.3 Integration Dimension III: Subjective Integration

Subjective integration refers to the personal and internal feelings of belonging, acceptance, and identification with a particular community or nation. It speaks to an individual's sense of place, values, and alignment with the dominant culture or community in which they reside. As reviewed in the previous section, we approach this concept through measures of national identity and selected measures of pride. As we have done throughout this report, we look at how our groups of interest converge or diverge as a measure of the degree to which these societies are integrated. We start with our findings based on the novel national identity choice-based conjoint (CBC) implemented in all three populations.



Figure 5.18: Interaction Effects for German Discrimination Conjoint — Candidate Origin × Previous Record.

Marginal means quantify how each attribute value influences the likelihood of preferring a candidate. The estimates are based on an OLS model with clustered standard errors. Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates.



Figure 5.19: Discrimination Conjoint Analysis Results — "Receiving Societies" Focus on Origins: South Korean and Western German. "No Record" Profiles Only.

Marginal means quantify how each attribute value influences the likelihood of preferring a candidate. The estimates are based on OLS models with clustered standard errors. Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals for these estimates.

South Korea

Starting with the Korean populations, we report Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) for the national identity CBC instead of marginal means. AMCEs show the average effect of an attribute level, compared to a reference category, on the probability of a profile being chosen, holding all other attributes constant. Put differently, the AMCE for an attribute level tells us how influential that specific level is in driving the choice of a profile, which in this case is a hypothetical person whom respondents are evaluating as "truly South Korea", compared to a baseline level of that same attribute. The findings are reported in Figure 5.20.

The attributes can be understood in terms of the "presence" or "absence" of a particular trait. Then, the AMCEs tell us how important the presence of the trait is relative to its absence. We know that all identity traits are deemed important by the respondents because the AMCEs are all positive. What we are focusing on is the relative importance of the traits and where there is divergence between the groups. The findings tell us that for South Koreans if the hypothetical person was born in South Korea, it increases the probability that the profile will be chosen by .08 (or 8%); this is the least impactful value. Speaking Korean increases the probability by 13 percent and respecting South Korea's political system or feeling South Korean increases it by 17 percent. National sentiment ("feeling South Korean") and respect for the country's political system are the most impactful values.

How do North Koreans differ? The differences are few, but some are notable. North Koreans are less likely to emphasize language or national sentiment as important but more likely to think that respect for the political system is important. Otherwise, there is general alignment in the two groups' conception of what it means to be South Korean. Figure 5.21 plots the AMCE differences to show where there is notable divergence. The blue indicates a statistically significant difference where South Koreans find the items more important, and the red indicates the same but for North Koreans.

Germany

Next, we look at Germany, again analyzing our sample by Western German, Eastern German, and Post-GDR Citizen subgroups. Figure 5.22 reports the AMCEs for the national identity CBC. For all three groups, the political system variable and speaking German are important values for being considered a "true German". However, the effect of the political system variable is smaller for Eastern Germans than it is for the other two groups. We can also see that on the ethnicity and origins attribute, being an ethnic German and being born in Germany are relatively more important for Post-GDR Citizens than they are for others.

Then, to simplify the analysis, both analytically and visually, we collapse the Eastern German and Post-GDR Citizen groups into one "East German" category and re-run our analysis. Figure 5.23 shows the updated findings. Here, we can see some of the subtle but not significant differences, especially regarding citizenship and the political system attribute. It is nevertheless difficult to see the effect differences. Figure 5.24 then visualizes them, showing more clearly that Western Germans place a greater focus on respect for the German political system in their conception of "true Germanness". In contrast, Eastern Germans emphasize citizenship, residence, origin, and ancestry—and although the differences for several are not particularly large, they are significant, statistically and substantively.

Inter-Country Analysis

To provide a comprehensive conclusion to our empirical analysis of the national identity choice-based conjoint (CBC) study, our focus extends to a comparative analysis between two distinct cohort categories: those from the receiving societies—South Koreans and West



Figure 5.20: National Identity Conjoint Analysis Results — South Koreans vs. North Koreans.

Estimates represent the effects of the randomly assigned identity attribute values on the probability a person is chosen. The AMCEs are based on OLS models with clustered standard errors. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Germans—and the "post-communist citizens" comprising North Koreans and citizens from the post-German Democratic Republic (GDR) areas.

In examining the South Korean and West German groups, the research aims to disaggregate the prevailing narratives and perceptions of national identity held by the established populations. We look to discern the ingrained conceptions and expectations that characterize the concept of the nation held by these groups. These ideas reflect the dominant cultural, historical, and ideological narratives that inform the collective understanding of what it means to be a part of these nations and how these narratives shape attitudes towards more recent members of the society.

Conversely, when turning our attention to the North Koreans and post-GDR citizens, the analysis is oriented around the lived experiences and challenges associated with the assimilation into and acceptance by their new democratic environments. Therefore, we look closer at how "post-communist citizens," who have previously been under socialist regimes, navigate their new social landscapes, form new national identities, and internalize the values and norms of democracies. It also considers, for Germany specifically, how those living in the former GDR conceive of the nation.



Figure 5.21: Difference in AMCEs Between Samples — South Korean Estimates – North Korean Estimates.

The blue and red point estimates and error bars indicate where the differences are statistically significant. Black indicates they are not. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

The results are presented in Figures 5.25 and 5.26. There are some attributes for which there is alignment. Origins and ancestry have a relatively unimportant effect on identity preferences for both, and respect for the political system (i.e., democracy) is one of the most important qualities of national identity—consistent with what we have explored throughout this report. Speaking German or Korean, too, is important for both, but slightly more important for the German population.

There are notable differences, too. South Koreans place a much greater emphasis on having lived in South Korea for most of their life; Western Germans do not. Citizenship is another notable difference, with South Koreans again thinking it is a particularly important quality of what makes one a true national. Lastly, national sentiment matters much more to South Koreans, with more than a seven percentage point difference, it represents the most different thing about the two groups.

Lastly, we report our findings focusing on "post-communist" citizens. It is important to note here, first, that given the considerably smaller sample sizes, the error bars are considerably larger—that is, there is a much greater amount of uncertainty regarding the true preference of the population. If we focus on where there are considerable and clear differences, we conclude that language is considerably more important for Post-GDR Citizens than it is for North Koreans. Less unambiguously clear in differences, but with notably divergent effect sizes, we see that origin[8] and ancestry is less important for North Koreans. The largest effect size (+20%) is North Koreans' belief that respect for the South Korean political system makes you truly South Korean. Such emphasis on the importance of a political system signifies, perhaps, a profound recognition of civic values and an embrace of constitutional principles as essential cornerstones of belonging in their new societal context.

[8] In the context of the Korean Peninsula and the socio-legal ideas regarding citizenship, identity, and belonging, the "origin" attribute is a complex one for North Koreans. They could perceive themselves as having been born in what is legally considered, by South Korean law, as part of the same country. This constitutional perspective could potentially ameliorate the ambiguity or starkness of the attribute by aligning it with a broader, more inclusive national identity that transcends the current political divide. From this standpoint, the attribute of being born in "South Korea" could be interpreted as being born within the sovereign territory that South Korea claims, which technically includes North Korea.



Figure 5.22: National Identity Conjoint Analysis Results — By German Population Groups.

Estimates represent the effects of the randomly assigned identity attribute values on the probability a person is chosen. The AMCEs are based on OLS models with clustered standard errors. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

National Pride

National Pride in Germany

Figure 5.27 shows national pride in Germany, portraying collective sentiments that vary across the populations of concern, notably between those from the former West and East Germany and Post-GDR Citizens. Given the uniqueness of these findings compared to the others in this section, we report and analyze in some depth what we observe.

Regarding the armed forces, Germany's history in the 20th century, particularly during the World Wars, has had a lasting impact on its national psyche shared by all. The devastation wrought by war, especially under the Nazi regime during World War II, mutes Germans feeling of national pride. The legacy of militarism associated with these periods has led to a broad cultural aversion to military glorification (Lockenour, 2017). Post-WWII, Germany has maintained a defensive military posture, emphasizing integration within a liberal world order.

History, as a source of pride, is similarly complex in Germany. The national narrative is overshadowed by the atrocities committed during the Nazi era, including the Holocaust. The country has undertaken a thorough process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, which translates



Figure 5.23: National Identity Conjoint Analysis Results — By German Population Groups: Eastern and Western German.

Estimates represent the effects of the randomly assigned identity attribute values on the probability a person is chosen. The AMCEs are based on OLS models with clustered standard errors. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

to "coming to terms with the past," underscoring a national commitment to remember and learn from history rather than celebrate it uncritically (Niven, 2002).

Post-GDR Citizens' even lower levels of pride in history likely stem from the complex nature of East German history under Soviet influence and the subsequent challenges of reunification. The GDR period involved significant political repression and economic challenges, with a legacy many may not view with pride. After reunification, integrating into the Federal Republic of Germany also involved significant social change and challenge and economic hardship for many former East Germans, which may further diminish the sense of historical pride.

In contrast, there are aspects of German history that are sources of pride, such as contributions to philosophy, science, literature, and the democratic rebuilding of the country after WWII.

Indeed, we see areas of significant pride among Germans that resonate across all groups surveyed—Western Germans, Eastern Germans, and Post-GDR Citizens. As the data suggests, the common ground of pride is prominently found in science and technology, where Germany has made substantial global contributions. The nation's reputation as a power-



Figure 5.24: Difference in AMCEs Between Samples — Western German Estimates – Eastern German Estimates.

The blue and red point estimates and error bars indicate where the differences are statistically significant. Black indicates they are not. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

house of scientific research and technological innovation, evidenced by a history of notable Nobel laureates and pioneering inventions, provides a shared source of national pride. Contributions to arts and literature also stand out as a source of pride, albeit to a lesser extent than science and technology. Germany's literary and artistic heritage, marked by figures such as Goethe and Beethoven, continues to be a point of cultural identity for the German people.

Furthermore, the democratic rebuilding of Germany after World War II is another significant aspect where pride converges across the population groups. Establishing a stable democracy, characterized by the rule of law, political pluralism, and social freedoms, is a remarkable feat considering the historical context of the 20th century. This democratic resurgence is intrinsically linked to the nation's current identity, reflecting resilience and a commitment to fundamental human values, which has likely bolstered the sense of pride in the country's political system, particularly among Western Germans who have experienced it for a longer duration.

Notably, Post-GDR citizens exhibit a higher level of pride in social security and democracy, which indicates the value placed on these aspects for their sense of belonging within a unified Germany. The increased pride in social security could be attributed to the memory of social guarantees that were a significant part of life in the former GDR, where state provision for social welfare was extensive. The transition to a reunified Germany may have amplified the importance of social security as an indicator of a stable and caring society, particularly for those who experienced the uncertainties that came with the reunification process.

Post-GDR Citizens also show a substantially higher degree of pride in democracy than their Eastern German counterparts. Similarly, a marked difference is observed in the level of pride in social security.

The higher levels of pride in democracy among Post-GDR Citizens could indicate generational differences in perception and value systems. Therefore, those from the GDR may have a more favorable view of democracy, appreciating its values and principles, possibly influenced by educational systems and societal norms that emerged after reunification. They might associate democracy with the freedom, self-determination, and prosperity experienced in post-reunification Germany. Alternatively, it could indicate a sense of relative indifference, dissatisfaction, or worse among those who belong to the jurisdictions in the for-



Figure 5.25: National Identity Conjoint Analysis Results — "Receiving Societies": South Korean and Western German.

Estimates represent the effects of the randomly assigned identity attribute values on the probability a person is chosen. The AMCEs are based on OLS models with clustered standard errors. The reference categories are dropped. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

mer GDR. We cannot say for certain here, but this is a most relevant finding for integration considerations beyond post-communism concerns.

For social security, Post-GDR Citizens, again, exhibit greater pride than Eastern Germans. This suggests that this group values the social security system as a beneficial legacy from the GDR era, now effectively integrated into a broader, capitalist system. It could also be reflective of a contemporary context where social security represents a stable and protective aspect of German society, one which they have always known and perhaps see as a given, in contrast to the older generation who experienced the transition and may evaluate it against a backdrop of past insecurities or systemic changes.

The significance of these differences lies in the intersection of generational experience, societal transformation, and individual expectations. Such disparities in pride suggest that Post-GDR Citizens, shaped by a different historical narrative and socialization process than their predecessors, may align their national pride more with the ideals and practical benefits of the current German state rather than the lived realities and memories of the GDR. It underscores the influence of temporal and experiential contexts on national identity. It indicates



Figure 5.26: National Identity Conjoint Analysis Results — "Post-Communist Citizens": North Korean and Post-GDR.

Estimates represent the effects of the randomly assigned identity attribute values on the probability a person is chosen. The AMCEs are based on OLS models with clustered standard errors. Reference categories are dropped. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

that even within a reunified country, the past continues to exert a differentiated impact on various population segments.

Overall, the data reflects that, despite the complex layers of German history, there is a collective acknowledgment of the country's accomplishments in intellectual, cultural, and political spheres, which continue to shape the narrative of national pride in contemporary Germany with some notable differences worthy of closer inspection.

National Pride in Korea

To conclude this section, we look at national pride in Korea. For the Korean population, we take a much simpler and more direct measure of pride, asking whether people are "proud to be South Korean" and, for those of North Korean origin, whether they are proud to be from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. For North Korean migrants, we also included an indirect measure of both pride items obtained via the list experiment, which was explained in detail in the previous section. We turn now to our findings (Figure 5.28).



Figure 5.27: Estimates of Pride in Germany — By German Population Groups.

Estimates are corrected for age, gender, and education. The proportion with "pride" includes answers "a lot" and "somewhat". The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

The point estimate for North Koreans shows a higher percentage, close to 100 (96%), with a narrow confidence interval, which suggests a high level of reported pride in being South Korean and low variability in the responses. The score for South Korea is noticeably lower, around 90 percent, but for new citizens from North Korea, there is a strong sense of pride and alignment with the receiving population.



Figure 5.28: National Pride: Comparing North and South Korea — Those who say they are "proud to be South Korean".

Estimates are adjusted for various demographic factors. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

However, there is reason to believe the estimate is inflated. The elevated estimate for North Korean pride in being South Korean can be interpreted with caution due to the potential influence of social desirability bias—a tendency of respondents to answer questions in a manner that will be viewed favorably by others. Consequently, the high level of expressed pride may not solely reflect genuine sentiment but also an adaptive response to the sociopolitical context in which the respondents are situated. We look for evidence of this via the list experiment and present the adjusted proportion of North Koreans who express pride in being South Korea and compare it with the direct method. We complement this with answers to the question about pride in being from North Korea.

Figure 5.29 presents two sets of estimates for national pride among North Korean migrants: one derived from direct questioning (blue) and the other from list experiments (red), which are designed to mitigate social desirability bias. For pride in being from North Korea, the list experiment estimate is approximately 32 percent higher than the direct estimate. When asked directly, only 17 percent of North Koreans sampled said they were proud of being from the DPRK, but when given an indirect way to express their opinion, this increases to 49 percent. Conversely, pride in being South Korean is around 31 percent lower in the list experiment compared to the direct estimate. When given an indirect way of expressing a preference—the truer preference, we could say—the high percentage agreement comes in adjusted at 65 percent.

The substantial discrepancies indicate that respondents may have overstated their pride when asked directly, likely due to social desirability bias. The list experiment provides a more accurate measure of true sentiments by allowing respondents to conceal their responses. Furthermore, the findings demonstrate the critical role of methodological approaches in survey research, particularly when dealing with sensitive topics like national pride in a politically divided and emotionally charged context such as that of North and South Korea. The data underscores the necessity of using methodologies, such as the list experiment (or the choice-based conjoint), that account for underlying biases to capture a more accurate representation of individual preferences. This insight is paramount for researchers and policymakers who rely on such data to understand the complexities of national identity among migrant populations.



Figure 5.29: National Pride: North Korean Migrants — Measured Using List Experiments and Direct Estimates.

Estimates are adjusted for gender, age, education, and time spent in both North and South Korea. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

6 Conclusion and Discussion

The research laid out in this report centers on the questions related to the social integration of post-communist citizens in their new, 'receiving societies' that experienced division. This approach particularly focused on the political, social, and psychological integration of individuals from distinct, socialist political and economic systems for which we selected the cases of former citizens of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) integrating into a reunified Germany after 1990 as well as North Korean migrants resettling in the Republic of Korea (ROK).

In Germany, citizens from the former GDR experienced a passive shift, not involving physical migration, but rather a systemic transformation of their society. This transition contrasts sharply with the experiences of North Korean migrants in South Korea. The South Korean scenario involves an active and involved process of integrating these migrants, highlighting a stark difference from the German experience, where the active integration of East Germans by West Germans was comparatively less pronounced.

The objective of this study was to provide conceptually and methodologically sound insight into the characteristics of integration by post-communist citizens and to offer insights into the process and challenges of integration in the cases of Germany and Korea, which have experienced division but are at different stages of unification. Ultimately, our insights are meant to inform the planning that goes into a potential Korean unification scenario.

The case selection leveraged post-unification integration experiences in Germany with the individual integration experiences of North Korean migrants in South Korea. The comparative analysis rested on a historical assessment of Germany's three decades of integration following the unification and juxtaposed this with the continuous integration of North Korean migrants in South Korea — a form of 'unification in action'. While German unification is often upheld as a potential example or guideline on a broader, objective level, we specifically addressed certain research gaps in our investigation of post-communist citizens. We argued that an intra-country comparison allows us to assess the alignment of attitudes between the 'receiving' societies and post-communist integrators. Furthermore, the case comparison between Korea and Germany enabled us to contrast the intra-country results, assess the legacies of communist socialization as elaborated in the literature, and consider the social implications arising from discrimination against new citizens.

The surveys developed built on the existing literature in post-communism, political socialization, and related subjects while also addressing commonly identified methodological problems. Thus, the study design was anchored in insights from the existing literature and enriched by innovative approaches to create novel insights. Our methodology centered around a novel choice-based conjoint survey (CBC) design using hypothetical profiles that our respondents were asked to evaluate. The context and attributes assessed in these profiles were dependent on the scenario we provided and based on the dimensions that we purposefully

chose to employ. The CBC designs were employed to operationalize the measurement of different kinds of concepts related to political, economic, and social order, to explore origins-based discrimination through redistribution attitudes, and in order to measure better and understand national identity preferences. This approach allowed us to attain a reliable measurement of respondent opinions, mitigating the possible effects of social desirability bias or a lack of realism in survey design. We supplemented this approach with additional survey instruments to support the reliability of our CBC data. The survey is complemented by conventional survey questions for which we utilize question batteries with solid academic foundations.

The study approached the question of social integration from a subjective perspective, focusing on the attitudes and preferences of both the citizens in the receiving societies and those integrating. It measured integration in three primary dimensions: political attitudes, social discrimination, and subjective integration. These dimensions explored various aspects such as political, economic, and social order preferences, social acceptance and discrimination dynamics, and personal connections to national identity and pride. What did our research find? We summarize across our three main dimensions as follows:

1. Political Attitudes and Preferences: The research reveals a convergence of political attitudes between North and South Koreans, with South Koreans showing a stronger democratic orientation. This indicates the significant role of living in a democratic society in shaping political perspectives. The study challenges the notion of a post-communist ideological predisposition, suggesting that national context plays a crucial role in shaping current political attitudes.
2. Social Discrimination: The study examines social discrimination against new citizens, exploring barriers to integration and attitudes of the receiving society towards new residents and immigrant groups. The findings indicate significant native-born preference in South Korea, with pronounced discrimination against North Korean migrants, and a less stark but discernible bias in Western Germany favoring individuals from their former territory.
3. Subjective Integration: The research focuses on the extent to which new citizens feel, express, or imagine themselves as part of their receiving nation. Notable differences in national identity perceptions were observed, with North Koreans emphasizing respect for South Korea's political system and South Koreans assigning greater importance to language proficiency. In Germany, differences are observed between Eastern and Western Germans in their perceptions of national belonging.

Overall, the research findings summarized here and reviewed in greater detail in this study show considerable degrees of convergence and some interesting differences between the cases, offering novel theoretical insights and practical implications for integrating divided nations post-unification. The comparative framework between Germany and Korea provides a nuanced understanding of integration dynamics shaped by history and context, underscoring the importance of considering these factors in policy and societal cohesion efforts.

The implications for future unification scenarios are profound. The German experience provides critical lessons for Korea, particularly in managing the systemic transformation challenges and the varied expectations of citizens from different political backgrounds. Meanwhile, the active integration efforts observed in South Korea highlight the crucial role of recipient societies in successful integration processes, offering insights applicable to other contexts of societal unification.

Next, we expand on the significance and discuss the relevance of our findings as per each integration dimension.

6.1 Political Attitudes and Post-Communist Citizenship

The existing literature on social attitudes in post-communist and other post-authoritarian societies demonstrates that these systems substantially affect public opinion and social attitudes that can outlive them. The mechanism by which they do this is primarily political socialization. As children and young adults, we learn what is politically acceptable, what is to be taken for granted, and what is contested or contestable. For instance, an important part of political socialization in many western societies today is educating children about the evils of racism and sexism — ideas antithetical to liberal societies. The mechanism by which socialization is affected is primarily schooling, but in more liberal societies, parents and home life may also have an outsized influence. The ages at which political socialization occurs are the subject of scholarly debate, but generally up to the ages of either 18 or 25 are considered the 'critical period'.

Generally, all political regimes seek to socialize their younger citizens into their respective country's political culture. In this respect, communist regimes were no different. But they produced a particular type of socialization that was quite distinct to other authoritarian regimes, not to mention democratic regimes.

Communist regimes are single-party, consolidated autocracies. They do not practice genuine electoral competition, and substantial debates on party policy were not entertained or tolerated in the public sphere. As a result, people socialized under such a system have been found to be less well-predisposed toward democratic politics. Democracies can appear chaotic and anarchic especially compared to the orderly appearances projected by communist regimes at large set-piece events like party congresses or in the sessions of rubber stamp parliaments.

Such regimes are also dominated by state control of the economy, with all productive assets, firms, and resources owned by the state, alongside most of the country's labor force being under the control of state administration. The communist command economy was presented as being rational and run in the interests of working people, whereas markets were irrational, anarchic, random, and ultimately serving the interests of capitalists. While the communist economies of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and in other parts of the world, ultimately failed to produce sustained economic growth, experience of them seems to have produced enduring effects on how post-communist citizens think their countries' economies should be run. With many post-communist citizens believing that the state curtails the power of firms and exercises more of a controlling hand in the economy than it does in many of the post-communist economies of the world.

Communist regimes also sought to create all-encompassing welfare states, including universal healthcare, education, pensions, universal housing, and full employment. The quality of healthcare provision, and the supply of housing may have been found to be rather wanting, but the fact that everyone who needed a job could find one, and that basic healthcare and housing was generally available on demand were substantial achievements for these systems. They appear to have created durable expectations about what the state should provide its citizens even following the collapse of communism.

Alongside formal institutionalized forms of socialization, it is also worth noting two other forms of socialization that these systems seemingly reproduced and that have persisted since their collapse. Gender attitudes and attitudes toward migration and immigrants are both seemingly more consequences of social structure than they are of formal regime policy per se, but their effects have proved durable all the same.

Firstly, communist regimes were outwardly committed to formal, legal gender equality and sought to facilitate family creation and child-rearing while also allowing women to participate in economic activities outside the home. They did this through the provision

of universal daycare and education for children, among other measures. But while they did make substantial progress in some countries in advancing women's entry into the world of work and their capacity to remain in the workplace after having children, they also suffered from considerable occupational segregation and the persistence of conservative gender norms. Consequently, post-communist citizens often espouse values more in keeping with the social realities of communist regimes than these regime's notional commitments to full gender equality.

Secondly, communist regimes, while being outwardly cosmopolitan and even committed to the spread of socialist revolution across the world, were often not ethnically diverse or open societies. While the Soviet Union itself was the multiethnic successor state to the continental Russian empire that spanned Europe and Asia, its politics was dominated by Russians and Ukrainians. Most Eastern European states were also largely closed to immigration and were largely monoethnic. Hence, attitudes toward immigration after the collapse of communism have tended to follow on from these and in many parts of the former communist world, migrants have been met with hostility.

Ultimately, this is a potent, profoundly illiberal and anti-democratic set of attitudes that communist regimes sought to inculcate in or were otherwise a consequence of the social structure that communist regimes reproduced. Socialization is not total, and of course, with changing circumstances and acculturation to a new political and social order can come changes of attitude.

However, from this existing literature emerge interesting questions about just how durable the communist socialization has been amongst former GDR citizens who have now lived under a democratic, liberal, capitalist order for over 30 years, and what lessons this may present for a future unified Korea. Further, in being able to examine North Koreans alongside both South Koreans and the peoples of the two Germanies, we can better understand whether and to what extent acculturating North Koreans to South Korea is possible.

6.2 Social Discrimination

Alongside such concerns, we also seek to utilize the theoretical insights and empirical findings of the voluminous literature on social discrimination. North Koreans often complain about having suffered discrimination in surveys conducted with the North Korean migrant community, and the limited qualitative literature on attitudes toward Easterners in unified Germany points to the potential existence of discriminatory attitudes among Westerners. The literature on discrimination points to three major sources: economic self-interest, sociotropic concerns and prejudice.

Economic self-interest can take a variety of forms. These include labor market competition, i.e., wishing to keep one's own segment of the labor market free of additional workers who could compete on price, quality, and so on. They also include issues like the potential fiscal costs associated with a particular group and the impact this might have on one's tax obligations — like through the costs of additional welfare spending. Further, it may include concerns about the limits of state capacity and the potential rivalry of welfare goods provision — for instance, a house given to a migrant cannot be given to a native.

Alongside such self-interested concerns are broader concerns about culture, the social fabric, and the economy. A group may have a cultural practice that is considered to violate the nation's norms and values — like arguments about halal meat in some parts of Europe. Some groups may be considered to not contribute to economic growth or else have a negative impact on economic life, even if it does not directly affect one's own standard of living, job prospects, tax bill, or access to welfare.

Finally, prejudice or hostility to an out-group without any particular self-interest, culture or social concern. The lines between sociotrophy and prejudice are often blurry to begin with, and prejudice is generally frowned upon in liberal, democratic societies. But it is nonetheless persistent and widespread. While it may or may not explain structural and institutionalized discrimination in some circumstances, aggregated individual prejudices are important nonetheless insofar as they shape the options and preferences of the political class in democratic societies.

Paradoxically, what we find is that origins-based discrimination documented in the South Korean case is also replicated by North Korean migrants. They hold views similar to South Koreans with regard to the relative importance of origins — i.e., they are more likely to select those born in South Korea as 'truly South Korean' relative to those who are not. For North Koreans, ethnicity is equally important to South Korean respondents, as is citizenship and knowledge of history and tradition.

6.3 Subjective Integration

The final dimension we seek to explore is the multi-faceted subjective integration. We seek to utilize the literature and our findings to shed light on the ongoing process of integrating North Korean migrants into South Korean society and assess the integration of former GDR citizens in unified Germany.

A sense of belonging is an essential psychological need for most humans. Feeling that one is a part of a broader community is a source of pride and comfort for many across the world. Indeed, the sense of being subjectively integrated into the nation one resides in is a crucial part of the broader integration puzzle for migrants and other groups in society. Germany, already a multicultural society with a substantial portion of its population born outside its borders, and South Korea, a country that has historically been monoethnic but is now becoming more multicultural. This growing multiculturalism complicates the unification question because North Koreans are often treated like and seemingly perceived as similar to migrants from other foreign countries even though they consider themselves and are legally considered to be part of the same nation.

In discussions about national identity, there are a range of ways to ask people about where they feel they belong and who they consider to be part of the same nation. In this study, we utilized a conjoint experiment, as with other parts of the study, to ascertain what potential characteristics of national identity are most salient to South Koreans relative to North Korean migrants, and Western Germans relative to Easterners.

Given the apparent emergence of South Korea-specific ethno-nationalistic sentiment and North Korean concern with being accepted as fellow Koreans, it is interesting and important to consider what kinds of identity appeals work with South Koreans. Further, asking North Koreans what is important in making someone truly South Korean helps us better understand whether their sense of national belonging in South Korea may come from or why it might be absent.

The existing literature points to the importance of objective markers of integration in the process of identity formation. These include citizenship in the nation that one purportedly belongs to, linguistic capabilities, economic and social capital, and human capital. The role played by each of these is debated, and there are sometimes some rather paradoxical consequences to some, with higher levels of human capital amongst some groups actually leading them to feel less a part of broader society, and dense social networks creating less need or interest in participating in broader national life and less identification with the nation.

The major areas of disagreement between South Koreans and North Koreans in South Korea is with respect to feeling South Korean and speaking Korean. Both these identity markers are more important for South Korean respondents. Conversely, North Koreans prize respect for South Korea's political system and laws. The latter is an important aspect of civic identity (i.e., respect for the national order). Accents and dialects are a source of discrimination for many North Koreans, and this might explain why North Koreans feel that language should be less stressed in the definition of 'true South Korean'. Nonetheless, in other important aspects of both civic and ethnic identity, there is a surprisingly high degree of convergence between the two.

The German case demonstrates that Easterners think that German ancestry, having citizenship, being born in and having lived in Germany are all more important for Easterners. But not in many regards for Post-GDR Citizens, who are actually more convergent with general Westerners. The major areas of difference appear to be the extent to which Post-GDR Citizens prize German ancestry, being born in Germany, and having German citizenship. Clearly, Post-GDR Citizens prize a major aspect of ethnic identity, i.e., ancestry and citizenship.

It is also a fruitful comparison, given that Easterners' identities as citizens of unified Germany would logically probably be less questioned and provisional than those of North Korean migrants. They are also subject to less discrimination by co-ethnic Westerners, making the stakes of such questions arguably less profound. But nonetheless, it is worth examining how important ethnic or civic appeals are to the contours and constitution of identity in the German case and how they compare with South Koreans and North Koreans in South Korea.

6.4 North Korean-South Korean Convergence in Attitudes and Broader Implications

Given the report's central focus on the potential unification of Korea, a critical examination of the similarities in political attitudes and subjective integration between South Koreans and North Korean migrants is essential. Findings not only illuminate the current state of integration but also provides vital clues about the prospects and challenges of a future unified Korea.

There are some differences in opinion, but overall, the fact that South Koreans and North Korean migrants do not differ significantly in political attitudes and subjective integration carries profound implications for both academic understanding and practical policy-making in the context of integration in divided societies. This finding from the research offers insights into several key areas:

1. Successful Acculturation of Democratic Values: The convergence in political attitudes between South Koreans and North Korean defectors suggests a successful integration of democratic values among the defector population. This is significant considering the stark differences in the political systems of North and South Korea. The assimilation of democratic principles by North Korean defectors indicates a flexibility and adaptability of political beliefs, even after long periods of socialization under a different regime. This flexibility is crucial for the stability and cohesion of a reunified or integrated society.
2. Role of the Receiving Society in Integration: The similarity in attitudes underscores the role of the receiving society (South Korea) in facilitating integration. This convergence suggests that the South Korean society, culture, and political environment play a pivotal role in shaping the attitudes of new arrivals. This finding can inform integration

strategies, highlighting the importance of the receiving society's openness, inclusiveness, and the provision of opportunities for political participation and civic engagement for new citizens.

3. Implications for National Identity and Social Cohesion: The similarity in subjective integration, including national identity and pride, is indicative of a successful blending of identities. This is particularly important in societies like South Korea, where national identity is often closely tied to ethnicity and cultural homogeneity. The findings suggest that shared values and beliefs, particularly democratic ones, can transcend ethnic and cultural differences, fostering a sense of common national identity.
4. Challenges and Opportunities for Policy-Making: These insights provide valuable information for policy-makers in South Korea and other divided or integrating countries. Policies aimed at promoting integration should consider not just the economic and social aspects but also the political and subjective dimensions. Programs that encourage political participation, civic education, and cultural exchanges could be particularly effective in reinforcing shared values and beliefs.
5. Broader Implications for Divided Societies: The research has broader implications for other divided societies contemplating reunification or dealing with significant migration flows from disparate regimes. It suggests that despite differences in political socialization, populations can find common ground in shared democratic values and national identity, provided there is a supportive environment for integration.

The observed minimal differences in political attitudes and subjective integration between South Koreans and North Korean migrants present a cautiously optimistic picture of the integration process, particularly in the context of a potential Korean unification. This phenomenon illustrates that populations, even those emerging from vastly divergent political systems, are capable of converging towards a cohesive set of democratic values and a shared national identity. Such convergence plays a pivotal role in enhancing social cohesion and stability within the receiving society, thereby embodying the resilience and adaptability of democratic values in fostering integration across diverse social landscapes.

This research, primarily centered on the impending scenario of Korean unification, provides key insights into the nuances of social integration within such a unique geopolitical context. The current landscape, characterized by varying perceptions of democracy and liberal values and the evident discrimination towards North Korean migrants, highlights critical areas requiring attention and strategic action. The German experience, while not directly analogous to the Korean situation, offers valuable lessons on how divided societies might gradually find common ground, potentially easing social discrimination over time.

Our empirical findings add depth to the existing literature on post-communist citizens' preferences, particularly in comparison to those socialized in capitalist democracies. The data suggests a more nuanced reality than previously assumed, with notable areas of convergence, indicating a degree of acculturation among former GDR citizens and North Koreans in South Korea. This convergence is significant, as it reveals the potential for shared understanding and societal integration in the face of historical and ideological divides.

In Germany, the research uncovers a level of out-group discrimination directed towards Easterners by Westerners, although this appears to be relatively subdued, especially in comparison to the more pronounced aversion observed among South Koreans towards North Koreans. This comparison not only highlights the varying degrees of social discrimination in divided societies but also underscores the need for targeted policies to address these disparities.

In terms of national identity and belonging, our study uncovers widespread areas of agreement between the populations of the two Germanies and the two Koreas. Interestingly,

North Koreans seem to inadvertently support a notion that contributes to their discrimination — the perception that true South Koreans are those born in South Korea. This paradoxical finding reveals the complex layers of identity and acceptance in divided societies.

In conclusion, our findings aim to contribute a set of valuable insights that can inform and guide the planning for future unification scenarios. By addressing the challenges and harnessing the opportunities for integrating North Koreans into a post-unification, democratic, capitalist order, this research seeks to pave the way for a more cohesive and inclusive future for divided nations. Through a comprehensive understanding of the intricacies of social integration, we hope to provide a framework that assists policymakers and stakeholders in navigating the complex journey towards unification.

Korean-language Text for Experiments

A

실험블록 1: 정치규율과사회질서

두명의신흥정치인이있습니다. 다음의정책입장및의견을고려하여두사람중어느쪽과가장동의하시는지선택해주세요.

이것은가상의입장및의견이므로완벽히동의하시지않을수도있습니다. 가장동의하시는쪽을선택해주세요.

속성	단계
민주주의에대한견해	- 민주주의는경제력을약화시킨다 - 민주주의는결정력이부족하며질서를유지하지못한다 - 민주주의는문제점이있지만, 다른어떤정부형태보다는나은방식이다
경제에대한견해	- 국가는사기업을확대해야한다 - 국가는국영기업을확대해야한다
복지에대한견해	- 당사자가각자의생계에책임을져야한다 - 정부가복지에더책임을져야한다
성별에대한견해	- 평등한채용결정을위해지원자들의능력이동일한경우에도여성이남성보다우선적으로심사되어야한다 - 일자리가귀할때에는여자보다남자에게일자리를우선부여해야한다 - 사회생활에서역할을분담할때성별이중요하지않다
다양성에대한견해	- 인종및문화의다양성은국가의결속력을약화시킨다 - 인종과문화의다양성은시민들의삶을향상시킨다 - 인종및문화의다양성은나라에경제적이득이되기때문에받아들여야한다
종속변수질문	
둘중어떤정치인과가장동의하시나요?	- 정치인 A - 정치인 B

실험블록 2: 국가정체성

한국가의진정한국민이라고정의하는데에는많은사항이고려됩니다. 그사항이누구에게는중요할수도, 중요하지않을수도있습니다. 밑은두명의가상인물과해당인물의특징입니다.

다음두명의프로필을주의깊게읽고두인물중누가더진정한한국인에가까운지평가해주십시오.

속성	단계
출생지	- 한국에서태어남 - 한국에서태어나지않음
거주지	- 인생대부분을한국에서보냄 - 인생대부분을한국에서보내지않음
민족성	- 한국계 - 비한국계
시민권여부	- 한국국민 - 외국인
역사및전통이해도	- 한국의역사와전통을이해함 - 한국의역사와전통에대해아는것이없음
정치제도및법태도	- 한국의정치제도와규범을존중함 - 한국의정치제도와규범을전혀존중하지않음
언어능력	- 한국어를함 - 한국어를할수없음
국민정서	- 한국인임을느낌 - 한국인임을느끼지않음
종속변수질문	
어느사람이더진정한한국인인지선택해주십시오	- 사람 A - 사람 B

실험블록 3: 취업지원서비스

연구들은국가가웰빙을이루고유지하기위해서는그국가의시민들이적절하고의미있는직업에종사해야함을보여줍니다. 한국정부가새로운직업훈련지원프로그램을도입한다고상상해보십시오. 지원을받게될분들은기술향상을위한금전적지원뿐만아니라특별고용상담사가배정될것입니다.

귀하는이프로그램의심사위원으로선정되었습니다. 아래두후보자를평가한후, 직업지원을우선적으로받아야할사람을선택해주십시오. 이시나리오는가상의것입니다.

속성	단계
나이	- 25 세 - 36 세 - 45 세 - 62 세
가족관계	- 미혼, 무자녀 - 기혼, 자녀 1 명 - 기혼, 자녀 2 명 - 미혼, 자녀 1 명
성별	- 남성 - 여성
현재/가장최근가진직업	- 마트시간제근무직원 - 백화점직원 - 경비원 - 가게매니저
전과기록	- 전과기록없음 - 소액절도 [15%] - 탈세 [15%]
출생지역	- 함경북도, 조선민주주의인민공화국 - 부산, 대한민국 - 경기, 대한민국 - 하노이, 베트남
종속변수질문	
어떤후보를우선으로선택하시겠습니까?	- 후보 A - 후보 B

B German-language Text for Experiments

Experiment Block 1: Politische Führung und soziale Ordnung

Betrachten Sie die folgenden politischen Positionen und Meinungsprofile von zwei aufstrebenden Politiker*innen. Wählen Sie dann aus, mit welcher der beiden Personen Sie am ehesten übereinstimmen.

Dies sind hypothetische Positionen und Meinungen. Sie müssen nicht vollständig mit einer der Politiker*innen übereinstimmen. Wählen Sie jedoch die Person aus, mit der Sie am meisten übereinstimmen.

Attributes	Levels
Ansichten zur Demokratie	- In einer Demokratie funktioniert das Wirtschaftssystem schlecht - Demokratische Systeme sind unentschlossen und schlecht darin, Ordnung aufrechtzuerhalten - Die Demokratie mag Probleme haben, aber sie ist besser als jede andere Regierungsform
Ansichten zur Wirtschaft	- Der Staat sollte Unternehmen mehr Freiheit geben - Der Staat sollte Unternehmen effektiver kontrollieren
Ansichten zur Sozialhilfe	- Die Menschen sollten mehr Verantwortung übernehmen, um für sich selbst zu sorgen - Die Regierung sollte mehr Verantwortung übernehmen, um sicherzustellen, dass für alle gesorgt ist
Ansichten zur den Geschlechtern	- Das Geschlecht sollte bei der Bestimmung sozialer Rollen nicht wichtig sein - Um Gleichheit zu fördern, sollten Frauen bei Entscheidung bezüglich der beruflichen Anstellung gegenüber Männern bevorzugt werden, wenn sie gleich qualifiziert sind - Wenn Arbeitsplätze knapp sind, sollten Männer mehr Anrecht auf einen Arbeitsplatz haben als Frauen
Ansichten zur Diversität	- Ethnische und kulturelle Vielfalt untergräbt die Einheit eines Landes - Ethnische und kulturelle Diversität ist von ökonomischem Nutzen und sollte daher akzeptiert werden - Ethnische und kulturelle Vielfalt bereichern das Leben der Menschen in unserem Land
Dependent Variable Questions	
Bitte wählen Sie aus, mit wem Sie am meisten übereinstimmen	- Politiker*in A - Politiker*in B

Experiment Block 2: Nationale Identität

Manche Leute meinen, dass die folgenden Dinge wichtig sind, um wirklich ein*e Deutsche*r zu sein. Andere halten sie für nicht wichtig. Unten sehen Sie die Profile von zwei hypothetischen Personen. Wählen Sie unter den beiden, wer Ihrer Meinung nach einer wirklich deutschen Person entspricht.

Diese Aufgabe ist rein hypothetisch. Wählen Sie bitte auch ein Profil aus, wenn Sie sich unsicher sind.

Attributes	Levels
Herkunft	- In Deutschland geboren - Nicht in Deutschland geboren
Aufenthalt	- Hat den Großteil des Lebens in Deutschland verbracht - Hat den Großteil des Lebens außerhalb Deutschlands verbracht
Familienhintergrund	- Hat deutsche Vorfahren - Hat keine deutschen Vorfahren
Staatsbürgerschaft	- Besitzt die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft - Besitzt eine andere als die deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft
Verständnis von Tradition und Geschichte	- Ist mit deutscher Geschichte und Tradition vertraut - Ist kaum mit deutscher Geschichte und Tradition vertraut
Einstellung zum politischen System und Gesetzen	- Hat Respekt vor den politischen Institutionen und Gesetzen Deutschlands - Zeigt wenig Beachtung für oder Kenntnis der politischen Institutionen und Gesetze Deutschlands
Sprachvermögen	- Spricht Deutsch - Spricht kein deutsch
Nationales Empfinden	- Empfindet sich als deutsche Person - Empfindet sich nicht als deutsche Person
Dependent Variable Questions	
Bitte wählen Sie die Person, die sie am ehesten als deutsch empfinden	- Person A - Person B

Experiment Block 3: Unterstützung zur beruflichen Weiterbildung

Studien zeigen, dass das nationale Wohlbefinden in einem Land am besten dadurch erreicht und aufrechterhalten wird, wenn Menschen in guter, geeigneter und sinnvoller Arbeit beschäftigt sind. Stellen Sie sich vor, die deutsche Regierung würde ein neues Programm zur Unterstützung der beruflichen Weiterbildung einführen. Die ausgewählten Empfänger erhalten finanzielle Unterstützung zum Erwerb von Kompetenzen sowie spezielle berufsbegleitende Beratung.

Sie wurden für die Entscheidungsfindung in diesem Programm ausgewählt.

Bewerten Sie die beiden untenstehenden Kandidaten und wählen Sie aus, wer für die berufliche Unterstützung priorisiert werden sollte.

Attributes	Levels
Alter	- 25 - 36 - 45 - 62
Familienstand	- Ledig, keine Kinder - Verheiratet, 1 Kind - Verheiratet, 2 Kinder - Ledig, 1 Kind
Geschlecht	- Männlich - Weiblich
Aktuelle oder letzte Beschäftigung	- Teilzeitanstellung in einem Supermarkt - Anstellung in einem Kaufhaus - Sicherheitsdienst - Filialleiter*in
Vorstrafen	- Keine [70% of all profiles] - Diebstahl [15%] - Steuerhinterziehung [15%]
Herkunft	- Sachsen, DE - Hamburg, DE - Bayern, DE - Bukarest, RO
Dependent Variable Questions	
Wen würden Sie bevorzugen?	- Kandidat*in A - Kandidat*in B

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